by Kathryn Dura
It is no secret that the tools of warfare are increasingly automated. Perhaps the most well-known example is the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drone. These devices perform many functions, such as carrying out armed attacks, flying reconnaissance missions, and distributing humanitarian aid, without the risk of loss of personnel. A period of uncertainty regarding protocol accompanies the introduction of any new military technology – especially when the device possesses strike capability. Recently, the United States, along with 52 other countries, issued the “Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).” While this declaration is a necessary first step for standardizing armed UAV export practices, the signatures of many states are conspicuously absent, namely China.
By signing the Joint Declaration, the abiding states recognize the UAV’s potential to create and agree to measures of transparency aimed at ensuring “the responsible export and subsequent use of these systems.” The five agreed-upon principles are as follows: international law applies to armed UAVs, existing international arms control and disarmament norms apply to armed UAVs, exporters will examine potential recipients’ records of adhering to international commitments, exporters will provide voluntary transparency measures pertaining to the exports, and the signatories will continue discussions on responsible transfer and deployment of armed UAVs. Since this is the first major, international document explicitly addressing strike-capable drones, these principles lay the necessary groundwork for future agreements. However, this agreement is flawed; China, one of the world’s largest drone exporters, is not party to the accords and nor are most of its armed drone-seeking clients including Myanmar, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Somalia, and Nigeria. China also failed to sign on to a previous agreement pertaining to UAV export, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
China’s armed drone program offers what the United States cannot: lower barriers to acquisition. First, between China and the United States, there is a sizable discrepancy in UAV price. While the exact price of the technologies is closely guarded, the Chinese versions are believed to be about four times cheaper. For example, a U.S. Predator drone costs $4 million while the Wing Loong – the Chinese equivalent – is $1 million. This price allows smaller and poorer countries to purchase the innovative technology more easily.
Second, China offers the technology with fewer conditions. In contrast, the United States sells arms under strict stipulations, requiring that “sales be made through government programs and that recipient nations must agree to certain ‘end-use assurances.’” Many domestic American drone developers have urged Washington to loosen these conditions because they force buyers to seek the technology elsewhere, buying from Israel or China. This is even the case with U.S. allies. For example, Jordan, a key U.S. partner in the fight against the Islamic State, requested unarmed MQ-1 Predators from the United States. However, delays in the United States’ considerations and process opened the door for China, and, in May 2015, Beijing offered to sell Amman missile-firing drones. Jordan is not a unique case; of U.S. allies, only the United Kingdom and Italy (and the latter only as of late last year) have received U.S. armed-drone technology. If even a close U.S. ally seeking an unarmed drone cannot purchase one, what is to say that non-allies will not seek the cheaper and more quickly obtained armed UAVs?
Granted, U.S. drones are largely considered superior to the Chinese versions. For example, Chinese weapons in the Caihong armed UAV family lack the capabilities, reliability, and range that U.S. equivalents possess. However, for most countries, including the seekers named above, Chinese drones are “good enough.”
Thus, while the Joint Declaration is significant in that it lays the foundation for future armed UAV export regulations, China’s refusal to sign on undermines the document.
