By Andy B. Anderson
Introduction
Validation of terrorism seems an impossible task since it represents a “complex phenomenon open to subjective interpretation.” [1] Walzer characterizes terrorism similar to “rape and murder… an attack upon the innocent.” [2] By contrast, Fullinwider forewarns that “we cannot define terrorism into a moral corner where we do not have to worry anymore about justification” (1988, p. 257). This position paper, on behalf of an international terrorist organization Al Qaeda, justifies its struggle against the United States through the discourse of the Western just war tradition by employing the jus ad bellum’s principles, namely right authority, just cause, last resort, as well as the reasonable hope of success. The just war tradition, the preeminent perspective on the war ethics, comprises of three components: the jus ad bellum (justice of war), the jus in bello (justice in war), as well as jus post bellum (justice after war). Jus ad bellum consists of seven clauses, namely just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, reasonable hope of success, restoration of peace, and proportionality of means and ends. [3]
Due to the lack of a universally adopted definition of terrorism, before I begin my argument to justify Al Qaeda’s struggle, I have to clarify what constitutes terrorism in this position report. Terrorism, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, is “the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear: intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, religious, or ideological.” [4] In other words, this definition not only separates terrorism from criminal behavior but also identifies this phenomenon as a means of religious, political or ideological struggle. The state violence against its citizens, particularly during the French Revolution (1789-1799), used to describe terrorism in the past. However, the term is recently interpreted as the “use of violence by small groups aiming to achieve political change.” [5] Cronin (2002/3) outlines various types of the current terrorist groups into the following categories: right-wing, left-wing, ethno-nationalist/separatist, and “sacred”/religious terrorists. Currently, “sacred terrorism,” represented through such terrorist groups as Al Qaeda, has become more significant around the world. [6]
The militant Sunni Islamist organization Al Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam and several Arab supporters during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [7] It is an international terrorist group with whom the United States has been engaged in ongoing hostilities. International terrorism represents a non-traditional threat to international security since “the combination of ideology, mobility, access to information, and lethality gives modern terrorist capabilities close to those of states without the latter’s restraint.” [8] In other words, international terrorism represents an effective strategy for weak states or non-state actors who can use acts of violence to influence powerful actors in the international system. Traditional and non-traditional threats to international security significantly affect the Post-Cold War’s international system. International terrorism is a non-traditional threat, which is a threat that can be directed towards both states and non-state actors. [9] International terrorist activities are distinguished by the following characteristics: operations in a foreign country, domestic attacks against victims with international significance, and clearly defined international implications. Nowadays, international terrorism predominantly demonstrates most or all the features of the new terrorism, which is terrorism “that seeks the total defeat of its opponents.” [10] These features are the following: asymmetrical warfare with mass casualties, cell-based networks with weak lines of control, political, religious, and vague missions, exploitation of the Internet and the media, acquisition, and possession of high-intensity weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, not only the psychological but also the political effects of terrorist acts spread well beyond any domestic agendas. [11]
According to Cronin, Al Qaeda’s “fluid organization, methods of recruitment, funding, and means of communication distinguish it as an advancement in the twenty-first-century terrorist groups.” [12] Such an international terrorist organization, which strongly emphasizes local initiative and individual cells, should not be treated just as an “irrationalist cult of slaughter.” [13] By contrast, in this position report, I will argue that is possible to justify Al Qaeda’s struggle against the United States by employing several jus ad bellum criteria. First, I assess Al Qaeda’s right authority to resort to war with the preeminent Western superpower.
Right Authority
As I’ll describe in this section, Al Qaeda possesses the right authority to engage in warfare with the United States. According to the just war tradition, only state actors may wage legitimate war. [14] Since terrorism represents a social fact, the “constructivist approach brings us closer to the heart of terrorism than conventional ones.” [15] Social constructivists believe that social forces, such as ideas, norms, knowledge, and rules shape not only the identities and behavior of state and non-state actors but also the composition of global politics. [16] From a constructivist point of view, by forcing a state’s action Al Qaeda “achieves state-power without any of the traditional physical or institutional assets of statehood.” [17] In other words, Al Qaeda’s ideationally-motivated actions can significantly affect the state response in the international system.
As a non-state actor, Al Qaeda also effectively represents the interests of its followers by “constructing a collective identity rather than simply reflecting it”. [18] By contrast, some states don’t protect or represent the best interests of their citizens. For example, the resistance from the majority of the population in Burma shows that people do not recognize its sovereign government as a legitimate entity. [19] Valls (2000) asserts that in cases when states are considered as illegitimate, then it is possible that some non-state actors may claim right authority even without elections (i.e. popular support). [20] Wilkins (1992) further claims that “it might … be enough for a terrorist movement simply to claim to represent the aspirations or the moral rights of a people.” [21] In other words, terrorist organizations may enjoy the status of the right authority even in the absence of popular support. Thus, as a non-state actor, Al-Qaeda has the right authority to use force on behalf of its community whose interests it claims to represent. In the next section, I describe why this terrorist organization’s struggle against the United States adheres to the principle of a just cause.
Just Cause
As demonstrated below, Al Qaeda has a just cause in its war against the United States. Kiras (2017) defines a just cause as self-defense or defense of a third party. [22] Brown (2015) agrees that in the just war tradition war is “impermissible unless its purpose is to resist or reverse a terrible wrong.” [23] Some scholars argue that even if terrorist groups can have the right authority, they cannot have a just cause. Walzer (2005) claims that terrorism has no “moral justification.” [24] In other words, when non-state agents use violence their cause is dismissed as unjust. However, since “the UN definition of ‘just cause’ recognizes the rights of peoples as well as states,” in principle, there are situations when terrorists can have a just cause, namely the defense of a community that is being threatened/attacked or the defense of the right to self-determination. [25]
Al Qaeda has a just cause to wage war against the United States to defend its community. Kapitan (2011) argues that either a state or a non-state community can exercise the right to collective self-defense when it is under threats or attacks from foreign occupations and invasions, government repressions, or civil disorder. [26] Both the Koran and Muhammad’s teachings (hadith) indicate that sometimes it is imperative for all Muslims to wage war for defensive reasons. [27] Al Qaeda advocates “fighting a global war, defending pure Islam against all forces of decadent Western civilization and its puppets in the Islamic world.” [28] In so doing, it calls for the global jihad, which is defined as a Muslim’s religious duty to spread Islam by engaging in war. [29] Al Qaeda’s current leader Ayman al Zawahiri still describes the United States as the main enemy of all Muslims. Therefore, Al Qaeda insists that Muslims must engage in global conflicts against “the system of the major international criminals - America being the foremost.” [30] In the section that follows, I explain why Al Qaeda’s use of force satisfies the principle of the last resort.
Last Resort
As presented below, Al Qaeda’s use of violence in its struggle against the United States represents a last resort. Brown (2015) defines a last resort as the legitimate permission to use force “unless all peaceful alternatives have been analyzed and found to be less effective and more costly in securing the interests and values at stake.” [31] Since Walzer (2005) compares terrorism to “an attack upon the innocent”, he doubts that it adheres to the criterion of a last resort since the “resort to terror is ideologically last.” [32] To put it otherwise, the scholar believes that terrorist’s recourse to violence as a last resort is always illegitimate. However, Valls (2000) exposes Waltzer’s double standard towards state and non-state actors by seeing no reason why non-state actors cannot arrive at a last resort while states can. [33]
As a non-state actor with less influence and resources than the United States in the international system, Al Qaeda cannot fully explore various alternatives to violence. Walzer (2005) claims that to adhere to the principle of the last resort, “one must try indeed everything (which is a lot of things).” [34] However, Kapitan (2011) explains that due to the “gross disparities in economic and military resources between oppressor and oppressed… terrorism might be the only means of resistance available.” [35] Pape (2005) agrees that in zero-sum conflicts suicide terrorism is perceived by its agents as the only viable strategy of a last resort. [36] Since Al Qaeda believes that its community faces a radical threat to its existence from the United States, Burke explains that “in self-defense [it] can justify using tactics that might be frowned on in other circumstances.” [37] Lastly, I will argue how Al Qaeda complies with the principle of reasonable hope for success.
Reasonable Hope of Success
As described in this section, Al Qaeda’s struggle against the United States has a reasonable hope for success. According to such a principle, “states should not begin wars they cannot reasonably expect to win.” [38] Walzer (2005), with his loaded idea of terrorism, “doubt[s] that terrorism has ever achieved national liberation.” [39] Laqueur asserts that, in general, terrorism is “politically ineffective.” [40] In other words, these scholars believe that terrorism has no probability of success. However, Crenshaw (1983) warns that it is hard to define or measure the notion of “success.” [41] Valls (2000) warns that the probability of success of a terrorist campaign “depends on a number of factors, including the time horizon one has in mind.” [42] Teichman also assesses the historical evidence about the efficiency of terrorism as “both ambiguous and incomplete.” [43] Merari (1993) illustrates that even if terrorists do not accomplish all of their goals, they can still achieve their partial objectives, namely attraction of global attention, political concessions from their adversaries, or achievement of international legitimacy. [44] Thus, it is unreasonable to conclude that terrorism cannot possess some likelihood of success.
Al-Qaeda can demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability of success in its efforts to empower the community to achieve objectives associated with the just cause. For example, the current Al Qaeda’s leader alludes to the success of its first terrorist attacks on the U.S. targets in Aden and Somalia in the 1990s. [45] To put it otherwise, he explains how its threatened community’s recourse to violence against a powerful adversary, as a last resort, can be successful in defending its just cause.
Conclusion
This thought-provoking research study, on behalf of Al Qaeda, justifies its struggle against the United States through the discourse of the just war tradition by employing the jus ad bellum’s principles, namely right authority, just cause, last resort, as well as reasonable hope of success. Briefly, Al Qaeda logically complies with the principle of right intention as a consequence of satisfying criteria of legitimate authority and a just cause. This international terrorist group can also claim that it attempts to restore peace through its struggle to defend pure Islam whose “ultimate purpose [is] to bring peace through universal submission to Allah.” [46] Lastly, Al Qaeda also satisfies the criterion of proportionality of means and ends since even its most deadly act of terrorism, performed on September 11, 2001, is on the much smaller scale than the recent wars with the participation of the United States. Generally, the attempt to validate terrorism is a difficult task due to the negative dominant view about the subject at both popular and scholarly levels. This study aspires to prove that if warfare by state actors can be justified, then terrorism by non-state actors can be condoned as well.
Andy B. Anderson is a recent graduate of Norwich University where he obtained a Masters of Art in International Relations and a concentration in International Security.
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Image Source: https://www.vox.com/2015/6/8/8745757/jihadism
