“The use of force in the 21st century has illustrated a heavy push towards a focus on counterinsurgency training. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 tell us that it has been ineffective and has exacerbated the conflict rather than eased it. ”
By Nicki Ghazarian
With regard to the usefulness of military force in the 21st century, the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the powerful desire of the United States to shift the basis of its military force strategies from conventional to counterinsurgency tactics and training (COIN) that proved to be excessive and unproductive. Neither war has shown overwhelming success from the use of military force, with the exception of the entrance into Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
Operation Enduring Freedom had great military success at the beginning of the war with air strikes and special operations methods. The latter portion of the war in Afghanistan illustrated an excessive push towards the use of counterinsurgency force that first proved to be somewhat ineffective, as newer Taliban insurgent forces fought on, and second, could render the United States unprepared for an extended conventional war in the future. The use of force in Iraq, particularly the continuous employment of brigades that have trained only in counterinsurgency strategies, was impulsive and “unwise” as there were many uncertainties going into the war and many alternatives to direct use of force.
Specifically analyzing Operation Enduring Freedom in the early part of the war, I will argue that an effective limited amount of military force was used to pursue American national interests of defeating terrorists. The initial goals behind the Bush administration’s decision to go to war with Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers were to use military force to destroy terrorist activity, disrupt any furtherance of terrorist activity, and signal to other nations considering pursuing terrorist actions against the United States that they will not succeed. The operation was a terrific military success, though not without effort. If the United States had used the wrong amount of military force it could have furthered the humanitarian crisis with respect to the Afghani people, or could have angered new Afghan forces and/or outside terrorist forces to unite.
Though I will argue that because this war was distinct in the fact that the US was fighting an unusually weak opponent, the threat of the use of force may have been enough to end and prevent terrorist activity. In the end, I agree with Bush’s decision to go to war because our country had just been violently attacked and the United States had to overcome its vulnerability and prove its position as a world leader. Fighting a preventive war with limited military force, air strikes and special operations on the ground, was an effective and strategic decision to try to eliminate any future terrorist threats and reassure the American public of their national security and safety.
As we progressed further into the 21st century and into the second portion of the war during the Obama administration, it had largely become more complex and I will argue that there was unnecessary emphasis placed on using counterinsurgent forces and improving American abilities in this sector of the armed services. More recently, the use of force in Afghanistan took a dramatic and more complicated turn as the Taliban regained power and developed insurgent forces. There is a now a complex debate surrounding the use of counterinsurgent forces to fight the Taliban and the addition of counterinsurgent training for our military.
I agree with Gentile’s argument in that focusing entirely on counterinsurgent training is unreasonable because it will not always be the most effective solution in a conflict. Gentile argues that the use of force in the latter portion of the war in Afghanistan illustrated significant emphasis on counterinsurgent training and strategy. By focusing primarily on improving our counterinsurgency tactics, our military forces face the risk of losing capabilities in the use of major conventional military operations. Overuse of counterinsurgent force and strategy has led to a stronger focus on nation-building tactics, which Gentile feels are now the only guide for US military training and “potentially neglects key aspects of US national security.” Gentile comments that “our organizing principles are inverted”, and unless the structuring of our military force training changes to incorporate more than just counterinsurgency and nation-building tactics, we will face long-term dangerous consequences such as being unprepared in an extended conventional war.
Our attempts at regime change and nation building have proven to further complicate the conflict as well as result in major casualties and major loss of public support home and abroad. The government’s goals and interests in pursuing the use of counterinsurgent forces were to protect the population, to create a more legitimate Afghan government, and to cooperate with the political and military approaches the Afghan president demanded. Though, Eikenberry argues that “COIN failed in Afghanistan” in the long term, he acknowledges the failed attempts at fulfilling each of these three goals because they are too vague, unclear, and open-ended.
Though they direct how the US should initially use its military forces in Afghanistan, it is difficult to construct a long-term plan that will maintain any achievements gained through use of force, illustrating the structural problems in Afghanistan. Though Nagl argues that the United States should not make the same mistake it did coming out of the Vietnam War by not learning from its mistakes and training to decrease vulnerability in these areas (Lecture), I argue that in this situation the overuse of force in one specific strategic way proved inefficient and ineffective and led to further tension.
As for the United States’ entrance into the war with Iraq, it was an “unwise war of choice.” The government was too eager to switch to and then use excessive counterinsurgent force when there were too many uncertainties and the overall situation looked unnecessary and infeasible.
The Bush administration’s goals in deciding to use military force in Iraq were to eliminate the presence of weapons of mass destruction and the risk for development or obtainment of nuclear weapons, get rid of the current regime and its leader, and prevent any further threat towards US security. We were unprepared with regard to the adequacy of our intelligence forces upon entering the war, as the end result showed Iraq never had weapons of mass destruction or nuclear forces.
Additionally, deterrence would have been a viable option because historical situations and conflicts had proven that Hussein has acted to ensure his country survives, not necessarily out of spite towards the US as many thought during the Kuwait crisis. Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq owed a large debt to Kuwait that was never forgiven, causing tensions between the two countries.
Many argue that Iraq invaded Kuwait to gain control over its oil reserves and thereby gain hegemonic superiority in the Middle East. If Hussein really did want Iraq to be considered a hegemonic power in the Middle East region, he would have subsided at the threat of the use of force by the United States because a single attack on our part would have humiliated him and his country’s status in the region. Lastly, it is unlikely he would have given his weapons to terrorist groups outside Iraq for reasons I will explain below.
Thomas Schelling, a renowned scholar of security studies, nuclear strategy, and American foreign policy, supports the idea that it is difficult for developing countries to even obtain nuclear weapons because their parts are expensive, a solid and educated group of nuclear scientists is not easily accessed, using the weapons with enough precision to cause irreparable damage is improbable and would most likely be inconsistent, and throughout this process there are dangerous and untrustworthy parties with a large amount of money involved, which is always cause for conflict.
The use of force in the 21st century has illustrated a heavy push towards a focus on counterinsurgency training. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 tell us that it has been ineffective and has exacerbated the conflict rather than eased it. Operation Enduring Freedom in the initial stages of the war in Afghanistan did prove effective in using limited military force to eliminate terrorist activity or the threat of future anti-American terrorist activity. But, the further use of counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan only proved to lose public support on all fronts and take away from effective training for major conventional military operations.
Our use of force in Iraq was eager, impulsive, and risky. There were a number of uncertain factors (the actual presence of WMDs, the possibility of Hussein obtaining quality nuclear weapons, and the accurateness of our intelligence forces) that should have been further analyzed before deciding to deploy soldiers. We lacked not only United Nations’ approval to engage in nation building or regime change actions but also the assurance that Iraq had dangerous weapons it would absolutely use to attack the US. Though our motives for entering the war were aimed to protect our national security, immediately deciding to overcompensate by changing our military tactics to the use of counterinsurgency force was ineffective.
Nicki Ghazarian is an assistant online editor for the SIR Journal for International Relations. She is currently a senior at the University of Pennsylvania, majoring in International Relations.
