By Simon Ciccarillo
Since November of 2013, the crisis in Ukraine has drawn increasing international attention to a circumstance that is more apparent, than threatening for a number of countries. The fact that Ukraine is a member neither of NATO nor of the European Union emphasizes this point. Why then did the United States and the EU feel the necessity to enter into this issue at all? In the US, the general sentiment is that the territorial integrity of Ukraine has been compromised, that Russia should not have invaded Crimea, and that Russian policymakers’ suggestion that they do not want to invade or annex more of Ukraine is eerily similar to promises made by Adolf Hitler in the years before the outbreak of World War II. This flagrant anti-Russian sentiment underscores an increasingly bellicose reaction from the West, and in particular, the US. This reaction however, is misplaced, and though well intentioned, is an overreaction to events not truly concerning the United States.
In October of 2014, Professor John Mearshimer authored an article critiquing US policy toward Russia, giving an in-depth and realist-based view as to why pursuing such a strong anti-Russian policy is not how the US should conduct relations with Russia. In fact, according to Mearshimer, “the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis.”[1] In the article, Mearshimer reminds his readers that US and Western countries had antagonized Russia when it was unnecessary to do so in the form of NATO expansion. This along with the Clinton Administration’s interference in the Balkans conflicts (another traditional sphere of Russian influence) without including Russia as a major ally, and the Bush Administration’s harsh condemnation of Russian actions in Georgia in August of 2008 caused a feeling of alienation to emerge in Russia. In Russian educational institutions, antagonizing events and foreign policy decisions such as these are taught and explored deeply, causing a continued fomentation of negative feelings and hostile actions on the Russian side of policy. In Russia, policymakers generally view themselves as morally right, or at least justify what may be considered against international law (influencing the Ukraine Conflict), by providing examples of when the US or other Western powers took part in similar actions previously. It makes little sense to continue this vicious-cycle trend if constructive policy and a peaceful, favorable world is desired by both the US and Russia. Unfortunately, negative public image and trends occurs in the US as well based on similar logic – demonstrating Russian aggression as a threat to international stability.
A Gallup poll conducted from February 8-11 of 2015 showed Americans viewing Russia as an enemy, not an ally, and around 72% look unfavorably on Russia and President Putin, making Russia America’s greatest enemy according to the US population, even past North Korea.[2] This predisposition against Russia seems to be the guiding force in the US response to the Ukraine crisis. In this case, President Vladimir Putin has suggested that the move to take and annex Crimea was a correction of an illegality dating to 1954, when Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union simply redrew the boundaries of Ukraine by giving it Crimea as a gift of friendship between Russia and Ukraine. This was all done without consulting Crimeans, Russians, or Ukrainians. Khrushchev’s arbitrary move was not based on popular consent at the time, and certainly did not take anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union would 57 years later. Therefore, a claim that popular consent should be safeguarded cannot be a valid argument for the United States to use. Even so, one need only look to the duties and oath of the President of the Russian Federation, including: “to protect the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity” as well as, “to protect the rights and freedoms of man and citizen” respectively.[3] It seems logical that President Putin felt the duty to protect and defend Russian citizens, which by a 2001 Ukrainian census suggests 17.3% (or 8,334,100 Ukrainians) identify themselves as ethnic Russians.[4] That number does not include the thousands of ethnic Ukrainians opposed to the new government. Actions taken by the new Ukrainian government and supported by Western powers have not improved the situation to date. For example, Ukraine sent billionaire CEOs such as Igor Kolomoysky and Sergey Taruta into eastern Ukraine as provincial governors with the purpose of economically coercing workers to desist supporting pro-Russian separatists.[5] The fact that the U.S. is supporting such a government is hypocritical at best, since that is not representative of its own people. Thus, democratic principles are not a valid reason to support the new Ukrainian government either. In fact, the current government under Petro Poroshenko came to power based off a coup that removed a democratically elected president from power.
The United States should not hastily move to support the new government of Ukraine given the difficulty of the US or its policymakers to view the crisis from the point of Russia. In his annexation of Crimea speech to the Federal Assembly, as well as from the beginning of his presidency in 2000, President Putin has grown increasingly vocal about the way Russia feels it has been historically treated by the United States, suggesting, “we were cheated again and again, with decisions being taken behind our back.”[6] Examples he gave included foreign policy choices in Kosovo, as well as Syria, which explains the hostility of the Russian reaction to militant Western involvement in Ukraine. Not only has Ukraine been vital to Russian defense (housing the Russian Black Sea Fleet), it has also been tied to Russia culturally for hundreds of years in terms of religious faith, as a buffer region after repeated European invasions into Russia, and as the jewel and breadbasket of Russia for abundance in natural resources. Thus, Russia has found it imperative to keep Ukraine close – as a bordering state – and away from the perceived threats of the West, which are historically well founded. Since the Putin Administration uses a form of realist international theory to govern its actions on the international stage, one can also assume that the power, prosperity, and protection of the state is a key element to Russian grand strategy – as it is for the US and many other countries. What the West fails to do is place itself a similar scenario. For example, if the Mexican government was to collapse and be replaced by a government sympathetic to Beijing or Moscow, or became a failed state due to the serious cartel-induced war between gangs and the government, the US might react similarly to how Russia is in Ukraine. With these understandings, as well as the fact that the United States and other European powers have acted with hostility, one can see why Russia has acted the way it has, and why the West has effectively dug itself deeper into a diplomatically calamitous hole.
The response by the United States in particular has been rather weak, delayed, and ultimately ineffective except to alienate Russia further and increase tensions. The first round of sanctions as well as the removal of Russia from the G8 brought criticism from Russian leaders including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who said, “the G8 is an informal organization that does not give out any membership cards and, by its definition, cannot remove anyone…we don’t see a great misfortune if it will not gather.”[7] Russian officials affected by sanctions lambasted President Obama for freezing assets in a country in which they do not have anything of particular value. No effective diplomacy can be expected to come with current circumstances, especially with NATO – an organization focused on military operations – taking a direct role in the Ukraine crisis. This is not the time to be tough on Russia – a country attempting to deal with its own demographic, economic, and military shortcomings. It is not reasonable to assume Russia could or would be a serious threat to NATO or American security. What Russia does posses is more independence and power in terms of being able to delay diplomatic missions in Syria or other parts of the Middle East than it is given credit for. Moscow has already proven useful in coming to an agreement with Iran on its nuclear development, as well as removing chemical weapons from Syria. Not only that, but Russia is still quite significant for Europe as a trade partner, since it controls a major energy supply to European countries, and acts as a large importer from European markets.
In the Middle East, new threats such as ISIS have made cooperation between the West and Russia absolutely necessary. In Syria, Russia has proven it is able to effectively conduct combat missions with its special forces and air force – having activated half of its bombers to begin a large-scale air campaign not seen in years. However, continuing to create problems where there should not be have hindered cooperation. When the Russian bomber was shot down over Turkey by Turkish forces recently, the United States was quick to side with the Turkish government – as were other members of NATO (Turkey is also a member), which believed the Russian jet to have repeatedly entered Turkish airspace without authorization. The obvious question here is what exactly the Turkish government thought the Russian jet was doing? Russia had made perfectly clear that its air force was in the area to combat enemies of the Assad government, namely ISIS. It had made no prior, hostile actions or remarks to Turkey that suggested it was a real threat. Realistically, an attack against Turkey would incur the wrath of NATO or at the very least create another problem area for Russia that could lead to greater economic or political isolation. That is in no way beneficial or smart diplomacy, and rationally not something any state, including Russia, would pursue. The fact that the West has fueled the fire of this new conflict has not brought improved relations any nearer.
One way to deal with Russia in general for the US may be to compartmentalize diplomatic relations with Russia. Instead of allowing negative relations in one region of the world dictate all relations, each region of the world (Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, etc.) could be viewed separately to better organize and cooperate on diplomacy. What is clear is that rather than engage Russia with brinksmanship, which will not constructively help any country, the U.S. and Western powers must be more conciliatory and understanding of Russia’s position by responding diplomatically, with all lines of diplomacy in use before resorting to force. The talks that will be held to resolve the crisis on April 17, 2013 in Geneva were a good step. Another step the West might consider is ending ineffective sanctions and removal of Russian participation from international organizations, as it serves only to galvanize Russia further. Reinstating Russia into the G8 as well as allowing the European Union to become the direct mediator between the West and Russia is the most sound policy decision. Perhaps even recognizing Russia’s claim to Crimea, and accepting the referendum that cemented its annexation, though a large concession, could be possible in the future. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, could lead further talks. Ashton has proven herself able most notably by chairing the P5+1 negotiations with Iran on nuclear matters in 2013, leading to an interim agreement in Geneva on the Iranian nuclear program. With her diplomatic skills, general EU leadership in negotiations, and a well-informed, conciliatory approach to Russia, a more constructive dialogue can be opened and result in the end to a crisis, perhaps with an internationally monitored referendum in eastern Ukraine on independence or autonomy. If this can be done, a final agreement may be achieved in a timely, peaceful manner. [8]
Simon Ciccarillo is a senior at Dickinson College, who is double majoring in Russian Studies and International Relations with a focus on Eastern Europe and Russia. The inspiration to write this op-ed piece came from his critical view of US foreign policy on the Ukraine and Crimea crises, seeing the current situation as destructive and ultimately harmful for US-Russian relations. Last year (Academic Year: 2014-2015), he studied International Relations and Russian at the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow, Russia. This transformative experience helped shape the understanding of US and Russian foreign policy, culminating in a research project on the two interacting in Latin America. During the summer of 2015, he interned at the US Army War College in Carlisle, PA assisting the director of the Eurasia Program. Simon hopes to continue research in that region of the world, and analysis of diplomatic exchanges between the US, Russia, and Latin American countries.
Works Cited:
[1] Mearsheimer, John J. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5
(September 2014): 77-89. Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost. Accessed December 6, 2015.
[2] Jones, Jeffery. Americans Increasingly See Russia as Threat, Top U.S. Enemy. Gallup.com.
February 16, 2015. http://www.gallup.com/poll/181568/americans-increasingly-russia-threat-top- enemy.aspx?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_content=morelink&utm_campaign=syndication. Accessed December 6, 2015.
[3] Bucknell University. "SECTION ONE." Russian Constitution Chapter 4.
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/ch4.html. Accessed December 6, 2015.
[4] State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. "The Distribution of the Population by Nationality and
Mother Tongue." All Ukrainian Population Census. 2003-2004. http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/nationality_population/nationality_1/s5/?botton=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=00&p=80&rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1%20%20%20&n_page=5. Accessed December 6, 2015.
[5] Russia Today. "Rule by Oligarchs: Kiev Appoints Billionaires to Govern East. RT English.
March 3, 2014. https://www.rt.com/news/ukraine-oligarch-rule-governors-512/. Accessed December 6, 2015.
[6] Walker, Shaun. Putin condemns western hypocrisy as he confirms annexation of Crimea. The
Guardian. March 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/crimea-putin-condemns-western-hypocrisy-annexation. Accessed December 6, 2015.
[7] De Clercq, Geert. Russia's Lavrov says no problem if G8 does not meet. Reuters. March 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/24/us-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-g-idUSBREA2N1D820140324. Accessed December 6, 2015.
