By Serena Rachel Ninomiya
The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Relationship
Despite the sudden resignation of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, the appointment of Yoshihide Suga as the new prime minister restored the confidence of Japanese citizens in their government. However, there remains some concerns about Japan’s foreign policy directives.
Mr. Abe took unparalleled initiative in constructing relationships with foreign nations. During his almost-eight-year term, Mr. Abe visited 81 countries in total. These visits produced important cornerstones for Japan’s foreign policy such as the Japan-China Joint Press Statement. He also achieved notable accomplishments in Japanese foreign relations history. For example, he successfully invited Obama to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in 2016 to pay respects to the victims' call for a "world without nuclear weapons" and confirm the U.S.-Japan alliance.
But how about Mr. Suga? Clearly, the U.S.-Japan alliance will be crucial, but what can we expect in the near future of the U.S.-Japan relations?
Understanding the stance of Mr. Suga’s government on the main challenges of the U.S.-Japan relations is vital to answering these questions. More specifically, considering the rapidly changing world due to the COVID-19, the three pivotal components of the U.S.-Japan alliance are diplomacy towards China, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), and novel challenges including cyber security and digital trade. Toshimitsu Motegi (Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs), Nobuo Kishi (Japanese Minister of Defense), and Hiroshi Kajiyama (Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry) will have important roles along with Mr. Suga in shaping the U.S.-Japan diplomacy.
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga
Mr. Suga is not known to be a particularly strong diplomat. In comparison with ex-Prime Minister Mr. Abe's foreign excursions, Mr. Suga’s visits abroad have been few in number. During the ruling party election debate, Mr. Suga admitted that he doesn’t think he can match Mr. Abe’s leadership diplomacy.
Still, Mr. Suga has committed to reinforcing the U.S.-Japan alliance. In his press conference on September 16th 2020, Mr. Suga stated that he will develop policies that place the U.S-Japan alliance at its center, such as the FOIP.
The prime minister then called President Donald Trump on September 20th 2020, soon after his appointment. Mr. Suga confirmed his views that the U.S.-Japan alliance should be strengthened, since the alliance is the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region and the international community. Mr. Trump offered Mr. Suga to contact him anytime of day if needed, exemplifying the unique cordial relationship between the U.S. and Japan which is not seen in other diplomatic relationships.
Furthermore, Mr. Suga had his first meeting face-to-face with The Honorable Mike Pompeo on October 6th 2020. They confirmed their shared thoughts on the increasingly complex situation in Asia and the need for facilitating cooperation among comrades and fortifying the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Given Mr. Suga's ongoing diplomatic efforts, it is reasonable to be relieved that his diplomacy has not been detrimental or insufficient for the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Japanese Diplomacy towards China
Unlike the U.S.-Japan relations in which progress has been made through direct meetings between Mr. Suga and Mr. Pompeo, China-Japan relations have been marked by a period of stagnation. There has been no direct meeting between prominent Japanese and Chinese officials as of November 11th 2020. General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping's visit to Japan, which was originally planned for this spring but postponed due to COVID-19, has not been rescheduled yet.
However, the early actions of Mr. Suga are indicative of Japanese diplomatic strategy towards China.
Mr. Nobuo, the new Japanese Minister of Defense, is known to have close ties with Taiwan, which China still denies independence to in order to maintain Chinese sovereignty claims. For example, Mr. Nobuo met with President Tsai Ing-wen before and after she became president. Mr. Suga’s choice on Mr. Nobuo’s appointment insinuates interest in closing ties with Taiwan, inevitably increasing friction with China.
The deliberate choice on the order of calls to key global leaders by Mr. Suga also shows Japan’s low affinity towards China. After his appointment as prime minister, Mr. Suga scheduled his conference call with the U.S. first. Subsequently, he made appointments with other allies such as Australia on September 20th, Germany and Europe on the 22nd, the United Kingdom on the 23rd, and Korea on 24th 2020. The appointment with China was scheduled on the 25th. The order indicates Japanese diplomatic familiarity from highest to lowest as follows: the U.S., Australia, Germany, Europe, the United Kingdom, Korea, and finally China.
Mr. Jinping and Mr. Suga discussed on the phone on September 25th the recent issues of countering COVID-19, the reopening of traffic between borders, and North Korea. Most notably, Mr. Suga expressed concerns about Chinese territorial aggression in the East China Sea and Okinawa Prefecture and the enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law. Mr. Jinping noted that China and Japan should actively practice multilateralism and defend the international order with the United Nations at its core, implicitly repelling Mr. Trump’s America-first policies. Finally, the two leaders did not speak about the rescheduling of Mr. Jinping’s visit to Japan.
It is also important to note that the Japanese public has been generally unfavorable towards China; The participants often cited their concerns for territorial issues surrounding Japanese airspace and waters and Senkaku, Chinese criticisms over historical affairs, and Chinese human rights abuses. These critical views towards China have been seen most recently through the strong opposition to Mr. Jinping's visit by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese public.
Despite Mr. Suga’s approach and public opinion towards China, the Chinese market and influx of Chinese visitors to Japan is a huge economic resource for Japan. Thus, Japan inevitably must balance between its economic needs and national security interests, making it unlikely to expect such explicit action against China as the U.S. administration has taken.
Thus, while the Japanese government seeks to maintain friendly relations with China in terms of economic benefits, overall, Japan is likely to project a tough approach against China, especially in terms of territorial security.
This stands in comparison to the U.S.’s relative emphasis on economic competition and trade war over territorial security concerns of allies. Still, the shared concern for China’s aggressive expansion and infringement of human rights will guarantee the continued coordination of the U.S. and Japan to confront China.
Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Motegi, pioneering inclusive and powerful diplomacy, has put a lot of energy into the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP). He commented that this strategy, which embraces the strengthening of economic partnership, guarantee of freedom of navigation, strategic communication through media, and other specifics, will be increasingly important in the post-coronavirus world.
FOIP is inherited from Mr. Abe, who proposed this strategy in response to China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. For Japan, FOIP embraces both a realist approach and a liberal approach. To elaborate, FOIP has the potential to strengthen territorial security interests between member countries against Chinese expansion in neighboring seas and islands. Furthermore, the promotion of development, stability, and democracy in Africa and Asia under FOIP rivals the appeal of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for developing countries who desire both national security and development.
The second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. foreign ministers’ meeting took place in October this year with Mr. Motegi, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, H.E. Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, and Mr. Pompeo. As representatives of the key countries of FOIP, the ministers discussed the expansion of FOIP to an ASEAN-led regional framework and cooperation over health policy, digital trade, the creation of new international rules, maritime security, counter-terrorism, North Korea, and other pressing issues.
Furthermore, Mr. Suga made his first overseas trip to Vietnam and Indonesia in order to expand and strengthen FOIP with ASEAN countries, which offer low cost labor and infrastructure for strong production bases. In Vietnam, Mr. Suga and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, with their shared interest of rule of law against escalating territorial security tensions, agreed on the export of Japanese equipment and technology to Vietnam. Successively, Mr. Suga boldly offered “$470 million in loans to Indonesia” for its economic fallout due to the pandemic and gradual relaxation of travel restrictions.
The continued work on FOIP, especially in South Asia, will be important for the U.S.-Japan alliance, since it combines the security interests of Japan and economic interests of the U.S. to counterbalance the BRI led by China.
However, cooperation concerning these interests is not expected to go very smoothly. Mr. Tsuneo Watanabe, from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, writes “Japan’s proactive contribution to peace [FOIP] is derivative not of optimism and trust in the US commitment to the Asia-Pacific but rather pessimism and fear that the US would become increasingly detached from the region.”
Despite such setbacks, there is still hope for future development in FOIP under Mr. Suga as a shared policy with the assistance of the governmental and nongovernmental Japanese and American experts.
Novel Challenges: Cyber Security and Digital Trade
Recently, two new challenges have arisen in the U.S.-Japan relationship: cyber security and digital trade.
In terms of cyber security, Japan’s annual defense white paper reports that state-sponsored cyber attacks have been increasing in number and complexity in recent years. Ranging from functional impairment of the security networks, attacks on infrastructure systems, data falsification, to cyber espionage, it is no understatement that the cyberattacks could seriously threaten security for both the U.S. and Japan. As Minister of Defense Mr. Kishi spoke at his inauguration ceremony, the advanced cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in various areas, including space cyber dangers, is important for the deterrence and countermeasures of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Furthermore, Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Motegi both expressed interest in deepening cooperation in cyber security through the “5G Clean Path Initiative,” which hopes to ensure secure communication between diplomatic facilities. It will be key for the U.S.-Japan alliance to tackle cyber-security-related problems together through methods such as, developing countermeasures against cyber attacks and establishing a legal framework.
Recently, the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement and the Digital Trade Agreement have strengthened the freedom of digital trade and collaboration in international rule-making concerning digital trade. The terms of the agreement include liberalization of cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, personal information protection, restriction on data localization, etc. Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Mr. Kajiyama positively noted that the agreement encourages Japanese companies to thrive and further deepens the U.S.-Japan economic relationship. Considering the Chinese movement to secure control over data and the current citation of data trade-related rule fragmentation across countries, it is likely that the U.S. and Japan will further collaborate to unify global rules on digital trade. Mr. Kajiyama’s meeting with USTR representative Lighthizer on reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) and creating international rules in the digital field is one of the actions already taken.
All in all, as international cooperation inevitably progresses slower on digital trade and cyber security which develop rapidly, countries will have to rely on bilateral or smaller multilateral cooperation for early agreement on the terms of these novel challenges. Thus, the close coordination of the U.S. and Japan on these areas will continue to grow under the new Japanese administration.
Conclusion
Mr. Suga’s slogan, “The Cabinet for the Citizens,” could appear misleading, since it could be interpreted as focusing solely on the wellbeing of its citizens and neglecting foreign affairs. However, as Mr. Motegi refuted, there are many ways to contribute towards Japanese citizens' interests through foreign affairs such as, building good relations with countries, increasing Japanese presence in relationships, and promoting free trade.
Furthermore, Japan will continue to view its foreign diplomacy with high importance and support the U.S.-Japan relations.
Despite numerous challenges, the U.S. and Japan will continue to work closely, especially concerning diplomacy towards China, FOIP, and the novel challenges of coronavirus, cyber security, and digital trade.
Looking forward, the most important factor to consider while watching Mr. Suga’s government would be its reactions towards China. Caught between strategic and economic interests, Japan has prioritized avoiding direct conflict with China and consolidating its ties with international allies through the FOIP. However, as Chinese intrusion in neighboring seas and the Sengaku islands continues to accelerate, there may be changes in Japanese diplomatic strategy. Such concerning changes will ultimately affect Japanese actions in FOIP and the novel challenges of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
While new Japanese leadership has maintained a stable approach to the U.S.-Japan alliance, ongoing controversy over the validity of the U.S. presidential election results may undermine new American leadership. Without American domestic support and strong leadership, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and accordingly Japanese diplomacy may change drastically.
Serena Rachel Ninomiya is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania studying International Relations.
Citations
Daniel Hurst, “Japan, US Beef up Their Cyber Alliance,” The Diplomat, April 26, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/japan-us-beef-up-their-cyber-alliance/
Johnson, Jesse, and Tomohiro Osaki. “Suga Expected to Take Back Seat in Shaping Japan's Foreign Policy.” The Japan Times, September 16, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/16/national/politics-diplomacy/yoshihide-suga-japan-foreign-policy/?utm_source=dailybrief.
Kota Ishikawa, “Overview of the Japan-U.S. Trade Negotiations (Part 2) Digital Pact Setting the Tone for Trade Negotiations,” Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, October 25, 2019, https://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/contribution/ishikawa/08.html
Malloy, Allie. “Abe, Obama Affirm Alliance in Ceremony at Pearl Harbor.” CNN. Cable News Network, December 27, 2016. https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/27/politics/shinzo-abe-pearl-harbor-obama/index.html.
Masamizu Kibashiri, “『菅外交』の今後の優先順位がわかりやすく出現している電話会談の順番が興味深い,” BLOGOS, September 23, 2020, https://blogos.com/article/486488/
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 日米外相会談. 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_008818.html
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 第2回日米豪印外相会合. 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press6_000682.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. ポンペオ米国国務長官による菅総理大臣表敬. 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/na1/page4_005211.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 日中共同プレス発表. 2006, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_abe/cn_kr_06/china_kpress.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 日米首脳電話会談. 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/na1/us/page6_000432.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 茂木外務大臣会見記録（令和2年9月25日（金曜日）12時19分 於：本省会見室）. 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/kaiken4_001009.html
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan.令和2年9月16日 菅内閣総理大臣記者会見. 2020, kantei.go.jp/jp/99_suga/statement/2020/0916kaiken.html (October 22, 2020)
Seiyu Mori, “中国を驚かせた菅義偉首相の絶妙な閣僚人事,” Yahoo! Japan News, September 24, 2020, https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/abc8f32cd6140c4f8d3e1fde1f851f6e8a9adb83
Sonoko Kuhara, “Can the U.S. and Japan handle cyberattacks?,” The Japan Times, February 25, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/02/25/commentary/japan-commentary/can-u-s-japan-handle-cyberattacks/.
Tsuneo "Nabe" Watanabe, “Japan’s Rationale for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy [1],” The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, October 30, 2019, https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/watanabe_01.html
“Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019,” The Genron NPO, (October 2019): 6, https://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/191024.pdf
“Suga needs public's understanding to improve ties with China,” Nikkei Asia, September 30, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-Nikkei-View/Suga-needs-public-s-understanding-to-improve-ties-with-China
“【ノーカット】岸信夫防衛大臣が着任 出迎え・栄誉礼、着任式,” SankeiNews, September 17, 2020, YouTube video, 11:26, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_WT67oS_Ss&ab_channel=SankeiNews.
“インド太平洋戦略（英語）,” Mission of Japan to ASEAN: 3, https://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000352880.pdf
“令和2年（2020年）年頭所感 ～経済産業大臣 梶山弘志～,” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, accessed October 22, 2020, https://www.meti.go.jp/speeches/danwa/2020/20200101.html.
“尖閣沖 中国海警局の船2隻 領海侵入続ける 国有化以降最長に,” NHK, October 13, 2020, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20201013/k10012660661000.html.
“日米豪印、来月東京で外相会談 中国攻勢に対抗―菅首相も面会調整, ” Jiji Press, September 19, 2020, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020091800928&g=pol
“日米首脳「同盟発展へ連携」 初の電話会談, ” Jiji Press, September 20, 2020, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020092000387&g=pol
“梶山経産相、米通商代表と会談 ＷＴＯ改革で連携確認, ” Jiji Press, January 14, 2020, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020011400378&g=int
“菅内閣の初閣議「国民のために働く内閣」 基本方針を決定,” NHK, September 17, 2020, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20200917/k10012622021000.html
“菅首相 中国・習近平国家主席と電話会談「緊密連携で一致,” NHK, September 26, 2020, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20200925/k10012635361000.html
