By Steven Honig
In Zhanaozen, a barren industrial town in western Kazakhstan, China’s presence is palpable. The rapid construction of Chinese factories in the last two years highlights an emerging trend in the region: Beijing’s foray into Central Asia masks a paucity of returns and questionable motives with minor economic gain and toothless promise. Like many in Central Asia, the citizens of Zhanaozen are on the losing end of China’s economic surge in the region.
The data tells two tales. On the surface, the Silk Road Economic Belt has been a panacea for transportation across the region, eliminating previous borders erected by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, one of many Chinese-lead energy projects in the region, pumps over 130,000 barrels per day from the Caspian shore to Xinjiang, elevating Kazakhstan on a shortlist of relevant oil exporters.
Key performance indicators such as standard of living and income security, nonetheless, remain stagnant. Chinese construction of the Rogun Dam should be a boon for jobs in Tajikistan. Instead, construction jobs have been outsourced to Chinese workers and air pollution in Tajikistan has increased at a faster rate than its Central Asian counterparts. The nexus of railroads built by China Railway, and other major Chinese corporations, has done little to show off what Central Asian states offer and a lot to expand Chinese energy extraction; China accounts for anywhere from 50% to 80% of new foreign debt undertaken by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, causing a crippling rise in debt-to-GDP ratio.
Chinese debt traps have created problems of economic diversification given that regional incomes largely depends on extraction businesses. Natural resources account for roughly 65% to 75% of exports in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and more than 90% in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Furthermore, unlike ASEAN in Southeast Asia, no economic bloc represents the interests of the Central Asian nations abroad. The Eurasian Economic Union doesn’t include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, rendering Central Asia without a unified voice.
The economics tell only one story; Chinese coffers have created dangerous security implications for the region. Beijing uses financial muscle to exercise broader security goals, namely quelling Muslim dissent. China has successfully extended its surveillance regime in Xinjiang, where there are numerous Kazakh and Kyrgyz prisoners, to its backyard in Central Asia.
The Kazakhstani government sent a clear message in March 2019 when Serikzhan Bilash, leader of the Atajurt Kazakh Human Rights Organization, a group that documents Chinese crackdown against Uighurs, was forced to take a plea deal with Kazakh authorities that barred further activism. This deal signified Kazakhstan taking a formal pro-China position on the Uighur question in exchange for its slice of the BRI pie, upsetting 1.5 million ethnic Kazakhs living in Xinjiang.
In Tajikistan, China has a military outpost outside of Shaymak that was constructed under the guise of border security. As the military outpost is kept from the public eye, there is no clear understanding of operations inside. What is clear, however, is that this base adds another asymmetry to China’s grip on the region. Tajik authorities have succumbed to the presence of China’s military, assisting them by outlawing Arabic names, cutting beards, closing headscarf shops, requiring mosques to endure a complex permit process and banning the main Islamic opposition party.
Business with China has resulted in a reliance on Beijing’s consumption and a faltering of agency for Central Asia. Before it is too late, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan can have a seat at the table by restricting the exportation of their ace, energy, which China is heavily reliant on. Otherwise, they will continue to play by China’s rules at the expense of their people.
Steven Honig is graduate of Tufts University where he studied international relations and political science. His academic interests include US-Sino relations, Southeast Asian politics, and Chinese political economy.
Image Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/02/28/will-a-place-called-khorgos-become-the-next-dubai/#d1cab09f4b7e
