By Cornell Overfield, Blogger for African Affairs
Articles about South Sudan invariably describe it as the world's youngest country; yet what is more important to remember is that civil wars have plagued the nation since before most countries in Africa enjoyed independence.
In late 1955, only a few months before Sudan emerged from British colonial rule, colonial-era forces from Southern Sudan defected from the military and began a war for Southern independence. Northern Sudan was characterized as Arab-Islamic, while the south was viewed as African and Christian, though as Francis Deng notes, just as in places such as Rwanda, these ethnic/racial divisions were largely based on perceptions of identity, rather than appearance. [1]
A tenuous peace between the Sudanese government and Southern rebels lasted from 1972 until 1983, but, in 1983, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) launched a new southern insurgency, calling for a New Sudan, not a South Sudan. Responding to the government in Khartoum which privileged Muslims and “Arabs,” John Garang, leader of the SPLM/A, articulated a vision of Sudan which would be secular as well as racially and ethnically blind,. This cause was naturally popular in the South, but also found support in non-Arab regions of the North. [1]
In 2005, the warring parties and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (a regional bloc) finalized a peace process, but Garang also died and was replaced by Salva Kiir, a career soldier in the SPLA. Although the 2005 deal strove to realize Garang's vision of an inclusive Sudan, Kiir opted to instead make use of a clause which provided for the possibility of Southern independence by referendum, which occurred in 2011.
In 2011, luminaries such as UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon hoped that the oil wealth of South Sudan would allow the country to finally begin constructing state institutions and providing social services. Instead, in December 2013, President Kiir announced that a coup attempt on the part of his vice president, Riek Machar, had been thwarted. Machar denied any such attempt, but fled Juba, the capital, and raised an army in opposition.
In December 2013, reports of violence in Juba against Nuer (Machar's tribe) provoked retaliatory violence against Dinka (Kiir's tribe) in Nuer areas, and today, ethnically-shaded violence has escalated to the point where the United Nations warns of potential genocide. [2] However, this is only part of the story. Kiir’s apparent marginalization of the party and neglect of Garang’s vision fueled the emergence of a multi-ethnic opposition in the SPLM. The 1990s had seen a number of anti-SPLA militias splinter off of the SPLA in the South, including one led by Machar. These were never fully integrated back into the South Sudanese army. After 2013, these militias, not a united tribal Nuer front, comprised the bulk of Machar's military strength. [3]
The first attempt to resolve the latest war to wrack South Sudan came in August 2015, when Kiir and Machar agreed to share power. However, the deal quickly broke down. Kate Knopf points out that not only was it ridiculous to believe that these two would be able to peacefully share power given their historic antagonisms (both in the 1990s and in 2013-2015), but also that institutions have disintegrated to the point that there is little state power to share. [4]
The scale of human suffering on display in South Sudan demands a solution. Over 3 million people have been displaced, while around 7.5 million are in need of humanitarian assistance due to impending drought and an obliterated economy. [2]
In a Council on Foreign Relations publication, Kate Knopf, director of the National Defense University's Africa Center for Strategic Studies, recently offered a bold vision for peace in South Sudan. Kiir and Machar are too steeped in violence and dysfunction to be part of a peace process, while the deteriorated state of government institutions would set up any other Sudanese leader for failure. She instead proposes an international transitional authority, under the auspices of the UN and AU, which would run the country for 10-15 years and help build up viable institutions and political cultures. She argues that this is the only way for South Sudan to escape civil war, while Richard Haass describes the proposal as “an exercise in realism.” [4]
While this is an ideal solution to South Sudan's problems, which Knopf accurately identifies, the proposal seems to ignore the broader international problems that this vision for conflict resolution would need to overcome to see the light of day. An international administration in and of itself is not an outlandish proposal. In 1999, the United States set them up in both East Timor and Kosovo, and they successfully operated in places like Danzig after the First World War. However, at the risk of stating the obvious, 2017 is not 1999. In the White House, Trump would rather throw American money and soldiers into the campaign against ISIS than do the unglamorous work of solving a stubborn conflict in Africa which draws little attention in the United States. While South Sudan does have oil, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson seems to be a marginalized member of the Trump administration and his State Department remains seriously understaffed.
In the time before populism stood politics on its head, we might hope that Europe would take the lead in implementing Knopf's plan. However, Europe's twin crises of migration and populism will certainly keep European leaders occupied trying to prevent European project from imploding. Finally, even if the United States or Europe were willing and able to take charge, this plan would likely founder in the United Nations. Russia seems leery of endorsing Western-led action after NATO abused a Security Council resolution to topple the Libyan regime. China has been investing in African resources, and so may want to reopen South Sudan's oil pipelines, but may also be turned off by Western leadership on this issue. I judge that, given the current political landscape, even if this proposal enjoyed support in the United States, it would have little chance of winning the requisite Security Council endorsement. The Gambian crisis demonstrates that Africa's regional blocs are growing more assertive, but a brief incursion to topple a defiant dictator is wholly different from occupying and managing a country for over a decade.
As the above summary of South Sudan's past outlines, a generation of the country's leadership is too used to employing violence to achieve their goals for there to be hope that Kiir or Machar will, in good faith, seek a negotiated settlement. However, in this international climate, the imposition of an international administration is simply not feasible. What can be done is depressingly inadequate. While South Sudan recently raised the cost of permits for aid workers, the United States and European states can ensure that refugee camps in surrounding countries, particularly Uganda, are amply funded. Furthermore, America's diplomats should learn from our experience with the Syrian Civil War and begin the process of promoting a viable opposition in exile. We should promote education programs in refugee camps, seek to develop programs to bring promising scholars and leaders to the United States for education, and connect with the South Sudanese diaspora already in the United States.
The conflict unfolding in South Sudan is deeply entrenched and has a long, complex history that would be challenging to wade into. Lacking both the will to deploy a humanitarian force and the international political landscape necessary to implement a Knopf-esque plan, there is little that the United States can do in the near term to resolve the crisis. Providing sufficient aid to South Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries is a good start, but while we wait for either the collapse of Kiir and Machar or a substantive change in American politics or the international situation, America's diplomats should not stand idle. When the time comes for action, having a cohesive and prepared South Sudanese government will hopefully propel it towards Garang's vision of an inclusive government for all the people of South Sudan.
Cornell Overfield is a junior at the University of Pennsylvania, where he studies International Relations and History.
Sources
[1] – Francis Deng, “A Nation in Turbulent Search of Itself”, ANNALS, Issue 603, January 2006.
[2] – http://africacenter.org/spotlight/un-commission-calls-investigation-south-sudan-violations/?utm_source=March+2017+Month+in+Review&utm_campaign=Mar+2017+Newsletter&utm_medium=email
[3] – Douglas Johnson, “Briefing: The Crisis in South Sudan”, African Affairs, Issue 113, Volume 451, April 2014
[4] – Kate Almquist Knopf, “Ending South Sudan's Civil War”, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 77, November 2016.
[5] – http://www.fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan
