By: Ariella Roitman
When military general Jorge Enrique Mora wrote “While Santos enjoys his Nobel Peace Prize, us Colombians are living with the consequences,” what had already become overall dissatisfaction with the result of the Colombian peace negotiations quickly became a direct critique of ex-president Juan Manuel Santos.
Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016 following his efforts to end a 50-year conflict that left 262,000 dead and more than 5 million internally displaced. With an emphasis on comprehensive rural reform, ex-combatant political participation, reduction in the production of illicit drugs, and victim compensation, the peace agreements marked a transitional moment in national reparation. Yet five years following the signing of the peace treaty, it has been made evident that advances are being made at a snail’s pace. This begs the question: Was Santos’ Nobel Peace Prize rewarded prematurely?
Of primary importance is the lagging advancement of victim reparation in the county— a promise that convinced victims to vote “yes” for peace during the 2016 referendum. Although popular consensus led to a vote against peace (skewed by less affected yet densely populated cities), communities hit hardest by guerrilla violence showed overwhelming support for the peace process. The community of Bojayá, located in the poorest department in the country, Chocó, has had a long history of violent encounters with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, and members of the paramilitary. In 2002, this largely Afro-American population recorded one of the worst massacres in Colombian history. Then, in 2016, the community topped the list of highest number of votes for peace, with 96% voting “yes.” The story of Bojayá paints the picture of reality for Colombians: internal displacement, violence, and a government whose negligence is hidden under false promises of peace.
Significant reforms included in the peace accords were Territoriality Focused Development Programs, designed to increase state presence which had been historically weak in rural areas. A transformation of the Colombian countryside would seek to address conflict and farmers’ continual production of drugs and, if successful, would bring much-needed peace to vulnerable communities. But with a budget that accounts for 85.4% of the accord’s 15-year implementation costs, government spending has come to a standstill. Until now, only 15.1% of the victimized population has been indemnified while victims still await the arrival of the peace accord’s idealized reforms.
As hard-hit communities continue to live with the consequences of the violent conflict, guerrilla soldiers responsible for killing thousands are receiving governmental aid for their return to civil society. In July 2021, the Colombian government announced an increase in monetary compensation to ex-FARC members. “We accompany the ex-combatant population with […] new opportunities to strengthen ties of conviviality and reconciliation,” stated the Agency of Reincorporation and Normalization, an organization instilled by the government as part of the peace accords. Not only have ex-guerrilla members been granted impunity from the law, but those guilty of crimes against humanity are also receiving free education and monetary compensation— all financed by the national government. Meanwhile, families of victims of the Bojayá massacre are still burying their loved ones 17 years after their unjust massacre.
In 2016, international praise for Santos’s reward was not shortcoming. Nancy Lindborg, president of the United States Institute of Peace, applauded the Nobel Committee’s decision to award Santos as consistent and commendable, arguing that “This sustained American backing helped Colombians reach a peace agreement that will increase stability in the region, reduce the flow of narcotics to the U.S. and allow Colombians to rebuild their lives.” Nevertheless, expected outcomes have strayed far from reality.
5 years after the signing of the peace treaty, Colombia continues to be besieged by violence. Massacres have increased by 175% between 2018 and 2020. 310 murders of social leaders have made 2020 the most violent year for human rights advocates. Rural communities run the risk of reverting back to levels of violence that existed before the signing of the peace agreements. Yet it seems as though “peace” as defined by ex-president Santos involves a disproportionate willingness to surrender the needs of millions of civilians to a couple of guerrilla members sitting at a round table in La Habana; a weak and immoral resolution to say the least.
Thorbjorn Jagland—a member of the Nobel Committee— claims that the Nobel Peace Prize has been increasingly awarded as an “encouragement,” or a nudge to persevere among a scarcity of peace. Nevertheless, the naïvety of Jagland’s arguments that “we have to award those who are trying” underscores the true nature of politics, driven primarily by desired power and wealth. Santos’s incentives reached a critical turning point following the acceptance of his award—a reality that has become increasingly evident for skeptical Colombians and hopeful foreigners alike. The prize, rather than acting as the “nudge” to persevere among a scarcity of peace, was contrarily received by Santos as a job well done.
International analysis of a domestic affair such as Colombia’s civil war can be unsurprisingly inaccurate. While the United States makes a decision to remove the FARC from its List of Foreign Terrorist groups, a new army of guerilla men, made up by dissidents of the FARC, is beginning to take prominence in Colombia. Here lies the danger of an international award such as the Nobel Peace Prize: what may be seen as a step in the right direction from abroad may just be what was needed to incentivize more resistance towards an increasingly powerful government. The Nobel’s international prominence—although previously successful in awarding individuals who have contributed to global peace and diplomacy—has not proven to be compatible with Colombia’s efforts to combat a characteristically national conflict.
It is easy to praise Juan Manuel Santos for his “heroic” efforts to bring long-lasting peace, but a 300-page delineation of peace advancements has no significance if simply left to theory. A necessary top-down approach would assure proper delivery of policy outcomes, but Santos’s lack of political presence has deepened the incompetence of an already divided and consequently corrupt political system. For the past five years, Santos’s primary role has been to burden his political successors with the difficult task of employing his visionary reforms, all the while receiving the benefits of having only stepped foot on the long road to peace in Colombia.
Ariella Roitman (ariellaroitman@gwu.edu) is a sophomore at George Washington University double majoring in international affairs and journalism.
