Political Protestantism in Latin America

By Nicholas Castillo 

Throughout the 20th century into the 1960s, at least 90 percent of all Latin Americans identified themselves as Catholic.[1] Protestant denominations were small, frequently represented by anti-establishment street preachers without any large-scale and well-organized institutions.[2] Today, this kind of Catholic domination is a thing of the past. In the last few decades there has been a spectacular increase in Protestant Christianity across Latin America. Nineteen percent of Latin Americans now identify as Protestant—largely Pentecostal and Evangelical.[3] This growth has resulted in a significant amount of political power. 

Far from street preachers, 21st century Latin American Protestantism is represented by figures like Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz, a successful Costa Rican Pentecostal musician who came in second in his country's 2018 presidential election.[4] Muñoz’s surprise showing in Costa Rica’s elections serves as just one example of a broader phenomenon across Latin America. Protestantism in Latin America has emerged as an influential force on the political scene—one that has become highly aligned with a unique brand of right-wing politics concerned with particular stances on social conservatism and foreign policy.

In recent years, one of the most prominent ways political Protestantism has shown its influence is through strict opposition to LGBT and feminist movements in Latin America. This alignment with social conservatism has manifested itself in contentious moments across the continent. In 2016, Evangelical Colombian voters blocked government efforts to reach an initial peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC), a Marxist rebel group that had been at war with the state since the 1960s. As peace negotiation progressed, one issue in particular angered the Evangelical community. The peace deal included wording that would have recognized how LGBT people had been specifically targeted over the course of the conflict. This drove large demonstrations by the country’s religious right, in particular the Evangelical community. In the words of the former conservative President Alvaro Uribe, those protesting the referendum’s language were marching “in defense of family values.”[5] When the initial deal was put up for referendum, mass numbers of Colombian Evangelicals voted no, contributing to the failure of the referendum by only .21 percent.[6] Two days after the referendum’s failure, in a confirmation of Protestant influence, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with a large assembly of Evangelical leaders to discuss their grievances.[7]

The case in Colombia is far from the only example of Latin American Protestants aligning themselves with social conservatism. In Peru and Argentina, grassroots Evangelical protest groups, under the banner of the broader “Don’t Mess With My Kids” movement, have sprung up in response to the introduction of new sex education curriculums that explore themes such as sexual abuse and transgender identity.[8] The rapid spread of protests by these groups prompted the Argentine government to halt its planned curriculum reform in 2018.[9]

Polling across the region provides evidence that Latin American Protestants across all countries are more socially conservative. This is especially apparent on the issue of same sex marridge. Statistics from the Pew Research Center shows lower support for gay marriage among Protestants as opposed to Catholics in every single Latin American country.[10] In some countries, the differences are drastic. In Argentina for example, only 32 percent of Protestants support gay marriage compared to 53 percent of Catholics. In neighboring Brazil, only 25 percent of Protestants support gay marriage, a full 26 percentage points less than Catholics.

Protestant movements have also proved politically important in foreign policy—specifically on policy relating to Israel. Like Protestants in other parts of the world, Protestant political actors in Latin America have taken a strong interest in Israel. In many strands of Evangelical and Pentecostal movements, full Jewish sovereignty over currently contested territories is seen as a crucial step in the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies.[11] This is especially pronounced in the Pentecostal movement, which aims to directly establish the circumstances they believe will lead to the second coming of Christ.[12] These beliefs are fast becoming influential in Latin America. 

Since 2018, two Latin American states have recognized a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel: Guatemala and Honduras. These countries boast the highest percentage of Protestants in all of Latin America at roughly 41 percent each—mostly Pentecostal and Evangelical.[13]

The connection between Guatemala’s 2018 choice to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem and political Protestantism is especially clear. Guatemala’s president from 2016 to 2020, Jimmy Morales, was a devout Evangelical Christian and political analysts such as Gaspard Estrada have pointed to the leader’s faith as a core reason for the change.[14] Further evidencing the religious motivations for the policy change, in an interview with the Evangelically focused Christian Broadcast Network, Guatemala's Ambassador to Israel explained the decision saying “this is a promise in the Bible.”[15] Speaking with the Washington Post, Guatemalan politician Marcos Fernando Yax likewise noted religious support for the move.[16]

Brazil and its current President Jair Bolsonaro are also useful case studies in the power and complexity of Evangelical and Pentecostal involvement in Latin American politics. The country hosts the largest Protestant community in South America with 26 percent of Brazilians identifying as Protestant.[17] Several Evangelicals in the country have risen to influential positions, such as the televangelist Silas Malafaia and the former Mayor of Rio de Janeiro Pastor Marcelo Crivella.[18] The country has many large and politically connected Protestant organizations, such as the Assembly of God network of Protestant churches.[19] Most importantly, Bolsonaro has made Protestants a crucial base of support for his far right politics.

Bolsonaro has long worked to endear himself to Brazilian Protestant communities both in his personal and political life. For over a decade Bolsonaro has attended a Protestant church (despite still calling himself a Catholic). Both his wife and son are Evangelicals. In 2016 Bolsonaro was publicly baptized in the Jordan River by a well-known Brazilian pastor and prominent member of the Assembly of God network.[20]

As President, Bolsonaro has continued to support hard right social policies by demonstrating hostility to gay rights and feminism. He has publicly condemned supreme court decisions concerning LGBT rights, such as allowing gay men to donate blood, teaching about homosexuality in schools, and allowing Netflix to carry a movie that depicted Jesus as gay.[21]

In another show of Evangelical political influence, Bolsonaro appointed Damares Alves Minister of Human Rights, Family, and Women. A former Evangelical pastor, Alves has frequently made appeals to conservative social politics. For instance, shortly after Bolsonaro’s victory, Alves drew controversy for pronouncing a new era where “boys wear blue and girls wear pink.”[22] Like other Latin American governments seeking to court Evangelicals, Bolsonaro promised in 2018 to move his nation’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.[23] And while Bolsonaro has so far failed to meet that promise, there are still indications that it will likely occur.[24]

While support for Bolsonaro among Protestants has not been completely uniform, these appeals have certainly paid off. In 2018, he garnered important Protestant endorsements, such as that of the aforementioned televangelist Silas Malafaia, winning 69 percent of the Evangelical vote.[25] As of April of 2019, his popularity among Brazilian Evangelicals was at least ten percent higher than that of the general population, and upwards of twenty percent compared to Brazil’s Catholics.[26]

However, Bolsonaro’s popularity with Protestants in his country has dropped significantly since his election. 100 days after his election, Bolsonaro’s approval rating among Protestants had decreased to just 49 percent[27]—though this was higher than his approval among Catholics, which was 27 percent.[28] This decline in support among Protestants likely has several factors. Some Protestant leaders do not view Bolsonaro as not right-wing enough, with his failure to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital being a particular sticking point.[29] Moreover, Bolsonaro has lost popularity across all of Brazil since 2018. Demonstrating this loss of support, several of the President's political allies, some Evangelicals, lost their own elections in November of 2020.[30] Nevertheless, Bolsonaro has maintained some degree of support among Brazil’s Evangelical community. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Evangelical leaders like Malafaia have supported the President and echoed Bolsonaro by downplaying the severity of the public health crisis.[31]

Latin American Protestantism has proved itself to be a powerful yet complicated force on the region’s political scene. The movement is large, has clearly defined interests, and is well organized behind specific movements and individuals. As a result, Protestants have been mobilized several times in recent years to great political effect across the region. However, as the example of Brazil demonstrates, the movement does not yet have solidified political ties and has shown the capacity to shift opinion on a large scale. While the exact future of political Protestantism in Latin America may still yet be unknown, its importance will likely only continue to grow.

 

Nicholas Castillo is a sophomore at George Washington University majoring in political science with a double minor in international affairs and history with areas of interest including nationalism, the post-Soviet space, and the Middle East.


Footnotes

[1]Pew Research Center, “Religion in Latin America” https://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/

[2]Levine, “The Future of Christianity in Latin America,” 121-123

[3]Pew Research Center, “Religion in Latin America”

[4]Reuters, “Evangelical holds double-digit lead ahead of Costa Rica election runoff.” Lee, “Conservative Christian Singer Loses Costa Rica Presidential Race”

[5]Quoted from Casey, “Colombian opposition to peace deal feeds off gay rights backlash”

[6]Zylstra, “Why Many Colombian Protestants Opposed Peace with FARC Fighters”

[7]Casey, “Colombian opposition to peace deal feeds off gay rights backlash”

 

[8] Greenesmith, “From the US to Peru, these ‘parent groups’ targeting sex education are all backed by the Christian right,” 

[9]Chavez, “Con mis hijos no te metas: desde EE.UU. vía Perú”  

[10]Pew Research Center, “Religion in Latin America”

[11] Pointu “Evangelicals wield voting power across Latin America, including Brazil.” Shellnutt “Blessed Through Israel: How Guatemala’s Evangelicals Inspired Its Embassy Move”

[12]Israel: How Guatemala’s Evangelicals Inspired Its Embassy Move”

[13]Pew Research Center, “Religion in Latin America.” Pointu “Evangelicals wield voting power across Latin America, including Brazil”

[14]Pointu “Evangelicals wield voting power across Latin America, including Brazil”

[15]Shellnutt “Blessed Through Israel: How Guatemala’s Evangelicals Inspired Its Embassy Move”

[16]Eglash, “As criticism of Israel mounts, Guatemala opens its embassy in Jerusalem” 

[17]Pew Research Center, “Religion in Latin America”

[18]Savarese, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro suffers wave of defeats in mayoral races”

[19]Polimedio, “The Rise of the Brazilian Evangelicals” 

[20]Polimedio, “The Rise of the Brazilian Evangelicals” 

[21]Teixeira and Lopez, “With Brazil's Bolsonaro attacking the Supreme Court, are gay rights at risk?”

[22]Smith, “Bolsonaro’s Evangelical Support Is Falling. Why?”

[23]Landau, “Brazil's Bolsonaro: I Intend to Move Brazil's Embassy to Jerusalem”

[24]Reuters, “Netanyahu says Brazil committed to move embassy to Jerusalem in 2020”

[25]Smith, “Bolsonaro’s Evangelical Support Is Falling. Why?”

[26]Smith, “Bolsonaro’s Evangelical Support Is Falling. Why?”

[27]Smith, “Bolsonaro’s Evangelical Support Is Falling. Why?”

[28]Smith, “Bolsonaro’s Evangelical Support Is Falling. Why?”

[29]Smith, “Bolsonaro’s Evangelical Support Is Falling. Why?”

[30]Savarese, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro suffers wave of defeats in mayoral races”

[31]Kibuuka, “Complicity and Synergy Between Bolsonaro and Brazilian Evangelicals in COVID-19 Times



Source: https://www.vqronline.org/international/gr...