By Gabriela Baghdady
Introduction
Twenty years ago, Turkey was on its way to becoming a leading democracy in the Central Asia/Middle East region, boasting an impressive and innovative economy along with promising liberal reforms. Within the last decade, however, the country has witnessed a dramatic reversal toward autocracy. Since Tayyip Erdoğan became the first president of Turkey to be directly elected by its citizens in 2014, he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have suppressed individual freedoms, amassed control of the free press, and greatly expanded executive power. Turkey has now joined a growing number of autocratic countries across the globe with a regime considered by some scholars as electoral authoritarianism. This is a term used to describe "regimes that present an illusion of multi-party democracy at the local and national levels while effectively stripping elections of efficacy.”[1] To better understand Turkey’s reversal and how electoral authoritarianism develops as a whole, Turkey will be analyzed alongside Russia, Hungary, and Argentina as other comparison countries. Russia and Hungary represent other examples of electoral authoritarianism while Argentina reflects a state that, though plagued by a history of turmoil and authoritarianism, has repaired its presidential democracy.
Background and Motivation
The Turkish Republic was created in 1923 after the victory of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a secular revolutionary who was chosen by the Turkish Grand National Assembly as the country’s first president. A period of one-party-rule followed, but a multi-party democracy gradually evolved and was solidified by an opposition party victory in 1950. The country faced political unrest for several decades as military coups threatened the regime in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997—however, political order was continuously restored with power returning to the citizens in the form of popular elections.[2] With the economic liberalization and increased foreign investment of the 1980s, Turkey’s wealth grew and the country fostered a relationship with the European Community by the 1990s.[3] In 2002, the Justice and Development Party came into power with its leader, Tayyip Erdoğan, as prime minister. Initially, both Turkey and the international community were optimistic about Erdoğan’s leadership capabilities. His first decade as prime minister seemed to realize these hopes—Turkey witnessed economic growth and success as well as an expansion of freedoms that decreased the military’s role in politics and lifted restrictions on religious worship. Erdoğan also pushed for peace with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an organization of the Kurdish minority in Turkey that has been advocating for its rights in armed conflict against Turkey since the '80s.[4] Yet despite these gains, in the 2010s Turkey’s democratic structure began to give way to repression and autocracy.
In 2013, Turkey witnessed a civilian protest and brutal government crackdown that would signal the democratic reversal to come. The protests initially started in response to an urban development plan in Istanbul, but as the government took measures to suppress the demonstrations, citizens began to protest other issues such as the increased government control over civilian life and lack of freedom. Violent encounters between police forces and protestors ensued for the next several months. The next year, when Erdoğan became the first directly-elected president in 2014 (even after facing an anti-corruption probe) he began to consolidate his presidential power. In subsequent legislative elections, Erdoğan and the AKP silenced and intimidated their opponents, gradually taking control of the media to boost their agenda and popularity. Another turning point for Turkey's regime came in 2016 with a military coup that nearly resulted in the death of Erdoğan. Erdoğan and his allies subsequently launched an attack on the “deep-state,” purging state institutions of secularists in a massive crackdown.[5] Despite the threat the coup posed, Erdoğan used it as an opportunity to again further maximize his power. The next year he would formally solidify his authority in a 2017 constitutional referendum which resulted in a shift from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. Brookings Institute scholars Kemal Kirişci and Amanda Sloat describe Erdoğan's gains from the referendum as such:
"These reforms eliminated the office of the prime minister and enabled the president to serve as head of the ruling party. They gave new powers to the president, including the right to issue decrees, propose the national budget, appoint cabinet ministers and high-level bureaucrats without a confidence vote from parliament, and appoint more than half the members of the high courts.”[6]
Erdoğan effectively granted himself unchecked power in Turkey.
The transformation of Turkey under Erdoğan has elicited concern from the rest of the world, and for good reason. Turkey’s democratic regression has already done damage domestically and internationally. Within the country, citizens face a declining economy, state-controlled education, weakened military, and a government completely lacking in checks and balances against the president. Democratic institutions such as the media and judiciary have been manipulated and distorted to serve the nationalistic interests of the government. The Turkish people have also been stripped of individual rights and freedoms, including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion.[7] For example, Erdogan carried out purges of liberal members of government, had journalists and academics detained, Non-Muslim and ethnic minorities faced harsh discrimination, and the Turkish relationship with the Kurds has drastically worsened. Meanwhile, the government adopted a foreign policy dictated by nationalism that is increasingly hostile towards neighboring countries in the Middle East.[8] Turkey has intensified its military action against the Kurds in Syria and fostered competition with Iran[9] and proxy conflict with Saudi Arabia.[10] Turkey has also turned on some of its former democratic allies in the West. With skepticism of Europe and the West increasing, Turkey has shunned its fellow NATO allies in favor of a growing strategic partnership with Russia. Turkish authoritarianism is a destabilizing force both within the country and the region as a whole. To further understand what caused the deterioration of democracy in Turkey and the context in which Erdoğan was able to amass power, structural factors and political traditions within Turkey's history must be analyzed and compared to other cases.
Analysis
Clear signs of Turkey's reversal from a democracy to an autocracy are most readily visible during 2013 and 2014. These events have broader implications for the nature of the Turkish government as a whole and demonstrate how Erdoğan was able to assume the presidency and lead the country toward authoritarianism.
First, the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the subsequent demonstrations that occurred against the government caused tension within Turkey in the months leading up to Erdoğan's election. These protests have been described as "the biggest spontaneous revolt in Turkish history."[11] While the unrest began as a peaceful protest against an urban development plan in Istanbul, demonstrations soon targeted the government. Citizens criticized the government's growing involvement in civilian lives in respect to control over the media and academic curricula as well as the lack of freedoms. The demonstrations were met with an intense reaction from the government that proceeded to purge liberal members from the administration.[12] The government’s brutal crackdown was but a harrowing signal of what would come next. Months later, the government faced a wide-scale anti-corruption probe. In early 2014, audio recordings of a telephone call between Erdoğan (then the Prime Minister) and his son in which the two men discussed an operation to hide vast amounts of money were leaked to the public on Turkish social media. While Erdoğan denounced the situation as “an attack on the Turkish Republic” and the recordings as “immoral edited material,” opponents of Erdoğan seized on the scandal and played the recordings in front of lawmakers.[13] With Erdoğan's incriminating audio recordings released, he joined a growing number of high-profile Turkish officials with alleged corruption scandals. In the weeks prior, police had detained more than fifty high-profile suspects, and "hundreds of senior police officers [had] been sacked or reassigned."[14] While Erdoğan claimed an international conspiracy, the corruption allegations and general tension in Turkish politics stemmed from a power struggle taking place between Erdoğan and Fetullah Gulen ahead of the local elections in March and presidential elections in April. Gulen, a Turkish Muslim preacher, had been an ally of Erdoğan against the military and secularists and had connections in academia, the media, business, and some governmental institutions.[15] While in self-imposed exile in the United States, “Gulen and his supporters… engaged in an open political war with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party since the corrupt investigation.”[16] In addition to his entanglement in corruption scandals and political conflict with Gulen, the Turkish economy was faltering. Though Turkey had witnessed a huge increase in foreign investment during the financial crisis of 2008, growth slowed to just 2% in 2013. With the U.S.’s economic recovery, Turkish currency slumped and interest rates rose.[17] The elections in March and April became crucial not only for Erdoğan and the AKP but for the state of the country as a whole.
Despite the various issues facing the AKP and Erdoğan, both were victorious in the 2014 local and presidential elections. There was, however, much about the elections that raised concern. The local elections in March "were the most controversial in recent history, triggering an unprecedented number of accusations of irregularities and vote-rigging" but the AKP had achieved a clear victory regardless of the unrest and statistical anomalies.[18] The recorded turnout was lower than expected—likely due to summer vacations and inconvenience for seasonal workers, dissatisfaction with the opposition candidate, and the perception that Erdoğan was a clear winner.[19] In addition, Erdoğan was allowed to freely make use of government resources to bolster his campaign and he was given almost all of the state-owned media's attention. In contrast, the opposition candidates lacked funding and received almost no airtime on the radio or television, greatly damaging the competitive nature of democratic elections. This de-democratization of elections marked another step towards authoritarianism for Erdoğan.
Several fundamental truths about Turkish political history can help explain how Erdoğan and the AKP so swiftly amassed power. Despite the presence of liberal reforms in Erdoğan’s early years, Turkey never had a truly liberal leader that completely upheld individual freedoms and civil rights. Halil Karaveli—Senior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute—described the main “cornerstones” of Turkey’s “illiberal order” as statism, nationalism, religious conservatism, and protection of powerful business interests.[20] These cornerstones not only provide a basis from which Erdoğan and the AKP could claim power but continuously preclude meaningful democratic progress in Turkey.
Historically, Turkey has been a country predisposed to “strongman” rule. With its past tainted by military coups and a long-standing fear of “fitna”, or anarchy, the state is seen as the ultimate defense for the Turkish people.[21] As a result, bold and nationalistic personalities, like Ataturk’s or Erdoğan’s, become popular and are legitimized even in light of corruption scandals. Before becoming president in 2014, Erdoğan had served as prime minister since 2002, which lent him a great deal of credibility in the eyes of the Turkish people. Furthermore, Erdoğan was also successful because he navigated the conflict between the state and religious conservatives. Within this context also existed a cultural tension—was Turkey united under the practice of Islam (religion) or by a pan-Turkish identity (ethnicity and statehood)? Erdoğan initially advocated for stances that appeased all groups.[22] After branding himself as a champion for various demographics and thereby exploiting the divisions in Turkish society (what can be called a cause for his success in the short-term), Erdoğan succeeded in further solidifying his position as president because of the long-term general Turkish belief in the strength of the state. Turkish academic Mustafa Erdoğan (no relation) has claimed that “the cultural code of our people dictates that the state’s authority must be obeyed even if it is tyrannical and evil.”[23] Nationalistic and statist tradition is so deeply embedded in Turkey that it allows Erdoğan to continuously maintain legitimacy simply because he has intertwined himself with Turkey’s image of the state. In the face of instability, he emerges victorious because Turkish political thought encourages the acceptance of state authority under any circumstances.
Furthermore, the strength of Erdoğan’s authoritarianism is exacerbated by Turkey’s presidential system. Juan Linz, a sociologist and political scientist who taught at Yale University, identifies presidential systems as inherently less stable than parliamentary systems. Because there is no measure for determining who truly represents the “people’s will”—the executive or the legislature—a system of dual legitimacy creates an institutional framework prone to conflict. Linz writes that “even more ominously, in the absence of any principled method of distinguishing the true bearer of democratic legitimacy, the president may use ideological formulations to discredit his foes; institutional rivalry may thus assume the character of potentially explosive social and political strife.”[24] In the case of Turkey, this is certainly evident; in order for Erdoğan to truly identify himself as one with the state and its will, he has steadily dismantled institutions of democracy that contradict his message and suppressed his opposition.
Overall, Erdoğan’s presidency has intensified the nationalism and statism rooted in Turkish politics to transform the country into an authoritarian project. Today in Turkey, Erdoğan maintains widespread control of the legislature, the judiciary, and the media, leading to weakened civil liberties and political freedom. Turkey has become an electoral authoritarian state—elections continue, but like other institutions, they lack crucial democratic requirements. Erdoğan’s success in gaining power and the persistence of political traditions that legitimize him have destroyed the last remnants of Turkey’s democracy.
Comparison
The context that allowed Erdoğan to assume power in Turkey and transform it into an autocracy—a divided society vulnerable to nationalism and strong statehood—is not exclusive to Turkish politics. Examining other countries that mirror Turkey’s current situation—Russia and Hungary—reveal similar trends of nationalism and statism as mechanisms for building electoral authoritarian states. However, as demonstrated by Argentina, it remains possible for a country to rebuild its democracy after an authoritarian regime.
Russia
Under President Vladimir Putin’s administration, Russia has witnessed a resurgence in authoritarian and repressive policies. Putin became prime minister of Russia in August 1999 and president just months later with a vision of Russia’s return to the world stage as a great power. To accomplish this, Putin has engaged in armed conflict with surrounding Eastern European countries (including Georgia, Chechnya, and Ukraine), assumed control over the media, centralized his power and limited that of Russian oligarchs, championed nostalgia for Russia’s superpower legacy in the Soviet years, and fostered anti-Western sentiments. As the 2008 elections approached, Putin negotiated an arrangement with First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Putin named Medvedev his successor and Medvedev promised to appoint Putin as prime minister if he won the presidency—Medvedev (and Putin) were indeed successful in the 2008 elections.[25] The move was generally viewed as an arrangement to ensure Putin’s eventual return to the presidency, while Medvedev served as his puppet in the meantime[26] As expected, Putin was elected president again in 2012 and Medvedev was appointed prime minister, despite the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) accusations of electoral unfairness. In his second presidency, Putin took greater measures to quash protests and imprison dissenters, enacted restrictions on NGOs, and limited political competition. He also began to control and restrict online content and launched patriotic propaganda. Rule of law was weakened and individual rights limited. Today, the Russian judiciary lacks independence and minorities face discrimination. The threat of violence from state-employed officials and imprisonment for supposed “terrorism” discourages the exercise of freedom of speech and assembly.[27] Most recently in March 2020, Putin signed off on a provision that changes the constitution to allow him to conceivably serve as president until 2036.[28] In many ways, therefore, Turkey’s situation can be likened to Russia’s—a gradual consolidation of presidential power that undermines freedoms, democratic institutions, and government transparency and accountability.
As with Turkey’s autocracy, in examining Russian authoritarianism under Putin, we must ask: how did Putin come to assume and remain in power? Like Turkey, the symbolic power of the state and its leader is a tradition that hearkens back to the Romanov era in the 1600s. From the czars, to the Soviet rulers, to Putin today, the Russian government and society have continuously lived under principles of emblematic leadership, a unique Russian identity, and a duty to love and serve the state.[29] Therefore, as in Turkey, statism and nationalism are strong and closely related in Russia, playing a key role in Putin’s ascendancy. When Putin first assumed the presidency as Yeltsin’s successor, Russians were still discouraged and embarrassed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early ‘90s. The country was also suffering great hardship due to food shortages, economic failure, and technological backwardness. Dissatisfied with Yeltsin’s lack of progress, “Russians were ready for a leader with an agenda and the mental capacity to implement it.”[30] For Russians, Putin appeared the ideal candidate for the job—he renewed faith in Russian patriotism and linked himself to the czarist and Soviet eras of Russian greatness and superiority.[31] His reassertion of control over domestic politics in Russia bolstered his strongman reputation. Even now, though Russians are aware of the atrocities Putin has committed at home and abroad, “they are also grateful to Putin for restoring Russia’s international power and authority.”[32] Putin’s demonization of the West also contributes to the image of Putin as a savior for Russian power and a defender of the country’s legacy against foreing influences. This can be likened to Erdogan’s portrayal of himself as a symbol of the state that will defend its identity and integrity from instability and anarchy. In both Turkey and Russia, therefore, the primacy of the state as the ultimate power has and continues to preclude instituting more democratic measures.
Hungary
Under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary is also moving away from democracy and toward an increasingly authoritarianism regime. Orbán, considered an emerging populist in European politics, has demonstrated himself to be “emblematic of a strongman age” and has praised both Erdoğan and Putin for their respective policies.[33] In 2010, he became prime minister after leading the right-wing nationalist Fidesz party to victory. Soon after he assumed power, Orbán and his fellow Fidesz members began enacting measures that steadily eroded Hungarian democratic institutions. Their laws attacked the independence and authority of civil society, the judiciary, the media, and the electoral process, all while the party manipulated the electoral map to continue winning elections regardless of the number of votes it received.[34]Orbán’s Fidesz loyalists were given positions in media, nonpartisan institutions for monitoring the government, economic organizations, and control of judicial appointees. Orbán and his party have also rewritten the Hungarian Constitution to suit their needs—for example, “when the Constitutional Court struck down Fidesz laws that, among other things, criminalized homelessness, Parliament amended the Constitution to include most of the laws that the court had rejected.”[35] With the erosion of checks and balances, the government has also fallen victim to Orbán’s crony capitalism, with many of his personal advisors and associates benefiting greatly from European Union contracts. Orbán’s most recent action in March 2020—emergency legislation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic—expands executive power to allow rule by decree and postpones elections and referendums indefinitely.[36]
What explains Hungary’s transformation? Orbán appears to have tapped into a dangerous form of right-wing nationalism in Hungary similar to that of Turkey and Russia, using it as a means to amass more and more executive powers. His approach includes identity-based politics that posits a threat to “traditional” Hungarian culture, a tactic common in populist strategy. As The Economist explains, “Hungary’s history has been that of a small, embattled nation, fighting continually for its survival. It has been conquered and occupied by Tatars, Ottoman Turks, Nazis, and Russians. The failed uprisings of 1703 and 1848 against the Habsburgs and the 1956 revolution against the Soviets are burned into the national psyche.”[37] Again, the earlier trend seen in Turkey and Russia in which countries with conflicting national identities find themselves vulnerable to strongmen is observable in Hungary. An appeal to a unique Hungarian identity, partly shared with Western Europe but also distinct in that Hungary lived under communist rule after World War II evokes “a long-denied sense of autonomy—an autonomy that’s not always recognized in the European Union.”[38] This rhetoric combined with a meek opposition has allowed Orbán to dominate Hungarian public thought, using appeals to nationalism to distract from the chaos occurring in the federal government—“appeals to national pride have helped him to keep the focus off difficult questions about corruption and the poor state of the health system.”[39] It is unclear how long Orbán will be able to maintain this narrative of an outside threat—but for now, his nationalist rhetoric has convinced most of Hungary, and his manipulation of elections and the constitution have solidified his position for the foreseeable future.
Argentina
Examining Russia and Hungary alongside Turkey helps reveal the power of nationalism as a factor that can threaten democratic institutions and their legitimacy. In contrast, Argentina can be viewed as an example of a democracy that survived an authoritarian past. In 1930, President Yrigoyen was ousted by the military as a result of the Great Depression, with civilian rule restored in 1932. As economic stagnation persisted into World War II, national army officers again seized power, led by Colonel Juan Perón. Perón would become a massively controversial figure in Argentina, initially supported for his push for Argentina’s self-sufficiency and social reforms but later becoming a symbol of Argentine authoritarianism. In his early years in power, he enacted reforms related to labor and industrialization. For example, “Perón enforced existing labor regulations and created new rights […] In less than two years, workers’ conditions improved dramatically, [and] labor activists and union leaders enjoyed a fruitful relationship with the government.”[40] When the government discharged Perón, the country rallied for his freedom. He returned to the government and continued experimentation in social reform after winning the 1946 elections. Perón, however, also began to turn toward a more authoritarian route of governance. In 1949, “a new constitution strengthened the power of the president; opponents were imprisoned, independent newspapers were suppressed” (BBC). Perón won reelection in 1951, but persistent economic issues, as well as the Left's dislike for Perón's authoritarian tendencies, caused his popularity to decline. By 1955, the country witnessed violent military revolts and Perón was ousted in another military coup. In the decades following, the government attempted to "de-Perónize” Argentina and undo his legacy. Perón, however, was elected to the presidency again in 1973 with hisis authoritarianism returning in full force; “Perón—and his wife, after his death in 1974—tolerated and encouraged right-wing paramilitary death squads that murdered Perónist and non-Perónist guerilla, leftist, and union activists.”[41] The situation worsened as a recession hit the country in 1974 due to the oil crisis. In 1976, Perón’s wife was overthrown in another military coup and was replaced by a military government that launched a “Dirty War” against supposed left-wing sympathizers. In 1983, Raul Alfonsin became president, and in the years following, it appears that democratic improvements have been made in Argentina.[42] As economic policies improved in the early 2000s and onward, other important reforms followed including the return of civil society and freedoms, a law opening political competition, and the declining role of the military in the government.[43]
Argentina’s democratic progression is certainly not finished, but the improvements of the last few decades are promising after the turmoil of the 20th century. Institutional adjustments, functioning political parties, and democratic self-correction are returning to the country after years of chaos under authoritarianism and military rule. Political rights and civil liberties are becoming stronger each year, as indicated by Freedom House.[44] The country's leaders have taken measures to open up their country to globalization to expand the economy that suffered during the Great Depression and the Perón years. While Argentina's democracy is not a complete success, it demonstrates that it is possible to overcome repressive authoritarian regimes when a country embraces institutional change and civil society rather than nationalism and statism.
Electoral Authoritarianism
Despite the hopeful case of Argentina, the troubling developments in Turkey, Russia, and Hungary are indicative of a growing phenomenon across the globe: electoral authoritarianism. According to Rachid Tlemcani of the Carnegie Endowment, in these regimes “rulers devise discriminatory electoral rules, exclude opposition forces from entering the electoral arena, and restrict what passes to the public via mass media. Means may change but the ultimate goal remains the same, electoral manipulation becoming the most stable institution upholding authoritarian rule.”[45] This is certainly the case in Turkey, Russia, and Hungary because all of these countries’ elections have been marred by massive state intervention in campaigning, monopolization of the media, and intimidation and restrictions against opposition parties and candidates. Data from V-Dem on global autocratization highlight the current tendency of an increasing number of rising dictators to “crack down on elections only after decimating the media in civil society.”[46] Once again, in Turkey, Russia, and Hungary, we see this process in action. After gaining power, authoritarian officials work to suppress the free press, curb civil society, and change their constitution’s electoral rules to solidify their power. And often, these regimes are self-legitimizing because they appeal to historical claims of national identity and culture.
This electoral manipulation is an especially serious threat to democracy, as free and fair elections are a foundational democratic guarantee. Revered political scientist Robert Dahl cites participation and competition as the most fundamental aspects of democracy in his work Polyarchy. Participation and competition are the factors that allow people to exercise their civil and political rights to take part in democratic processes and express opposition against the government.[47] If these two aspects of electoral democracy are restricted or lost, as they are in Turkey and Russia (and remain threatened in Hungary), then democracy appears difficult to regain.
Conclusion
Overall, Turkey has strayed farther and farther from democracy since 2013 and this trend can be linked to deeply rooted political traditions. Further, examining the increasing authoritarianism in Erdoğan's Turkey alongside Russia and Hungary demonstrates the general trend that emerging autocrats target civil society and institutions through nationalist and statist rhetoric before attacking elections. In doing so, they drastically weaken democratic mechanisms and solidify their power by manipulating the electoral process, prohibiting competition, and participation in the political process. While Argentina offers a contrasting example of a democracy that recovered from a nationalist and authoritarian past, the illiberal regimes in Turkey, Russia, and Hungary have solidified their power for the time being.
Gabriela Baghdady is a senior studying International Studies and minoring in Islamic Studies and Philosophy at John Hopkins University.
Footnotes
[1] Rachid Tlemcani, “Electoral Authoritarianism,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
May 29, 2007, https://www.carnegieendowment.org/2007/05/29/electoral-authoritarianism-pub-19176.
[2] Central Intelligence Agency, “Middle East: Turkey,” Central Intelligence Agency: The World
Factbook, n.d., https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
[3] Meltem Müftüler, “Turkish Economic Liberalization and European Integration.” Middle Eastern
Studies 31, no. 1 (Jan 1995): 85-98, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283700.
[4] Kemal Kirişci and Amanda Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey:
Implications for the West,” Brookings Institute, (Feb. 2019): 1, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-rise-and-fall-of-liberal-democracy-in-turkey-implications-for-the-west/.
[5] Kirişci and Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey:
Implications for the West,” 3.
[6] Kirişci and Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey:
Implications for the West,” 3.
[7] Kirişci and Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey:
Implications for the West,” 6-8.
[8] Kirişci and Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey:
Implications for the West,” 6-8.
[9] Galip Dalay, “Turkey in the Middle East’s new battle lines,” Brookings Institute, May 20, 2018,
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-middle-easts-new-battle-lines/.
[10] Lawrence Goodman, “The coming proxy wars between Turkey and Saudi Arabia,”
BrandeisNOW, Sept. 6, 2019, https://www.brandeis.edu/now/2019/september/turkey-saudiarabia-conflict.html.
[11] Kemal Kirişci and Amanda Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey:
Implications for the West,” Brookings Institute, (Feb. 2019): 2, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-rise-and-fall-of-liberal-democracy-in-turkey-implications-for-the-west/.
[12] Kirişci and Sloat, “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey:
Implications for the West,” 2.
[13] CNN Staff, “Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says incriminating phone recordings are fake,”
CNN, February 25, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/25/world/europe/turkey-Erdoğan-phone-tapping/.
[14] Fadi Hakura, “Is instability the ‘new normal’ for Turkey?” CNN, January 8, 2014,
https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/08/opinion/turkey-politics-conservatism-hakura/.
[15] BBC, “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Turkey’s pugnacious president,” BBC, June 24, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679.
[16] CNN Staff, “Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says incriminating phone recordings are fake,”
CNN, February 25, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/25/world/europe/turkey-Erdoğan-phone-tapping/.
[17] Ivana Kottasova, “Turkish economic mess: How did it get to this point?” CNN Business, March
28, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/28/business/turkey-economy-election/index.html.
[18] Bipartisan Policy Center, “Shadows and Doubts: The Turkish Local Elections of March 30,
2014,” Bipartisan Policy Center, June 9, 2014, https://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/report/turkish-local-elections-2014/.
[19] Ergun Özbudun, “The 2014 Presidential Elections in Turkey: A Post-Election Analysis.” Global
Turkey in Europe III: Democracy, Trade, and the Kurdish, (Jan. 2015): 99, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09856.17.
[20] Halil Karaveli, “Erdoğan’s Journey: Conservatism and Authoritarianism in Turkey.” Foreign
Affairs 95, no. 6, (Nov./Dec. 2016): 122. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43948388.
[21] Karaveli, “Erdoğan’s Journey: Conservatism and Authoritarianism in Turkey,” 127.
[22] Karaveli, “Erdoğan’s Journey: Conservatism and Authoritarianism in Turkey,” 129.
[23] Karaveli, “Erdoğan’s Journey: Conservatism and Authoritarianism in Turkey,” 127.
[24] Juan Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” in The Democracy Sourcebook, ed. Robert
Dahl, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 262.
[25] Britannica, “The Putin presidency,” Britannica, n.d., https://www.britannica.com/place/
Russia/The-Putin-presidency.
[26] Christian Neef and Matthias Schepp, “Medvedev’s Betrayal of Russian Democracy,” Spiegel
International, April 10, 2011, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-puppet-president-medvedev-s-betrayal-of-russian-democracy-a-789767.html.
[27] Britannica, “The Putin presidency,” Britannica, n.d., https://www.britannica.com/place/
Russia/The-Putin-presidency.
[28] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL), “Putin Formally Signs Off on Constitutional
Changes That Allow Him to Extend Power,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 14, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-signs-off-constitutional-changes-extend-power/30487735.html.
[29] Pierre Hassner, “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2, (April
2008): 8, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Hassner-19-2.pdf.
[30] Britannica, “The Putin presidency,” Britannica, n.d., https://www.britannica.com/place/
Russia/The-Putin-presidency.
[31] Pierre Hassner, “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2, (April
2008): 7, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Hassner-19-2.pdf.
[32] Hassner, “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy,” 13.
[33] Patrick Kingsley, “As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What’s Possible,” The
New York Times, Feb. 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world
/europe/hungary-Orbán-democracy-far-right.html.
[34] Patrick Kingsley, “As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What’s Possible.”
[35] Patrick Kingsley, “As West Fears the Rise of Autocrats, Hungary Shows What’s Possible.”
[36] Edward Szekeres, “Hungary ‘No Longer a Democracy’ After Coronavirus Law,” Reporting
Democracy, March 31, 2020, https://www.balkaninsight.com/2020/03/31/hungary-no-longer-a-democracy-after-coronavirus-law/.
[37] The Economist, “Why is Hungary Turning to nationalism?” The Economist, April 5, 2018,
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/04/05/why-is-hungary-turning-to-nationalism.
[38] James McAuley, “Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is widely expected to win Sunday’s Election. Why is
he so popular?” The Washington Post, April 7, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/hungarys-viktor-Orbán-is-widely-expected-to-win-sundays-election-why-is-he-so-popular/2018/04/07/0f491c54-36b2-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html.
[39] The Economist, “Why is Hungary Turning to nationalism?” The Economist, April 5, 2018,
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/04/05/why-is-hungary-turning-to-nationalism.
[40] Ernesto Semán, “Argentina: A Tentative Case for Democratic Populism,” NACLA, January 30,
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