Posted on March 20, 2012 by Michael Nourafshan
Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran is currently in the midst of a devastating unemployment crisis. The Iranian government has reported that the current rate of unemployment is approximately 12.5%; however, many economists have predicted the real rate to be roughly 20-25%.[i] Perhaps more troubling, according to the 2009 CIA World Factbook, the unemployment rate for Iranian citizens between the ages of 15 and 24 is rapidly approaching the 30% mark. This is a terrifying number considering the massive size of the youth population in Iran. In this essay it is argued that the persistently high rates of unemployment experienced in Iran can be directly attributed to the outcome of the Iranian revolution and the resulting fiscal policy decisions.
The Revolution and its Aftermath
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a large-scale nationalist and religious movement. It resulted from various political and economic factors, including the Shah’s questionably close ties to the United States, rampant corruption throughout the Iranian government, and the inequitable distribution of wealth in Iran.[ii] Although the Revolution was widely embraced by a sizable segment of the Iranian population, it caused irreparable economic damage that is still being felt throughout the country to this day.
Prior to the Revolution, a competitive private sector and an increase in oil production drove consistently high rates of growth in Iran. From 1960-1976, the Iranian economy grew at an average rate of 9.8%, while real per capita income grew by 7% on average. Both oil output and oil prices increased significantly during this period, with oil production growing at an annual average rate of 10%. More importantly, these stellar levels of growth were achieved while maintaining low levels of inflation and unemployment.[iii] In 1969, the unemployment rate in Iran was approximately 6.2%, an incredible feat when compared with the modern Iranian economy.[iv] Increased international trade, high levels of productivity in the petroleum sector, and vibrant and competitive private enterprises can all be attributed with helping the Iranian economy flourish prior to the Iranian Revolution.
Iran’s outstanding economic performance would come to a sudden halt as a result of the Revolution of 1979. The IMF staff estimates that in 1979, the Iranian economy contracted by roughly 15%, leaving millions unemployed and the country in terrible economic condition. From 1979-1988, the Iranian economy contracted at an average annual rate of 2.4%. Additionally, by 1988, oil production was only 36% of its 1976 level, and oil prices had fallen by 40% in real terms.[v]
This abrupt economic catastrophe was brought on by the nationalization of many of Iran’s key industries and the Iranian government’s decision to isolate itself from the international community. Shortly after assuming power, Ayatollah Khomeini– the religious and political leader of the Iranian Revolution– approved the nationalization of Iran’s finance, oil, transportation, utilities, and the country’s entire banking system, thus dismantling the competitive private sector that had previously flourished.[vi]
No industry in Iran was affected more than the petroleum sector. As a direct result of the nationalization of Iran’s petroleum sector, oil production greatly decreased and thus the price of oil rose significantly. This forced many countries, including the United States, to look for oil elsewhere. When the Iran-Iraq War broke out the following year, Iran’s oil production nearly ceased entirely. This left the country in complete economic and social disarray.[vii]
Matters in Iran were made much worse following the Iran hostage crisis of 1979. Upon hearing that the Shah had been permitted to enter the United States following the revolution, a group of armed students seized the American embassy in Tehran, thus infuriating the United States political leadership. In response, Iran was subjected to various crippling U.S. sanctions, and the country’s economy consequentially suffered. The United States government froze up to $15 billion dollars worth of Iranian assets, including bank deposits and other properties, and restricted foreign investment in the country. Additionally, several European Union states and other countries imposed tariffs and embargoes on Iranian exports, which greatly damaged international trade revenue.[viii]
Throughout the 1980s, U.S.-Iran relations further deteriorated as a result of both the Iran-Iraq War and the Beirut barracks bombing. In 1983, Hezbollah, a Shia terrorist organization, attacked a U.S. Marine base in Lebanon. The United States implicated Iran in the bombing, and declared them a country that supported terrorism. As a result, foreign aid to Iran was prohibited and dual-use exports were banned, as were many other exports including airplane parts and materials for weapons. Because the United States had been one of Iran’s primary trade partners during the Shah’s reign, the sanctions and tariffs imposed by the United States were all the more devastating to the Iranian economy.[ix]
Fiscal Policy Under the Ayatollah
From the years 1979-1990, the new theocratic government adopted three primary economic goals: to equitably distribute wealth, gain economic independence from the West, and strengthen Iran’s domestic industries.[x] Although the economic reforms implemented under Khomeini may appear beneficial in nature, the fiscal policy approach taken by the new Islamic government directly contributed to the country’s high rates of unemployment and inflation and meager levels of economic growth—a devastating impact felt in Iran to this day.
The aim of redistributing wealth manifested in policies that reallocated property, reoriented government expenditures toward low-income families, and increased minimum wage standards. Various state-run programs were instituted to improve the standard of living for low-income families, including the Foundation for the Oppressed, the Reconstruction Crusade, and the Housing Foundation.[xi] These policies directly contributed to rampant inflation, escalated the budget-deficit, and reduced productivity throughout all sectors of the economy.
The most detrimental effect of the Khomeini regime’s redistributive economic policy was the transition from capital expenditures to current expenditures. In his study “The Iranian Economy Under the Islamic Republic”, distinguished Iranian economist Adnan Mazarei states,
The share of capital expenditures in GDP declined from 15% in 1977/78 to 3.1% in 1988/89. As a result of this decline, maintenance and improvements in the country’s infrastructure have been delayed at a heavy, long-term expense.[xii]
The redistributive policies of the theocratic regime were incredibly shortsighted and have greatly contributed to Iran’s underdeveloped infrastructure. When a country has an unstable infrastructure, foreign investors are hesitant to put their capital into that country. Had the Khomeini regime focused on developing Iran’s roads, utilities, and access to electricity, rather than alleviating short-term concerns, many infrastructure-based jobs would have been created, and it is likely that there would be a much greater inflow of foreign capital into the Iranian economy today.
Another key economic objective of the Khomeini regime was to increase Iran’s independence from the West. Increasing anti-Western sentiment greatly contributed to the Iranian Revolution and in many ways defined post-Revolution economic policy. In order to increase Iran’s economic independence from the West, the Khomeini regime nationalized nearly all of Iran’s industries, imposed high tariffs on imports, and restricted foreign investment. As a result of these economic reforms, involvement in international trade and industrial production drastically declined and stagflation took hold of the Iranian economy.[xiii]
Major economic reforms were implemented throughout the 1980s with the primary objective of promoting Iranian economic self-sufficiency. By subsidizing domestic industries, including food and energy, the Khomeini regime believed Iran could reduce the country’s reliance on imported goods. Iran’s implementation of an import-substitution strategy greatly limited competition in both the food and oil sectors, consumed a large percentage of the state budget, and limited the potential for job creation and economic growth.[xiv]
Even more inefficient than the food and oil subsidies are the bonyads that were nationalized following the revolution. Bonyads are for-profit government-enterprise cooperatives established by religious groups that receive substantial government aid and are exempted from paying state taxes. The bonyads control a large portion of the economy and reap the benefits of unaccountability and preferential treatment. The country’s largest bonyad, the Foundation for the Deprived, has holdings worth roughly $12 billion. Iranian specialist Patrick Clawson describes the perverse nature of the bonyads when he states, “They are supposed to use the profits from their enterprises to provide inexpensive housing, health care, and other social services to the poor; in reality, much is siphoned off by those in control and relatively little reaches the needy.”[xv]
The bonyads are able to get away with these corrupt practices because they are completely unaccountable to the government. The bonyads are required to report solely to Iran’s religious leader, and are not forced to publish budgets or financial records of their profits and expenditures. Additionally, many of these foundations are directed by political appointees who often have little to no business experience. Ultimately, because these foundations are given preferential treatment by the Iranian government in the forms of favorable exchange rates, easy access to foreign capital, and tax exemption they eliminate the prospects of robust, sustained private sector-led growth in Iran.[xvi]
The widespread implementation of wealth redistribution programs, increased government subsidies and the nationalization of bonyads have greatly limited the potential for economic development in Iran. Although the fiscal policy approach taken by the new Islamic government greatly hindered economic development in Iran, economic reform would bring about drastic improvements in the economy throughout the 1990s.
Rafsanjani and Market-led Economic Reform
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was inaugurated as Iran’s 4th president in 1989, and shortly thereafter, Ruhollah Khomeini passed away. Rafsanjani was committed to prioritizing economic development over egalitarian purity, an approach that would generate rapid economic growth and ultimately improve the state of the Iranian economy.
President Rafsanjani introduced Iran’s first Five Year Economic, Social, and Cultural Plan in 1989. The Plan was based on the principles of market-led growth and aimed to improve Iran’s dismal economic conditions. The First Five Year Plan emphasized the importance of liberalization and privatization and thereby gained the support of both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The First Five Year Plan is remembered as one of the greatest attempts to reform the Iranian economy because it created over two million jobs, stimulated Iran’s oil and petroleum production, and increased the country’s exports significantly.[xvii]
The foundation of Rafsanjani’s plan was economic liberalization. Rafsanjani understood that rapid globalization was occurring and knew that Iran must become integrated into the global economy if it were to prosper. In order to increase Iran’s involvement in interstate economic activity, Rafsanjani reduced import controls, encouraged direct foreign investment with tax incentives, and attempted to stabilize the country’s currency, the rial. As a direct result, from 1989 to 1992, imports rose from US $13 billion to US $31 billion, thus eliminating many of the deficiencies caused by the Ayatollah’s ambition to achieve autarky.
In addition to liberalization, Rafsanjani emphasized the economic benefits gained from privatization. From 1989-1993, major efforts were made to privatize and expand Iran’s oil industry, the backbone of the economy. But due to political opposition, the industry was not entirely privatized. However, the increase in private ownership greatly stimulated production and boosted revenues. As a result of the reforms, oil production increased from 3 million barrels per day in 1989 to 3.9 million in 1993.[xviii] From the years 1988-1993, Iran’s gross domestic product grew at an average annual rate of 7.3%.[xix] It is evident that privatization had a significant effect on growth.
Although Rafsanjani’s First Five Year Economic, Social, and Cultural Plan succeeded in increasing oil production and boosting economic growth, it was flawed in several ways. The First Five Year Plan was funded mainly by borrowing from foreign countries. The foreign capital that was borrowed in order to fund the economic reforms is estimated to have exceeded approximately US $23.4 billion. The drastic increase in foreign debt caused Iran to significantly reduce its imports once the plan ceased. From 1993 to 1994, imports decreased from US $23.3 billion to US $19.3 billion, resulting in a brief period of economic stagnation.[xx]
Secondly, the First Five Year Plan did nothing to address the issue of rising income inequality in Iran. Iranian economist Abbas Valadkhani summarizes the gap in income equality when he states,
In 1991, the expenditure share of the lowest 40 percent of the population was 13.43 percent, whereas that of the upper 20 percent of the population was 50 percent. This data clearly indicates that this plan has not been successful in reducing income inequality.[xxi]
Income inequality has been among the most pressing issues in Iran for the last century. It was one of the driving factors behind the Iranian Revolution, and it continues to haunt the country to this day. Only if the growing gap between the rich and poor is addressed will standards of living be genuinely increased in Iran.
Thirdly, the First Five Year Plan was only marginally successful in reducing unemployment. According to the Central Bank of Iran, the unemployment rate consistently exceeded 15% from the years 1979-1994. Additionally, the increased oil revenues that were generated during the period of reform were very unequally distributed. Therefore, job creation was not widespread throughout the economy. Although Rafsanjani’s First Five Year Plan was successful in stimulating economic growth, it created a negative balance of trade, further worsened the growing gap between the lower and upper classes, and failed to address the issue of unemployment in Iran.
President Rafsanjani immediately introduced the Second Five Year Development Plan in 1994, which followed many of the same broad liberalization policies as the first plan. Its primary goals were to privatize major industries, continue to integrate Iran into the global economy, and reduce subsidies for basic commodities. However, due to decreased global oil prices and the resistance of parliament to continue the reforms of the first plan, Iran’s capacity for growth and job creation was greatly limited.
By the end of his presidency, due to the Iranian parliament’s refusal to reform the economic system, President Rafsanjani had failed to achieve the goals of the Second Five Year Development Plan. The unemployment rate in Iran rose to 17.2%, a dangerously high level, while inflation hovered around 20%.[xxii] From 1994-1999 Iran experienced meager economic growth, with an average annual growth rate of 3.1%.[xxiii] While the market-based rationale behind the second plan was sound, political conditions prevented President Rafsanjani from achieving the goals of the Second Five-Year Development Plan.
Khatami and Economic Development in the 21st Century
Like his predecessor, Seyed Mohammad Khatami was a reform-minded leader who understood the necessity of rapid economic development in Iran. Khatami served as Iran’s president from 1997 to 2005 and made marginal improvements in Iranian fiscal policy. In order to stimulate the Iranian economy, President Khatami implemented the moderately successful Third Five Year Development Plan in the year 2000.
The Third Five Year Development Plan possessed many of the characteristics of the first two plans; however, it varied in several ways. Rather than focusing on liberalization, the main objectives of the third plan were to address the expanding budget deficit, reduce poverty, and downsize the government’s role in economic activities.[xxiv] Additionally, the plan focused on Iran’s rapidly growing labor market and the need to accelerate job creation.
In order to meet these goals, Khatami encouraged rapid growth in the private sector, rather than government employment. In late 1999, the president made several attempts to privatize many of Iran’s major industries, including communications, post, rail, oil, and gas. However, like the plan that preceded it, the proposal faced staunch opposition from the hardliners in Parliament. Private ownership ultimately increased in many of these industries as a result of Khatami’s efforts; nevertheless by 2004, they remained largely dominated by the government.[xxv]
While Khatami’s efforts were limited, increased oil prices significantly improved the external perspective of the economy. From the years 2000-2004, the Iranian economy grew at an average annual rate of roughly 5%.[xxvi] Unfortunately, because the increase in gross domestic product was triggered by an international increase in oil prices, the new capital did not reach the lower-middle classes in Iran. The successor to Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Admadinejad, attempted to address the growing gap between the rich and poor in Iran.
Ahmadinejad and the State of the Modern Economy
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed office as the 6th president of Iran on August 3, 2005. Ahmadinejad, a highly polemic political figure, has received much of the blame for Iran’s economic failures and has recently been condemned by many Iranian economists for poor fiscal policy decision-making. Although Ahmadinejad has attempted to reduce unemployment and aid lower-middle class households, various economic policy decisions have greatly worsened the economic conditions inside Iran.
Ahmadinejad’s Fourth Five Year Economic, Social, and Cultural Plan was ratified by the Iranian parliament in October of 2005. The plan reflects many of the principles introduced in the previous five-year plans; however, its primary objective is to provide aid to low-middle classes. Additionally, the plan focuses on increasing exports, reforming the education system, and improving steel production in Iran.[xxvii]
The most notable achievement of the Fourth Five Year Plan is the increase in international trade. From 2004- 2007, Iran’s total trade in goods nearly doubled, reaching approximately US $147 billion. Additionally, during that same period, Iran achieved a trade surplus exceeding US $36 billion. Although increased oil prices are largely responsible for the increase in trade revenue, decreased import controls and the devalued rial can be partly attributed to the rise in inter-state economic activity.[xxviii]
Aside from increasing international trade, Ahmadinejad’s economic policies have greatly contributed to the poor state of the Iranian economy. In particular, President Ahmadinejad has been held responsible for persistent inflation, currently exceeding 25% (a modest estimate), and unemployment.[xxix] Ahmadinejad has consistently pursued expansionary monetary and fiscal policies without concern for increases in commodity prices. Increased subsidies, cash handouts to the poor, and recurrent attempts to increase Iranian fertility rates have directly contributed to Iran’s high rates of inflation and unemployment and are now bringing the country to the brink of collapse.[xxx]
According to Shayerah Ilias, an Iranian-American specialist in international trade and finance, the Iranian government spends approximately 25% of its gross domestic product on subsidies. Energy subsidies exceeded 12% of GDP in 2008 and are currently costing Iranians tens of billions of US dollars per year, money that could effectively be used to generate long-term job growth.[xxxi] New York Times journalist Robert Worth describes the problems associated with extensive subsidies in Iran when he states,
It encourages over-consumption of gasoline and other products, discourages domestic production and makes Iran more dependent on imports. The subsidies are also regressive because the rich pay the same artificially low prices as the poor and consume far more.[xxxii]
As a result of the global economic downturn in 2008, Ahmadinejad proposed a plan to reduce energy subsidies and instead use the funds to increase cash handouts to the poor. This plan has been highly criticized by many prominent Iranian economists who claim that it will only worsen Iran’s inflation crisis; however, it remains to be seen what will happen to Iran’s costly subsidies.[xxxiii]
In order to aid low-middle income families, President Ahmadinejad has relied on cash handouts, frequently referred to as “justice shares.” It is estimated that each lower-middle class family receives US $35-$60 per year, depending on their socio-economic status. Like energy subsidies, cash handouts have been criticized for their inefficiency and high cost. While these handouts are able to alleviate immediate economic concerns for some families, they neither promote long-term economic growth nor sustainable job creation. In order to reduce unemployment and inflation in Iran, cash handouts should be terminated and the money redirected to create sustainable job growth.
Perhaps even more devastating than Ahmadinejad’s expansionary fiscal policy is his pursuit of rapid population growth. In 2006, Ahmadinejad encouraged the Iranian legislature to promote an “American-like baby boom” in Iran in order to increase the country’s military and economic capacity. Ahmadinejad called for a population increase from 70 million to 120 million in a narrow 20-year span.[xxxiv]
Such a drastic population increase could have horrendous consequences in Iran. The current youth unemployment rate in Iran is approximately 30% and it is estimated that 3.5 million working-age young Iranians are jobless. Additionally, many economists predict that Iran will have to create more than a million new jobs every year in order to accommodate its current fertility rate. Currently, only 300,000 new jobs are being created each year, providing no chance for employment for the rapidly growing youth population in Iran.[xxxv]
The expansionary fiscal policy approach taken by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has greatly hurt the Iranian economy. Although Iran has experienced an increase in international trade, increased subsidies, cash handouts for the poor, and a misguided population growth policy have greatly contributed to high rates of inflation and unemployment in Iran. The current economic situation in Iran is bleak; nevertheless, critical shifts in policy decision-making can prevent the country from deteriorating into political, social, and economic chaos.
Future Economic Reform
The Iranian government must make drastic changes in fiscal and monetary policy if it is to save the country from economic and social calamity. Thus far, the inefficiencies created by the early Islamic Republic’s redistributive policies and the obstacles to reformist efforts to liberalize the Iranian economy have been discussed. While large-scale efforts have been made to reduce unemployment and inflation in Iran, several critical steps must be taken in order to revive a once booming, oil-rich economy.
First and foremost, Ahmadinejad’s government must put an end to its expansionary fiscal and monetary policy approach. It is detrimental to Iranian society to continue to pump money into the economy when inflation is already exceeding 20%. The government needs to focus on reducing inflation by increasing interest rates, and ending the recently adopted, inefficient cash handout program. By doing so, not only would Iran avoid the risk of hyperinflation, but also it could redirect the funds to promote long-term job growth.
Secondly, the Iranian government must decrease subsidies, particularly in the energy sector, in order to increase productivity and reduce waste. As New York Times columnist Robert Worth noted, energy subsidies in Iran promote wasteful consumption of energy and reduce both competition and total output in the oil and petroleum sectors.[xxxvi] By drastically reducing energy subsidies, not only would Iranian energy firms become highly more efficient, but the money allocated for subsidies could also be invested either in job creation or infrastructure, thereby promoting lasting economic growth in Iran.
Thirdly, the Iranian government must either dismantle or downsize the bonyads that continue to dominate and distort the Iranian economy. The bonyads have no obligation to pay taxes and contribute very little to Iranian infrastructure and social welfare. By eliminating the bonyads, private enterprise would become more competitive, tax revenues would increase and foreign investors would become less hesitant to invest in Iranian businesses.
The fourth recommendation for the Iranian government is that it reverses the population growth policy that has been endorsed by President Ahmadinejad. Unemployment among working-age youth is currently exceeding 30% and among Iranian women it is currently hovering at around 40%. The Iranian citizenry cannot afford a dramatic influx of new workers into the labor market. Jobs are already incredibly scarce, and job growth is far lower than population growth. If the government is to reduce the rate of unemployment in Iran, it must first take control of birth rates and population growth.
The final recommendation is that the Iranian government cooperate with the international community in limiting its nuclear ambitions. International sanctions have taken a serious toll on the economy and if increased, would greatly limit the prospects for economic development in Iran. The most prominent threat to Iranian national security is not a nuclear attack, but rather domestic economic decay. If Iran is to save itself from its current unemployment crisis, it will require increased involvement in international activity. Iran now must make a critical decision: whether to restore the rapid economic growth and prosperity it once experienced or economically self-destruct by becoming completely isolated from global goods, services, and capital markets.
[i] Martin Weiss and Jonathan E. Sanford, “The World Bank and Iran,” (Washington, DC Congressional Research Service, 2009), 25.
[ii] Adnan Mazarei Jr., “The Iranian Economy Under the Islamic Republic: Institutional Change and Macroeconomic Performance,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 20 (1996): 3.
[iii]Abdelali Jbili and Vitali Kramerenko. Islamic Republic of Iran: Managing the Transition to a Market Economy (Washington, DC: The International Monetary Fund, 2007), 2.
[iv] Jbili and Kramerenko, 3.
[v] Ibid., 3-4.
[vi] Mazarei Jr., 293.
[vii] Ibid., 294.
[viii] Ali Gheissari, Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 42.
[ix] Greg Bruno “The Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions.” Council on Foreign Relations. September 23, 2009, accessed February 25 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengthening-list-iran-sanctions/p20258.
[x] Mazarei Jr., 291.
[xi] Ibid., 292.
[xii] Ibid., 297.
[xiii] Patrick Clawson, “The Islamic Republic’s Economic Failure.” Middle East Quarterly 15 (2008): 58.
[xiv] Massoud Karshenas, and Hashem Pesaran, “Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian Economy,” The Middle East Journal 49 (1995): 95
[xv] Clawson, 60.
[xvi] Ibid., 60-61.
[xvii] Abbas Valadkhani, “An Analysis of Iran’s Third Five-Year Development Plan In the Post-Revolution Era (2000-2005),” Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis 17 (2001): 8
[xviii] Ibid., 9.
[xix] Ibid.
[xx] Ibid., 11.
[xxi] Ibid., 9.
[xxii] Clawson, 3.
[xxiii] Valadkhani, 10.
[xxiv] Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment, (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998): 12.
[xxv] D. Salehi-Isfahani, “Iran’s Third Development Plan: A Reappraisal,” Virginia Tech Economics Series (2005): 4.
[xxvi] Ibid., 13.
[xxvii] Ali Gheissari, Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 89.
[xxviii] Shayerah Ilias, “Iran’s Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues,” (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2009): 5.
[xxix] Ibid., 4-5.
[xxx] Ibid., 5.
[xxxi] Ibid.,” 5-7.
[xxxii] Robert Worth. “Iran’s Plan to Phase out Subsidies Brings Frenzied Debate,” The New York Times, 2009.
[xxxiii] Shayerah Ilias, “Iran’s Economic Conditions,” 7.
[xxxiv] Jahangir Amuezegar, “The Ahmadinejad Era: Preparing for the Apocalypse,”Journal of International Affair 60 (2007): 53.
[xxxv] Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran: Unemployment Becoming a National Threat,” March 02, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051866.html
[xxxvi] Robert Worth, “Iran’s Plan to Phase out Subsidies Brings Frenzied Debate.”
References
Amuezegar, Jahangir, “The Ahmadinejad Era: Preparing for the Apocalypse.” Journal of International Affairs 60 (2007): 35-53.
Bruno, Greg “The Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions.” Council on Foreign Relations. September 23, 2009, accessed February 25 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengthening-list-iran-sanctions/p20258.
Clawson, Patrick and Michael Eisenstadt. Iran Under Khatami: A Political, Economic, and Military Assessment. Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998, 3-12.
Clawson, Patrick, ”The Islamic Republic’s Economic Failure.” Middle East Quarterly 15 (2008): 1-61.
Esfandiari, Golnaz. “Iran: Unemployment Becoming a National Threat,” March 5, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051866.html
Gheissari, Ali, Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 42-89.
Ilias, Shayerah. “Iran’s Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues.” Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2009, 5-34.
Jbili, Abdelali and Vitali Kramerenko. Islamic Republic of Iran: Managing the Transition to a Market Economy. Washington, DC: The International Monetary Fund, 2007, 2-4.
Karshenas, Massoud and Hashem Pesaran. “Economic Reform and the Reconstruction of the Iranian Economy.” The Middle East Journal 49 (1995): 89-111
Looney, Robert E. Income Distribution Policies and Economic Growth in Semi industrialized Countries: A Comparative Study of Iran, Mexico, South Korea, and Brazil. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, 5-25.
Mazarei Jr., Adnan. “The Iranian Economy Under the Islamic Republic: Institutional Change and Macroeconomic Performance (1979-1990).” Cambridge Journal of Economics 20 (1996): 289-314.
Salehi-Isfahani, D. “Iran’s Third Development Plan: A Reappraisal.” Virginia Tech Economics Series (2005): 1-17.
Valadkhani, Abbas. “An Analysis of Iran’s Third Five-Year Development Plan In the Post-Revolution Era (2000-2005).” Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis 17 (2001): 1-21.
Weiss, Martin and Jonathan E. Sanford. “The World Bank and Iran.” Washington, DC Congressional Research Service, 2009: 1-6
Worth, Robert F. “Iran’s Plan to Phase out Subsidies Brings Frenzied Debate.” New York Times. December 1, 2009, accessed March 02, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/middleeast/02iran.html
About Michael Nourafshan
Michael Nourafshan is a senior undergraduate student double majoring in economics and international studies at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He is a current member of Sigma Iota Rho and has actively been involved with the organization since early 2009. His research interests include macroeconomics, financial economics, international economics, and Middle Eastern studies. Michael’s leading influences in the field of international relations include Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, George F. Kennan, and Hannah Arendt. Following graduation in June 2012, Michael plans to enter the investment banking industry and work extensively with private firms operating in emerging market economies.
