By: Anastasiya Miazhevich
In view of Russian military buildup near the Ukrainian border in the spring of 2021, the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, appealed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for membership saying it is “the only way to end the war in Donbas” [1]. The breakaway region of Donbas controlled by pro-Russian separatists has been in a state of civil war with the rest of Ukraine since 2014. The conflict was provoked by the increasing anti-Russian sentiments in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and subsequent annexation of Crimea by Russia. Historically, the Donbas region located in southeastern Ukraine has had the highest concentration of ethnic Russians and the largest number of Russian speakers in Ukraine outside of the Crimean peninsula [2]. The separatists did not support the installation of the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and self-proclaimed independent republics of Donetsk and Luhansk that together comprise the Donbas region. The Russian government has provided the breakaway republics with financial and military support [3]. Since 2014 the confrontation between the Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces has occasionally flared. Despite the ceasefire agreement signed last summer, the clashes in Donbas renewed in recent months [4].
The escalation of the unresolved conflict in Donbas was accompanied by the surge of Russian military activity along the southeastern border of Ukraine. The Kremlin’s motives behind the show of force remain unclear but the sudden military buildup prompted the Ukrainian government to sound the alarm and seek support from the Western partners. Without a formal membership in NATO, Ukraine cannot count on Western military assistance in case of a Russian attack. President Zelensky’s attempt to push for Ukraine’s admission into the Alliance was a rational request that ensued from a perceived threat to the country’s national security. Despite the United States and the EU’s outspoken support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Western allies have reservations about immediately bringing Ukraine into NATO. The reasons for Western hesitance include Ukraine’s formal ineligibility for NATO membership as well as inevitable deterioration of the West-Russia relations in the event of Ukraine’s accession to NATO.
Ukraine’s Ineligibility for NATO Membership
NATO views security as a broad concept that is not limited to military cooperation but also entails all-member commitment to the principles of democracy and free-market economy, and offers an open-door policy to countries that aspire to join the organization and contribute to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture [5]. With the provisions of article 10 of the founding Washington treaty, European states that meet the normative prerequisites may join NATO with the unanimous agreement of the existing members of the Alliance [6].
Since 1949, the founding year of the Alliance, 18 new member states have joined NATO. Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Alliance adopted a strategy of eastward enlargement that would bring NATO membership to the former countries of the Warsaw Pact. To facilitate onboarding of aspiring members, NATO introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) that provides “advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance” [7]. Adoption of an individual MAP is a key step towards NATO membership and requires an aspiring country to regularly report on the annual national programs targeted at implementation of political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal reforms [8]. After the 2014 Ukrainian political crisis, Ukraine has deepened its relationship with NATO and initiated comprehensive reforms in the security and defense sector hoping to bring the country closer to receiving a MAP offer [9]. Due to the increasing tensions in the Ukraine-Russia relations, president Zelensky called for acceleration of the accession process by stressing that “Ukraine's MAP will be a real signal for Russia” [10].
Although NATO shares Ukraine’s security concerns and has continuously supported the country in its aspiration to join the Alliance, Ukraine is unlikely to be accepted into NATO until it meets the organization’s accession standards. Most notably, the Alliance cannot move forward with a state that has unresolved territorial disputes. To be considered for membership, NATO requires that a country must settle an existing dispute “by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles” [11]. Thus, the very idea of accepting a country that solicits membership in NATO to resolve an ongoing military conflict is contradictory to the organization’s underlying recommendations. Until Ukraine finds a peaceful resolution to the war in Donbas, the county’s chances to join NATO will remain slim. Moreover, Ukraine’s corruption levels remain prohibitive and stay far from reaching NATO’s normative standards [12]. Extensive economic and political reforms must be put in place to ensure transparency and proper functioning of Ukrainian democratic institutions. Although Ukraine has started modernization of its defense sector, peaceful resolution of the war in Donbas and deep economic and political reforms are required for Ukraine’s further rapprochement with NATO in the framework of a MAP.
NATO Enlargement and Growing Animosity in the West-Russia Relations
NATO’s reservations about bringing Ukraine onboard are also influenced by fear of escalating the relations between the West and Russia that are already far from perfect. The Kremlin’s hostility towards NATO is the result of the Alliance’s expansion into the states that Russia has perceived to be located in its sphere of influence. Russia’s distrust of NATO stems from the broken promises of non-expansion of the Alliance to the east after German reunification. Shortly before the dissolution of the USSR, Western leaders recognized the Soviet security concerns associated with NATO enlargement and assured Moscow that “there will be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction of military presence one inch to the east” [13]. Nevertheless, once the Soviet Union ceased to exist, NATO membership was extended to the former members of the Warsaw Pact who used to be strategically allied with the USSR. Russia continues to perceive NATO eastward enlargement as a pressing threat to its national security and claims that NATO’s expansionist policy is responsible for instability in Europe and the Ukraine crisis in particular. [14].
In objection to Russia’s concerns about the enlargement policy, NATO asserts that bringing new members to the organization aims to reinforce security and stability in Europe and poses no threat to Russian interests [15]. However, the underlying problem with the collective defense alliances is that their sole existence relies on the presence of an external threat [16]. NATO has repeatedly framed the prospect of Russian aggression as a reason for new states to join the Alliance. From this perspective, the anticipation of the Russian threat may have become NATO’s self-fulfilling prophecy and sowed a conflict in place of an inclusive peace.
As to Russia’s accusations of broken promises to not expand to the east, NATO argues that such a pledge was never codified in a treaty. Denying membership to aspiring countries would be considered a violation of a country’s right to choose its own alliances protected by 1975 Helsinki Charter [17]. Moreover, Russia’s discontent with NATO enlargement is based on the idea of entitlement to a sphere of influence. The West may deny its geopolitical aspirations by discarding the very concept of having a sphere of influence as outdated and incompatible with modern realities of international relations [18]. It is, however, difficult to view NATO enlargement as anything but an expansion of the Western zone of influence. Russia is sure to view it that way. The Kremlin’s determination to prevent Ukraine from entering NATO is representative of the defensive realism theory and may be interpreted as Moscow’s resistance to further loss of influence in the region vital to Russia’s strategic interests.
Technically, Ukraine’s accession to NATO may still be possible despite the formal ineligibility under the organization’s standards. According to the Study on NATO enlargement published by the Alliance itself, the decision to accept a new member is taken on a case-by-case basis, and “there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance” [19]. The Ukrainian administration must be aware of this caveat when appealing to NATO for acceleration of the admission process. Meanwhile, NATO leadership anticipates that prematurely granting membership to Ukraine would instigate a negative reaction from Moscow. The risk of sparking a more serious conflict with Russia outweighs the benefits of securing Ukraine’s commitment to the westward vector of cooperation in strategic, political, and economic areas. At the end of the day, NATO’s priority consists of ensuring that the invited country will contribute to enhanced security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region [20]. At the moment, Ukraine cannot guarantee that its membership in NATO will result in a more peaceful Europe. On the contrary, NATO expansion to Ukraine may provoke an aggressive response from Russia and condemn Europe to greater instability.
Footnotes
[1] Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “On Ukraine’s doorstep, Russia boosts military and sends message of regional clout to Biden,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-military-biden-donbas/2021/04/09/99859490-96d3-11eb-8f0a-3384cf4fb399_story.html.
[2] “A divided Ukraine,” CNN, last modified March 3, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/02/world/ukraine-divided/.
[3] Anton Zverev, “Moscow is bankrolling Ukraine rebels: ex-separatist official,” Reuters, October 5, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-separatists/moscow-is-bankrolling-ukraine-rebels-ex-separatist-official-idUSKCN1251UQ.
[4] Andrew E. Kramer, “Fighting Escalates in Eastern Ukraine, Signaling the End to Another Cease-Fire,” New York Times, March 30, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-russia-fighting.html.
[5] “Study on NATO enlargement,” Official texts, NATO, last modified November 5, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm.
[6] “The North Atlantic Treaty,” Official texts, NATO, last modified April 10, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
[7] “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” Topics, NATO, last modified March 23, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm.
[8] NATO, “Membership Action Plan (MAP).”
[9] “Relations with Ukraine,” Topics, NATO, last modified April 27, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm.
[10] “President of Ukraine had a phone conversation with the Secretary General of NATO,” News, Official website of the President of Ukraine, last modified April 6, 2021, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-generalnim-sek-67813.
[11] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”
[12] “Ukraine in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2020,” Transparency International Ukraine, accessed May 19, 2021, https://ti-ukraine.org/en/research/ukraine-in-the-corruption-perceptions-index-2020/.
[13] Tom Sauer, “The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West,” Global Policy 8, no. 1 (February 2017): 86.
[14] Andrew T. Wolff, “The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis,” International Affairs 91: 5 (2015) 1103.
[15] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”
[16] Sauer, “The Origins,” 83.
[17] Wolff, “The future,” 1105-1106.
[18] Sauer, “The Origins,” 87.
[19] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”
[20] NATO, “Study on NATO enlargement.”
