Chemical Weapons: A Resurgent Threat

By Kathryn Dura, Blogger for Defense Affairs

In 1997, much of the world breathed a collective sigh of relieve when the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force.[1] Those states party to the agreement pledged to destroy their chemical weapons and their production facilities. With 192 states signing on to the agreement, it is widely viewed as an arms control success. However, following the assassination of Kim Jong-nam and President Bashar al-Assad’s CWC violations during the Syrian civil war, the use of chemical weapons seems to be on the rise. This article will examine how these recent events may influence the future of U.S. defense strategy.

Various sources report that Kim Jong-nam, the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, was assassinated in a North Korean plot.[2] Notably, Mr. Kim was killed by a chemical weapon that two women applied at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The weapon was the “highly toxic nerve agent VX”[3] from North Korea’s extensive weapons of mass destruction stockpile. On the heels of North Korea’s February ballistic missile test, this public execution once again succeeded in drawing international attention to the country’s military capabilities.[4] What does this mean for the United States?

First, the care with which this attack was carried out is key; the target was a prominent critic of the country, and no other individual at the airport suffered from the nerve agent. Therefore, the incident seems to be an attempt to project power due to the “new level of sophistication in its handling and use of chemical weapons.”[5]

Second, rather than causing indiscriminate chaos, the attack solely warns North Korea’s enemies. However, this creates uncertainty for the United States as the two countries are anything but friendly. In addition to historical animosity, the United States’ long-standing alliance with South Korea – the country most threatened by Pyongyang’s projection of power – puts Washington on the North’s blacklist .[6] While it is unlikely that the regime’s growing military would directly target the United States, Washington is liable to be dragged into a North versus South conflict.

Third, Seoul has previously been the target of chemical weapon assassinations.[7] However, this month’s instance is more significant because it is allegedly the first assassination via chemical weapons performed by North Korea since Kim Jong-un came to power. This attack is made all the more disconcerting by its too-close-for-comfort timing to the country’s successful ballistic missile test. Therefore, Pyongyang’s rising aggression should merit an American response.

Fourth, this calls the effectiveness of the CWC, and arms control regimes into question. North Korea is not party to the CWC and is therefore able to produce and maintain a chemical weapons stockpile while fomenting international distress. Therefore, the United States is forced to look beyond compliance measures in the CWC. Prior to Mr. Kim’s assassination, Washington and Pyongyang were scheduled to meet in March to provide a channel for dialogue.[8] However, the meeting was canceled when, as a result of the assassination, the U.S. annulled the visa necessary for North Korea’s envoy. With dialogue at least temporarily suspended, more aggressive responses, such as increased sanctions on the North and weapon assistance to the South, appear more likely. Failing to respond would not only anger Seoul, but also undermine American legitimacy, similar to the criticism leveled at former-President Obama over the infamous “red line” remark.

 In 2013, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime conducted a chemical weapon attack that killed 1,500 civilians, crossing Obama’s “red line,” which was supposed U.S. military action. The incident also violated Syria’s agreement to the CWC.[9] Instead of enforcing his “red line,” the Obama administration concocted a deal whereby Assad would turn over his chemical weapons to United Nations’ inspectors. However, the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons along with various Western and regional intelligence agencies have recently found that a “series of [Assad-led] chlorine bomb attacks [took place] in 2014-2015,” after the President supposedly relinquished the weapons.[10] In response, Washington and its European allies are aiming to pass a resolution in the United Nations to “impose an asset freeze and travel ban on 21 Syrian entities and military and intelligence chiefs linked to the government’s use of chlorine.”[11] However, Russia plans to continue to prop up the Assad regime by vetoing such a resolution.

This situation puts the Trump administration in a tricky situation; Washington could go forward with the resolution, which would fail, impeding Trump’s stated goal of improving U.S.-Russian relations, or abandon resolution, tarnishing the U.S.’s reputation on upholding Western values. However, some observers view the resolution as an attempt to “force Russia to pressure its Syrian proxy to accept a negotiated end to the civil war.”[12] Critics argue that yet another veto by Russia on action to punish Syria could hurt Moscow’s international image. However, the country has already exercised such a veto six times, making unlikely that Russia’s international image would markedly decline should they choose to continue this policy.

In both cases, the United States does not face immediate and direct threats to its national security. However, the U.S. is likely to respond to both incidents due to the more indirect threats that failing to act might preempt. Regarding North Korea, the United States is likely to choose a relatively aggressive response given the rise in Pyongyang’s aggression and the threat that the situation creates for South Korea. In the case of Syria and Russia, Washington will likely choose to follow through with the resolution in a weak attempt to create some good out of the otherwise doomed vote. Overall U.S. response to future chemical weapons attacks will follow a case-by-case evaluation to determine the optimal strategy given the context of the situation.

Kathryn Dura is a junior studying International Relations and Math at the University of Pennsylvania.