By Christopher D'Urso
Prince Klemens von Metternich is undoubtedly one of the most influential yet controversial figures of European international relations. In many respects, he was before his time, pursuing a realist strategy of power politics decades earlier than this approach dominated the foreign policies of peer countries. Metternich faithfully served the Habsburg Empire for 47 years as its envoy in Saxony, ambassador to Paris, and finally Foreign Minister (Kissinger). Throughout this period, he self-righteously followed a conservative ideology, attempting to ensure stability and the balance of power on the continent. His ultimate accomplishment was indisputably the Congress of Vienna which prevented European war for nearly 35 years and forestalled a major conflict for 99 years (Breunig and Levinger 174). Overall, Metternich was extremely effective in preserving Austria’s power which resulted from his ability to manipulate cunningly the events of 1812 to 1815 by temporarily preserving neutrality and tactically leading peace negotiations.
As the nineteenth century dawned, forces unleashed during the French Revolution and Napoleon’s reign perpetually endangered the Habsburg Empire. The motto of “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” translated as “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” epitomized the threats to the Austrian Empire’s rule and stability. Specifically, the revolutionary zeal of Liberté posed a direct challenge to the authority of Habsburg Emperor Francis by supporting beliefs such as popular sovereignty and the sharing of power between the monarchy and an elected legislature (“Conservative Pragmatism”). These principles offended Metternich’s sense of legitimacy since he considered any proposed liberal reforms as unnatural and thus “doomed to failure” (Kissinger 10). Concurrently, brewing calls for Égalité in the form of democracy and social equality threatened to give undue power to the middle class while inviting radical philosophies such as socialism. However, Fraternité was by far the most disconcerting to Austrian rulers since it contended that ethnic or linguistic identity was supreme where each ethnic group was entitled to nationhood (“Conservative Pragmatism”). Given Austria’s lack of “natural frontiers and … polyglot composition,” it desperately needed to contain these nationalistic forces or risk collapse (Kissinger 7). Statesman and political scientist Dr. Henry Kissinger further contends that Austria’s diverse population made it particularly vulnerable to unrest during times of war. As a result, its leaders were best suited to practice a foreign policy that emphasized the status quo (7).
In 1812, French Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia which unfortunately placed Austria in the middle of the dispute since both belligerents expected Habsburg support. Thus, Metternich was forced to navigate through this difficult situation while preserving the balance of power at a time when Austria’s strength was at an unprecedented low. In many respects, Austria could have been considered a “second-rate power” due to its numerous military defeats, loss of territory, and crippling national debt (Gady). Metternich knew he could not join Russia in opposing Napoleon since this would likely invite the conflict to occur on Austrian soil, leading to the disorder against which Kissinger warned (22-23). On the other hand, if Metternich allied with France, he would essentially be condoning Napoleon’s usurping behavior which was antithetical to the Habsburg Empire’s belief in legitimate power. This union would then undermine Austria’s credibility and moral superiority which was one of its last remaining strengths (Kissinger 22).
Skillfully, Metternich was able to exploit both sides and augment the Habsburg Empire’s strength. He signed a treaty with France whereby he agreed to send 30,000 troops to the French Grand Armée in exchange for concessions that Austria would be allowed to arm itself and gain “preferential status in the French system” (Kissinger 23). Although Metternich wished to terminate this arrangement as soon as possible, he recognized that any efforts would be futile until the Habsburg Empire regained its military power as allowed by the treaty’s rearmament provision. Therefore, he relied on secret overtures to maintain diplomatic ties with the Russians and assure them of the agreement’s temporary nature (Gady). In fact, Metternich attempted to coordinate military strategy with the Russians to minimize conflict between the troops of both countries (Kissinger 24). Despite the fact that Napoleon soon recognized Austria’s duplicitous behavior, Metternich understood that the French army was distracted and retaliation against the Habsburg Empire would remain a secondary priority (Gady). By effectively playing both sides, Metternich preserved Austria’s moral superiority while enhancing its power so that it could eventually assume a leadership position in determining the conflict’s outcome.
By 1813, Napoleon’s invasion of Russia had turned into a debacle whereby he decided to retreat rather than face a grueling Russian winter. This lull in the fighting appeared to be the perfect opportunity for the Habsburg Empire to declare its support of the Allies. Nevertheless, Metternich elected to remain neutral for six months due to justified concerns regarding the impact of war on Austria. Primarily, Metternich did not want Napoleon to be defeated only for Russia to emerge as the next hegemon which would similarly threaten the Habsburg Empire’s relative power (“Revolt of Europe”). Additionally, Metternich was uncertain of “the kind of war [Russia] would wage” (Kissinger 25). Specifically, if Russia chose to focus on the creation of nations based on ethnicities as opposed to simply restoring previous borders, the conflict would give strength to nationalist movements within Austria and thus threaten the Empire’s survival (Kissinger 25). Moreover, Metternich understood Austria was still in a position of relative weakness. As a result, waiting would greatly enhance the likelihood the Habsburg Empire would emerge victorious and be able to control the terms of the peace settlement. Furthermore, intervention on behalf of the Allies would signify Austria had violated its treaty with France and would imitate the treachery and disregard for international law Napoleon frequently demonstrated. This hypocrisy would directly contradict the Habsburg Empire’s insistence on legitimacy and undermine its bargaining position in peace negotiations (“Revolt of Europe”).
Concurrently, Metternich met with Allied leaders as a neutral third party to discuss a peace settlement with Napoleon. Although he agreed with the ideas behind the original Allied proposal, Metternich feared it would give Russia undue power in the resolution of territorial disputes which could upend the balance of power. Therefore, Metternich devised his own plan which relied on the natural borders of the Rhine and Vistula Rivers for France and Russia, respectively. In order to weaken Napoleon’s strength, Metternich included the restoration of Prussian and Austrian territory to match the 1805 to 1806 borders. However, he also did not wish to unduly weaken France which would serve as an important counterweight to Russia in maintaining the critical balance of power. The Allies agreed to these principles at the Conference of Reichenbach, and Metternich presented the terms to Napoleon in Dresden. Unbeknownst to Napoleon, Metternich had committed to the Allies that if negotiations broke down Austria would join their coalition (Leggiere 7-8). Unfortunately, Napoleon refused to accept the Allies’ demands. Nevertheless, Metternich later admitted in his memoirs that the coalition never intended to honor the agreement. Rather, the meeting simply served as a pretense for the Allies to continue fighting while Napoleon appeared to be the stubborn belligerent (Breunig and Levinger 118). Additionally, Metternich used the meeting at Dresden as an opportunity to convince Napoleon to terminate the French treaty with Austria (Gady). Thus, Metternich was able to end Habsburg neutrality while maintaining the optics of the situation since their involvement would no longer violate international law and the standard of legitimacy.
Following Napoleon’s rejection of the peace accord at Dresden, Austrian forces entered the conflict in support of the Allies, changing the course of the war. The Habsburg Empire contributed 300,000 troops and assumed supreme command of the coalition. This ensured that Metternich would possess a significant stake in negotiating the peace terms to serve Austrian interests. As the Allied troops crossed the Rhine and stormed Montmarte in Paris, the French had no choice but to surrender. Napoleon offered to abdicate the throne in favor of his son, but the coalition insisted on his exile to the island of Elba (Breunig and Levinger 118-119). The resulting peace deal, codified in the Treaty of Paris of 1814, restored France to its 1792 borders, reinstated a Bourbon monarch, and returned to France the majority of its colonial possessions (“Treaties of Paris”). This agreement mirrored Metternich’s plan whereby the Bourbon monarchy would ensure stability in France and serve as a bulwark against future aggression which could threaten Austria. Moreover, the lenient terms imposed on France would enable it to remain a great power, counterbalancing Russia, Prussia, and Britain. After Napoleon’s escape and subsequent capture, the Allies revised the Treaty of Paris to include harsher conditions but retained the general principle of French strength which benefited the Habsburg Empire.
Simultaneously, the coalition members began considering how they would divide the territory conquered by Napoleon which led to the Congress of Vienna, Metternich’s crowning achievement. In March 1814, the Allies signed the Treaty of Chaumont which declared support for a strong, independent Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain; pre-revolutionary status in Italy; and a confederation of independent German states (“Revolt of Europe”). The coalition also agreed to stand united for the next 20 years, which along with the creation of the aforementioned buffer countries, would protect against future French hostility (Breunig and Levinger 175). Following Napoleon’s first defeat, the coalition members organized the Congress of Vienna to discuss further territorial settlements. Through the Congress, Metternich endeavored to restore equilibrium on the continent which was accomplished via two important doctrines. Firstly, the great powers of Austria, France, Britain, Prussia, and Russia would negotiate amongst themselves any issue that arose in Europe and then dictate a resolution to the smaller powers (“Revolt of Europe”). This would not only promote stability but also ensure that conflicts were settled in a manner that served the great powers’ interests. Secondly, any proposed decision required the unanimous consent of the great powers (“Revolt of Europe”). This provision would guarantee the international legitimacy that Metternich so greatly desired as it would prevent one country from coercing another into accepting a solution.
Ironically, Prussia and Russia presented the Congress with its first test before the final agreement was even signed. These countries had already secretly agreed that Russia would receive all of Poland in exchange for Prussia receiving the German state of Saxony. However, Metternich vehemently opposed this plan since it challenged the delicate balance of power he so carefully constructed (“Revolt of Europe”). The proposal would unduly increase the power of both Prussia and Russia, consequently threatening Austrian hegemony in Central Europe. Surprisingly, French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand rather than Metternich proposed the ingenious solution which resolved this crisis. Talleyrand created a secret alliance with Britain and the Habsburg Empire where each would allegedly intervene if Prussia or Russia attacked Britain, France, or Austria. Nevertheless, the agreement was nothing more than a farce to intimidate Prussia and Russia who soon relinquished some of their demands after details of the alliance were purposefully leaked. As a compromise, the final settlement provided each with only a portion of Saxony and Poland (Breunig and Levinger 178). Once the great powers signed the final agreement to the Congress of Vienna, Metternich had been able to secure remarkable gains for Austria. Not only had he promoted stability and international legitimacy but he also increased Habsburg territory, restoring the Empire’s power on the continent.
Following Napoleon’s final defeat, Metternich’s last significant diplomatic action during the period of 1812 to 1815 emerged in the form of a peculiar agreement with Russia and Prussia. Proposed by Russian Tsar Alexander, these countries formed a Holy Alliance to “lend each other aid and assistance to protect religion, peace, and justice” (Breunig and Levinger 182). While the arrangement may seem counterintuitive given the vastly different denominations of Christianity practiced in the three countries, it merely served as a guise to quash future revolutions. In other words, it enabled Metternich to justifiably oppose reform movements which threatened to spill into Austria, arousing nationalist and liberal sentiments that could tear apart the Empire and challenge the authority of Emperor Francis.
In summation, Metternich’s statecraft from 1812 to 1815 was enormously successful at furthering Habsburg interests by ensuring stability and the balance of power. Despite his distaste for the usurper Napoleon, Metternich originally committed minimal troops to the French to avoid combat on Austrian soil which could provoke dangerous nationalistic uprisings. He then pursued a policy of neutrality to maintain Austria’s moral superiority and commitment to international law. Once Metternich was able to rescind his treaty with Napoleon, he intervened on behalf of the Allies, negotiating a peace which preserved France as a counterweight on the continent. However, his most significant accomplishment was the Congress of Vienna which established a lasting system of international legitimacy and regional equilibrium while increasing Austrian power. As scholars debate whether the world is currently moving toward a more multipolar system, important lessons can be learned from Metternich’s calculating efforts which successfully coped with such a distribution of power and prevented a major conflict for decades.
Christopher D'Urso is an assistant online editor for the Sigma Iota Rho Journal of International Relations. He is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania, majoring in International Relations.
Works Cited
Breunig, Charles and Matthew Levinger. The Revolutionary Era: 1789-1850. 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002. Print.
Gady, Franz-Stefan. “The Genius of Metternich: Austria’s Resurrection Through ‘Active Neutrality.’” The National Interest. The National Interest, 4 Dec. 2014. Web. 17 Oct. 2015.
Kissinger, Henry. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957. Web.
Leggiere, Michael. The Fall of Napoleon: The Allied Invasion of France 1813-1814. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Web.
McDougall, Walter. “Conservative Pragmatism: Concert Diplomacy, 1823-1839.” University of Pennsylvania. College Hall, Philadelphia, PA. 22 Sept. 2015. HIST 420 Lecture.
---. “The Revolt of Europe and Congress of Vienna 1812-1815.” University of Pennsylvania. College Hall, Philadelphia, PA. 15 Sept. 2015. HIST 420 Lecture.
“Treaties of Paris.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d. Web. 18 Oct. 2015.
