By Percia Verlin
Introduction
Hubert Lyautey was the first Resident General of Morocco and ruled beneath the façade of a native Moroccan sultan from 1912-25. Lyautey’s methods were considered widely successful and even emulated in other protectorates and colonies. He believed that military force should only be used as a last resort; it was expensive and alienated the local populace. Instead, Lyautey relied on a few basic principles to rule over his colonial subjects. He won over local leaders and further split social divisions that already existed in society. Lyautey knew that he could cultivate an appearance of legitimacy by controlling local notables. He went so far as to strengthen the positions of native elite, recognizing that they would muffle the effects of social change and keep a check on possible dangerous areas.
By convincing Moroccans that it would be much easier to comply than it would be to face French military action, he “brought tribes to submission”.[1] Lyautey then provided them with modern infrastructure, such as roads, medical facilities and agricultural assistance. These strategies coupled with his knowledge and respect for local customs, institutions, religion, and language were instrumental in the protectorate that lasted for nearly forty years. Though Lyautey’s system has been touted as humane and respectful, it is, like all imperialistic ventures, basically paternalistic and exploitative. The system works well to deal with traditional societies that have relatively undeveloped political systems, but it is not equipped to deal with nationalist movements. In an environment were social divisions are widened and local officials are simply puppets, the native society begins to experience severe tensions.[2] Providing certain groups with privileges and power in a colonized state may serve to control in the immediate sense, but playing favorites only serves to create tensions in an oppressed society that will return to ultimately hurt the imperial force.
Background
In order to examine the ways in which social divisions were exploited in Morocco, we must first review the social distinctions that existed in society. Morocco has a series of racial or ethnic divisions. There are the aboriginal Berbers, or Amazigh, the descendants from 8th century Arab invaders, the migrating Arab tribes of the later Middle Ages, and, finally, the backwash of urban Muslims and Jews who had been forced out of Andalusia. Diversity of languages corresponds somewhat to ethnicity, but not entirely; one third of Morocco’s population of 8 million speaks Berber, and the rest speak specific Arabic dialects that many other Arabs struggle to comprehend. Berbers and Arabs are united under Islam, if not under a common language. There are also serious geographical divisions. Urban people and tribesmen from rural areas both distrust and disapprove of each other. Town loyalties remain strong, even to modern day.
Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire emerged between the 14th and 16th centuries, linking the three continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa together under Turkish rule or influence. The Ottoman Empire began as a dynasty that was created out of a conglomeration of small states and received its namesake from Osman, their first leader. The Osmanli Dynasty started from “the frontier edges of Byzantium and the foothills of Anatolia to Southeastern Europe and the Arabian heartlands” and then expanded in the 16th century from the Danube to the Nile. The empire was multi-ethnic and multi-religious.[3] This diversity made establishing a coherent rule difficult, but the Ottomans rose to the challenge. They negotiated between contradictory, yet complementary political structures. The Ottomans balanced their ruling styles between Christians and Jews, Slavs, Vlachs, and Armenians, Sunni and Shi’a, and a variety of Sufi beliefs. They taxed and administered the collectives but allowed space for local autonomy. [4]
The Ottoman Empire founded their legitimacy in and prided themselves on the strength of their religion. They built a plethora of mosques and religious institutions and fashioned themselves Caliphs (rulers of the Sunni Islamic community).[5] Islam played a significant role in the construction of the empire. The Ottomans entwined religion and politics, which led to the subordination of religion to Ottoman administrative and political goals. Still, the Ottomans realized the importance of stabilizing the diverse groups of subjects. Thus, the Ottomans were flexible and embraced alternative ruling styles.[6] There are many examples of social and cultural interchange; a large amount of migration to Islamic lands, intermarriage among sultans and elites, and documented conversions to Islam. Unfortunately there were also periods were identities violently clashed, and conflicts raged between Muslims and non-Muslims, Christians and Jews. [7] It was with this in mind that the Ottomans introduced the Millet system.
The Millet system promised to incorporate tolerance and diversity into an administrative system. It was a loose organization of central-local arrangements that was only systemized in the 19th century. In order to gain control of the diversity in the Ottoman realm it introduced a script for multi-religious rule. The reforms also aimed to increase legibility in order to keep taxes flowing unhindered into Ottoman rulers’ pockets. Mostly the efforts were to protect non-Muslims from discrimination they might face. They were promised freedom of practice and worship as well as a certain amount of autonomy. They did, however have to recognize the superiority of Islam in the empire. The Millet system created a group for minorities that was “separate, unequal, and protected,” as Jews and Christians were forbidden to build houses taller than Muslim ones, ride horses, or build new houses of worship.[8] Here is where the French “divide and conquer” method can be preliminarily viewed.
From the 15th century to the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire struggled with Morocco and its neighboring Maghrebi provinces in North Africa. The placement of those provinces on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire made their situation a unique one. The Ottomans dealt with an autonomous region like Morocco and a dependent province such as Algeria during their struggle for dominance. The Moroccans were never fully controlled by Ottoman powers, and the two often clashed. During the 16th century the Sa’di and Alawi Dynasties attempted to challenge Ottoman presence in the Maghreb. They claimed superior legitimacy as Caliphs, citing their descent from the prophet. However after the 16th century there was a rapprochement of sorts between the two powers. The Ottoman Padishah seemed willing to accept the Sa’di power as an autonomous one, but tensions flared up again in the mid-17th century over border issues. The Moroccans and Ottomans formed a last peace towards the end of the 18th century, due to the mutual acknowledgment of the greater European threat.[9] These relations are important to note because Morocco maintained its independence during a time when most of its regional neighbors succumbed to Ottoman rule.
The Ottoman Empire acquired Algeria in what seems to be an almost accidental manner. At the beginning of the 16th century, there was a loosely organized maritime war between the Spanish and the Ottomans and North Africans. The city of Algiers, threatened by Spanish ships, requested assistance from some nearby Ottoman pirates. These corsairs, after protecting the city, took control and spread into the surrounding areas. This sudden association permanently aligned Algiers with the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan of the time, Selim I (1512-20), assumed control of the region and put the leader of the corsairs (Barbaros Hayreddin) in charge of their new province as governor-general. The Sultan also sent 2,000 janissaries, or Turkish infantry, and 4,000 volunteers to the new capital of Algiers. By 1587 the province was divided into thirds, from which emerged the modern states of Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. These provinces were ruled by a pasha, a high-ranking Turkish officer, who was sent from Istanbul every three years.[10] Manghreb was swiftly absorbed into the Ottoman Empire andruled by an alien Ottoman elite.
The Ottomans operated in a very specific way in Algeria, tightly controlling the political elite and empowering only a chosen few. They implemented a dual process - Ottomanizing Algerian elites and localizing Ottoman elites – to restrict Algeria in terms of culture and number. Only a minimal number of local elites were included in the Ottoman elites controlling Algeria. Instead, central authority, in today’s Turkey, delegated power. The administration put in place was basically a military organization that refused to recruit from the native population. They endeavored to preserve relative autonomy and, at the same time, demonstrate loyalty to Istanbul by making their existence dependent on imported human capital. They emphasized a manufactured dependence to preserve central control and prevent peripheral rebellion. [11] These fears incensed the elite to cultivate extreme “Turkishnesss” and exclusiveness. In order to do this they recruited janissaries from outside the province, de-incentivized marriages with local women and refused to include the children of these marriages into the elite.
The development of a Turkish identity among the elite involved embracing a variety of Turkish features such as lifestyle, language, and religion. These elites whole-heartedly threw themselves into the endeavor of being Turkish in an Algerian environment, separating themselves significantly from the indigenous population. Most of the elites came from non-Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire, they spoke Ottoman Turkish instead of Algerian Arabic and even dressed differently. The elites also subjected themselves to a different system of law, Hanafi instead of Mliki. This process of Turkishnization reached a climax in the 18th century. The trend of a minority of the population using a different judicial system can be seen extensively during French colonialism as well. The military-administrative elites also functioned under a non-hereditary status; their children could not be considered or operate as elites in Algeria.[12] The elite’s ability to persevere under this system long after the janissary corps of the imperial center abandoned it is uniquely impressive.
The policy of refusing to recruit natives into the janissary corps was not completely kept; about 1% of the infantry was made up of indigenous inhabitants. But no other program in the Empire adhered to this level of strictness. Aleppo had 4,000 locals enlisted in the Ottoman regiments and Cairo had 14,000. Recruiting locally was an essential strategy in other Arab provinces. By not employing native inhabitant, the symbol of Turkish authority remained the focal point of the elite. Nevertheless, this system had its consequences both financially and politically. By leaving the key to the Algerian Ottoman in the Sultan’s hands, the Sultan retained significant leverage. He used this to enhance his sovereignty in the remote province and overcome Algerian disobedience. The restrictive recruitment policy continued to be practiced until 1830. [13] However, the Ottoman elite was not satisfied with these conservatory measures; they also worked to avoid intermarriage between “Turks” and Algerians.
Their marriage policy within the janissary corps was practiced during the 18th century and directed to avoid the inevitable outcome of marriages, offspring, in order to maintain segregation between the elite and local population. Janissary foot soldiers, the lowest ranking soldiers, consisted of 80% of the Ottoman elite in Algeria. They would lose a series of benefits if they abandoned their celibacy and engaged with native women. A married soldier would lose his residency in one of the city’s eight barracks, lose his daily ration of four loaves of bread, and his right to purchase products at preferential prices.[14] These policies demonstrate not only how much the Ottoman elites wished to prevent the creation of kuloglus, but also the privileges that the janissaries experienced during their stay in Algeria. Providing only a minority with certain privileges that could eventually infuriate the majority into action.
The sons of Ottoman janissaries and Algerian women had kuloglu or ibn al-turki added to their name. The Ottoman elites intensely feared the growing number of kuloglu, and created the marriage policy as a remedy. The kuloglus were viewed as the Turk’s worst enemy during the 18th century, and for good reason. They had begun to operate as a group as early as 1596, when Hizir Pasha was governor of the province. Pasha attempted to use them in his struggle against the janissary corps.[15] The kuloglus were the obvious object of Ottoman distress because they felt they rightfully should be able to hold positions of power. Withholding this privilege from them made them turn against the Turkish elite.
In 1659 a transition period began in the Ottoman controlled province of Algeria. The real political power was transferred from the imperial pasha to a local ruler, who bore the title of Dey.[16] This suggests a larger transfer of power between foreign and local leaders. Thus ensued an internal political struggle between diverse factions in the Algerian Ottoman elite, lasting until 1729. Though no kuloglus became Dey in the 18th century, they occupied many other high-ranking posts in the first half of the century, and a lower amount in the second half. Only one kuloglu held the position of Bey (governor of a district of the province) between 1748 and 1780. The province soon became autonomous, and continued to be until the French conquest of Algiers in 1830.[17] The kuloglus did in fact gain political power when the imperial center lost control of its province. Their peripheral location, a placement that made the Ottoman elite in Algeria so insecure, became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Their stringent policies against the dilution of power did little to stop the imperial center’s ultimate disinterest in Algeria and local rulers regaining their positions of power.
Colonization
French rule in Algeria began in 1830 but the French did not fully control the country until 1880. Many French immigrated to Algeria, seeing it as a land of opportunities, and themselves as frontiersmen.[18] The French attempted to construct colonized Algeria as a natural extension of France itself. Their strategy was to grow the French population, cultivate the land, create modern European cities and integrate the Algerian economy with the French economy. They confiscated native Algerian lands and divided them up among the French settlers. The country was divided into three departments, Algiers, Oran and Constantine and organized into Northern Algeria. Unfortunately, the French were wholly unprepared to deal with their Muslim charges. They had ingrained cultural stereotypes that stemmed from the centuries old hostility between Christian Europe and Islamic North Africa.
France decided they needed to crush the power of Islam and de-Arabize Algeria. They blamed Islam for hatred, violence, bloodshed and the “jihad” against progressive forces of Europe. In order to do this France decided to make Algerian Muslims politically impotent. They denigrated the faith and depicted it as a hostile religion with a possible impending holy war. The French took the first steps in restricting native rights in 1881 by imposing the Code de l’indigenant, which set harsher penalties for Algerian Muslims convicted of certain offenses. In 1884 another statute was introduced that reduced the representation of Muslims in the communal councils from one-third to one-fourth.[19] This was possible because the French minority that controlled the government and economy created a subordinate and inferior status for the native Algerians, 90-85% of the population.[20]
Even though France tried to keep up the pretense of incorporating Algerian people into the French culture, they implemented little in terms of reforms to do so. Instead in 1870 the Crémieux Decree made only Algerian Jews French citizens. Recognizing that Algerian Jews had been oppressed minorities for centuries, their “upgrade” as French citizens was meant to give them an increased sense of security. Algerian Muslims, on the other hand, were wary of French citizenship, because with it came a new civil code deemed superior to Koranic law. However the majority of Algerian Muslims did not initially need to worry about becoming French citizens because most were not willing to fulfill the requirements. The prerequisites were to speak French and give up “one’s personal status under Koranic law by the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the French civil code,” [21] which most Algerians were not willing to do, and those that did remained on the periphery of French society.
In 1947 all native Algerians became French citizens, without the stipulation of giving up their adherence to Koranic law. The French were aware that Muslim Algerians were unlikely to simply trade their loyalty to Koranic law for the citizenship to a country that subjugated them. Algerians who continued to adhere to Koranic law were subsequently placed under a different electoral status. There were two electoral colleges in Colonial Algeria, one was comprised of Frenchmen and a small number assimilated Muslims, and the other consisted of most of the Algerian population. Each college elected an equal number of representatives for the French National Assembly and Algerian Assembly. The electoral college statute was in fact not at all created to pacify the rising anger of Algerian nationalists but to supplement French dominance. [22] Separating the French from unassimilated Algerians in the election process made sure that Muslims did not overwhelm the French, as they would if they had actual representation.
The French had also turned their attention on Morocco as a North African country ripe for exploitation. In 1905 the Moroccan government tried to stop French intervention by switching its French military advisors to Muslim ones from other countries but the Muslim military advisors faired not better against French diplomatic pressures and refusal of loans. Even Egyptians and Turks came to Moroccan aid when their political system broke down and widespread resistance erupted. A pan-Islamic organization created in Egypt had a parallel faction in Morocco, which was desperately trying to resist colonial rule. Even with these widespread Arab efforts, Germany signed and agreement with France that honored Morocco as protectorate in 1911.[23] In 1912 The French were still cleaning up remaining strains of resistance in Fez and Marrakesh. They laid siege to Fez and completely took over Marrakesh and by the end of 1912, the French moved into Morocco.
This struggle was happening all over the MENA region. There was rivalry for both Tunisia and Morocco; competition from Italy in Tunisia and Germany, Great Britain and Spain competed for control of Morocco. This troubled start and competition prevented the annexation that Algeria experienced, and instead Tunisia and Morocco were established as protectorates. Tunisia’s fate was decided at the Convention of La Marsa (June 8, 1883), when the Tunisian Bey pledged to “undertake the administrative, judicial, and financial reforms which the French Government shall consider useful” in order to “facilitate for the French Government the accomplishment of its protectorate.” [24] In Morocco, France gained the governing ruler's consent to place measures allowing them to reform the existing regime instead of removing existing rulers and institutions. The Treaty of Fez (March 30, 1912) echoed Tunisia’s fate
The government of the French Republic and His Majesty the Sultan have agreed to institute in Morocco, a new regime which will bring about the administrative, judicial, educational, financial, and military reforms which the French government shall consider necessary to introduce in the Moroccan territory. [25]
France had used its extensive persuasive powers, notably its armed forces and compliance of the European powers in their actions, to achieve this favorable arrangement.[26]
The Protectorate technique used a Resident General who exercised full government powers while supposedly working under Bey or Sultan. The policies created in the Protectorate were usually in the interest of the French, creating favorable environment for French settling and economic expansion. Much like Algeria, land was taken for European settlement, and they executed a number of modernizing projects. The French built roads, ports, railroads and imposed modern administrative methods. Morocco became financially and economically connected to France; the countries of the Maghreb were the France’s sources for raw materials and industrial products. [27] Europe was focused on exploiting Morocco’s natural wealth, and began to as early as 1912. They used the best arable lands of western Morocco for their wheat fields, orchards and vineyards. They developed European ports in Tangier and Casablanca and mined Morocco’s abundant supply of phosphate. Moroccans were unable to compete since the French passed a law forbidding Europeans to sell land to natives.[28]
These were all a part of France’s plan to use Morocco to supplement their wealth and influence internationally. They attempted to distract the Moroccan population by creating tensions between Arabs and Berbers until 1930. France emphasized divisions among Moroccan society by first giving official sanction to Berber tribal law. They also built a special school in the Middle Atlas where handpicked Berber boys could be educated (safely away from Arabs).[29] This divided Morocco into two cultural spheres. The Dahir Berbere, or Berber Decree by the French administration institutionalized 2 different legal systems, one for the Amazigh, which was based on customary law and the other for the Arabs, which was based on Sharia law. This distinction was strongly opposed by both parties. This is a prime example of France’s implementation of the divide and rule maxim and an attempt at an attack to Muslim unity in Morocco.[30] But this was only one of the social division that the French planned to take advantage of.
The Jewish population of Morocco had been marginalized since the Ottoman period of influence. In 1863-64 Sir Moses Montefiore asked Sidi Muhammad’s (1859-73) court to implement reforms like the Ottoman Tanzimat, which would remove legal disabilities that came with the dhimmi status of Jews. The Sultan instead issued a dahir that restated the protection of the Jewish people that can be found in the traditional Islamic system of justice.[31] The dhimmi status of Jews then persisted until 1912.[32] Under French rule, February 1913, it was recommended that Jews be adjudicated before French Courts, instead of native ones. However the notion was rejected; Algerian experience was not to be repeated in Morocco, The French wished to avoid further agitating Muslim population against colonist rule. Tunisian Jews were also considered natives and subject to Muslim jurisdiction in the Tunisian vizirial courts.
They did this because it was deemed the best way to control the Jewish population. Even though Jews remained under the jurisdiction of the Muslim Moroccan courts, there were still two separate systems of administration in Morocco under the French. The Sultan and Makhzan, headed by grand-vizir, led one system and resident-general led the other. French courts were established August 12th 1913, which were independent of native courts and created only to judge Europeans, excluding westernized and formerly privileged Jews.[33] Predictably, the French administration wrote these laws and decrees and the sultan simply rubber-stamped them. This Sultan puppet act was used to legitimize French rule in Morocco, they rarely ever actually consulted the Moroccan sovereign or Makhzan.[34]
A Rising Native Political Elite
The traditional religious leaders of the original political elite were growing more and more concerned about the state of Morocco.[35] There was a large move from rural to urban life, and three social groups were created: 1) a Moroccan successful merchant class, a haute bourgeoisie that was resentful of French dominance, 2) poor passive masses living in city slums, 3) and the French community of privileged, entrenched, entrepreneurs and petites fonctionnaires. The French-oppressed Moroccan state became a locus of ideological growth for a native intellectual elite, who would become the future source for a native nationalist movement. The French only had themselves to blame for this emergence; their ideals of liberté, egalité, fraternité and a western liberal-democratic tradition influenced the Moroccans to strive for equality, freedom, and brotherhood.
The French policies that limited Maghreb power also included repressing native resistance. French forces forcefully suppressed native nationalism; however, their oppression was only a temporary solution to an underlying long-term problem emerging in the Maghreb. They further aggravated the problem, thereby creating a cycle of oppression that fed resistance and heightened suppression.[36] The European treatment of their “protected” fledgling states incensed similar nationalist movements in Tunisia. The protectorate regime institutionalized the unequal dichotomy between Europeans and North Africans. Thus, the semblance of indigenous sovereignty permitted under French rule magnified the lust for independence. Nationalists fought back against protectorate policies and institutions, arguing that they were vestiges of imperialism from the 19th century. They also asserted that a protectorate was supposed to be temporary and that it was the time to restore independence.
The French in Tunisia and Morocco were aliens in their protectorates. In contrast, their leadership in Algeria remained strong due to lofty ideas about being “one” with France. The French accepted this status at first but then the rising nationalist movements made them nervous about their uncertain legal status as residents. This made them strongly reject any concessions made to nationalist pressures and make moves to preserve and perpetuate their rights and privileges. They decided a Resident General was not enough political power enough and demanded direct influence in the government. Nationalists similarly rejected reforms that favor the French settlers.[37] The French saw their colonial conquests begin to crumble around them. WWII impacted North Africa colonized peoples especially. Indigenous peoples saw their European rulers defeated and changes in the Muslim world such as the creation of The Arab League, and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Libya, India and Burma gaining their independence inspired Moroccans to stand up for themselves. After WWI the foundation of colonization was shaken, U.S. President Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination and the Soviet revolution appealed to colonial peoples. Colonized people became assertive and created militant nationalist movements.
Conclusion
North Africa has experienced various forms of colonialism from the 15th century to the 20th. Algeria arguably has received the most intense forms, both during the Ottoman Empire and French imperialistic rule. Morocco remained partly unscathed due to its location at the very westernmost edge of North Africa. The two main systems of control focused on giving special privileges and powers to the ethnic minorities that remained separate from the native populations. The Jews and Berbers of Algeria and Morocco were targeted in order to shift animosity from the Muslim majority away from the ruling powers and towards the minorities. Unfortunately these strategies often backfired. Instead the privileged parties also rejected the favoritism and the majority populations continued to focus on the foreign rulers.
The most ineffective strategy of oppression was actually the strategy of holding political power in a small, removed class of people. The Kuloglus of the Ottoman era and the Moroccans and Algerians of the French era received conflicting signals from their oppressive powers. They were enticed with the appearance of power, or the promise, and yet these promises did not deliver. This caused intense backlash, both these groups then strove even harder to achieve the political power that they had expected to receive. Finally, the foreign powers saw their empires falter and fall, and the people whom they had worked so hard to suppress were the ones who succeeded in constructing a new state in their stead.
Footnotes:
[1] Edmund Burke, “A Comparative View of French Native Policy in Morocco and Syria, 1912-1925,” Middle Eastern Studies 9 (1973): 177, accessed December 4th, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282469.
[2] Burke, “A Comparative View,” 178.
[3] Karen Barkey, “Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 19 (2005): 10, accessed November 3, 2014, http://jstor.org/stable/20059691.
[4] Barkey, “Islam and Toleration,” 11.
[5] Ibid, 12.
[6] Ibid, 9.
[7] Ibid, 17.
[8] Ibid, 18.
[9] El Moudden, “The Idea of the Caliphate between Moroccans and Ottomans,” 111.
[10] Tal Shuval, “The Ottoman Algerian Elite and its Ideology,” Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000): 326, accessed October 12, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/259512.
[11] Shuval, “The Ottoman Algerian Elite and its Ideology,” 323.
[12] Ibid, 327.
[13] Ibid, 329.
[14] Ibid, 330.
[15] Ibid, 330.
[16] Ibid, 331.
[17] Ibid, 335.
[18] James J. Cooke, “Tricolor and Crescent: Franco-Muslim Relations in Colonial Algeria 1880-1940,” Islamic Studies 29 (1990): 57, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20839982.
[19] Cooke, “Tricolor and Crescent,” 60.
[20] Rivlin, “Context and Sources of Political Tensions,” 112.
[21] Benjamin Rivlin, “Context and Sources of Political Tensions in French North Africa,” American Academy of Political and Social Science 298 (1955): 111, accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1028711.
[22] Cooke, “Tricolor and Crescent,” 63.
[23] Edmund Burke, “Pan Islamism and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912,” The Journal of African History 13 (1972): 102, accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/180969.
[24] Rivlin, “Context and Sources of Political Tensions,” 112.
[25] Ibid, 112.
[26] Ibid,.
[27] Ibid, 113.
[28] Cline, “Nationalism in Morocco,” 21.
[29] Ibid, 19.
[30] Abderrahman el Aissati “Ethnic Identity, Language Shift, and the Amazigh Voice in Morocco and Algeria,” Race, Gender, & Class 8 (2001): 61, accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41674983.
[31] Daniel J. Schroeter and Joseph Chetrit, “Emancipation and its Discontents: Jews at the Formative Period of Colonial Rule in Morocco,” Jewish Social Studies 13 (2006): 170, accessed December 6, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4467761.
[32] Ibid, 176.
[33] Ibid, 179.
[34] Ibid, 175.
[35] Rivlin, “Context and Sources of Political Tensions,” 109.
[36] Ibid, 110.
[37] Ibid, 113.
Works Cited
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