By: Mateja Nikolic
Abstract: This research paper is an excerpt of a larger body of work completed as a graduate thesis by the same author, regarding the War in Ukraine and the future status of Donbass. This section specifically focuses on the possible scenarios relating to the status of Donbass, examining how the conflict may evolve. The paper outlines four main scenarios: the situation in Donbass remaining the same for the foreseeable future, reintegration with Ukraine, military take over of the sepetarist held areas by Ukraine, or a Russian invasion of the region. The key findings of the thesis identified that the status of Donbass may remain the same for the foreseeable future; the study found that due to the political gridlock regarding the integration of the Minsk Agreements, the conflict will remain frozen, with few changes and skirmishes of varying intensity. A survey of academics, OSCE employees who worked in Ukraine, UN employees, and a German foreign ministry worker pointed to the same outcome.
Introduction
The conflict in Ukraine has been ongoing for seven years, leaving millions displaced and thousands of dead. The ouster of President Yanukovych in February of 2014, the annexation of Crimea by Russia during February and March of the same year, and the flareup of violence in Donbass on April 6th (2014) culminated in a civil war that is still seeing daily skirmishes. The Minsk Agreements are preventing the conflict from escalating further and may provide a pathway for a peaceful resolution. The election of President Zelensky of Ukraine in 2019 and a change of government may provide an opportunity in conflict resolution. This research will focus on the events from 2014 through 2021. The objective is to ascertain the future status of Donbass, with the key question being what is the likely outcome of the war and what strategies is Ukraine pursuing regarding the conflict?
When trying to predict the outcome of such a crisis, one is dealing with uncertainty. The future of Donbass is unpredictable, meaning that it is difficult to attach statistical probabilities relating to the different outcomes, which may occur inside or outside the region that are wholly unforeseeable and may change the status of Donbass forever. There is no cyclical theory of history which predicts the timing, scale, and the nature of the next war or conflict. This may be one of the reasons as to why societies go from one crisis to the next, preparing for the last war until a new one arrives.[1]Donbass is no different. As such, this study is an examination of the possible scenarios for the region, attempting to understand them and their possible consequences. It does not attempt to predict a single scenario over the others.
The causes of the war are complex; there are historical, socio-economic, and geopolitical reasons that can explain the sources of fighting. Therefore, to examine the War in Donbass specifically, this study assesses the conflict holistically, looking into the general causes of the war and exploring the different actors involved, both nations and individuals. From this research, one can better understand the different dynamics of the conflict, both domestic and international.
The paper utilizes scenario planning as part of its methodology, looking into each scenario and examining the process behind its possible occurrence. The work does this by dividing the outcome of the war into four potential scenarios: the conflict will remain frozen for perhaps decades (as it is today), with ceasefire violations of varying intensity, but no large offensives taking place; Donetsk and Luhansk will reunite with Ukraine (peacefully), with some autonomy, as stipulated by the Minsk II Agreement; Ukraine will take over the separatist held areas through force; and Russia will launch a new offensive, completely taking over the Donbass region.
Scenario I: Frozen Conflict
There are aspects pointing to a long-term impasse in Donbass (perhaps decades). Since 2015, there have been very few changes after the signing of the Minsk II Agreement; the agreement, itself, has not been followed, despite many years of opportunities in implementing its provisions. Based on the reports from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine,[2] as of March 4th, 2021, there were 105 ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region. Such violations, occurring daily between the two combatants, not only break the agreement but make it void if they become a norm on the frontlines. Importantly, the Mission observed heavy weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in the Donetsk area, located in a non-government controlled section, effectively breaking the second and third provision of the agreement,[3] which states that there needs to be a withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front lines by both sides. As this violation occurred in a non-government-controlled area, it points to the possibility that the separatists (local militias from the unrecognized Luhansk and Donetsk People’s republics) are responsible for it, representing a lack of will from their side in implementing the agreement.
These ceasefire violations delegitimize Minsk II and show that there is a lack of will in respecting the agreement and the likelihood that it will not be further implemented. Furthermore, an exchange of fire also has the potential of spiraling out of control, possibly drawing retaliation by the receiving side.
“The loser gets Donbass” is an expression predicated on the fact that whoever acquires the region would have to spend billions of dollars in its reconstruction efforts – another factor highlighting that the conflict will remain unresolved. This also relates to the repatriation of millions of refugees whose homes have been destroyed. Other factors doing the same would be the difficulty to achieve reconciliation efforts if separatist held areas integrate back into Ukraine. After seven years of violence, how would trust be achieved, how would vigilante justice be prevented in instances where revenge is wanted? As previously mentioned, relating to this scenario and to these questions, what should Ukraine do about the thousands of armed separatists, who through years of propaganda, have a strong hatred towards Kiev. The same can be said of Ukrainians who see the separatists and populations under their control as traitors – how to reconcile such different views? These factors lead to the gridlock of Minsk II and showcase the complexity of the situation. Perhaps, it is far simpler for the opposing sides to keep the conflict frozen than to truly seek peace and reconciliation as they carry with them massive complexities. On the other hand, escalation and full-blown war are also costly, whereas low level skirmishes are not.
As Lugansk and Donetsk lack international recognition – not even by Russia – these self-proclaimed entities do not have the authority to act as sovereign states. They are represented by Russia in the Normandy Format and the Minsk negotiations, a country in which they are not a constituent part of. This is significant as the population of the region is not represented by its own leadership. Its interests are not represented, instead Moscow’s interests for the region are the region’s own. Further, unlike Crimea, Russia has so far not annexed the Donbass region, perhaps due to the reasons above. This is despite the want of the separatists to be annexed by Russia. The lack of recognition for the two republics points to the conflict remaining unresolved; the lack of legitimate authority and disputed territorial integrity makes the War in Donbass difficult to resolve.
Ultimately, these factors indicate that the War in Donbass could become a decades long frozen conflict, an internationally unrecognized region in a continuous struggle reminiscent of other parts of the former Soviet bloc: Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, and North Ossetia. All these areas have one thing in common -- Russia intervention. Russia considers the areas of the former Soviet Union as part of its zone of influence, something discussed in the fourth scenario.
Scenario II: Reintegration into Ukraine
The negotiations on the reunification of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Ukraine have largely stalled, and there have been few attempts in implementing or renegotiating the provisions.
The Minsk II Agreement provides a framework for the gradual turnover of those territories to Ukraine; point eight refers to reinstating taxation and other payments within the legal structure of Ukraine.[4] That so far has not occurred. The irredentist governments have their own methods of taxation, the institutions necessary to implement their tax policies, and financial and humanitarian aid from Russia. Having separate institutions and financial systems makes it more difficult for reunification.
A major area of disagreement is point nine, relating to reinstating the full control of Ukraine’s borders after reaching an agreement on local elections and a comprehensive political settlement. As a comprehensive political settlement was not reached, Ukraine’s borders were never restored.
Another crucial paragraph in the agreement, one that has had domestic political consequences, is point 11 regarding constitutional reform in Ukraine. This section adopts a special status to the Donetsk and Luhansk (D/LPR) oblasts, meaning giving those entities more autonomy. Giving D/LPR more autonomy as part of reunification is a sensitive topic in Ukraine, with many seeing such policies as being pro-Russian and acquiescing to Russian demands. On October 2nd, 2019, hundreds of Ukrainians protested President Zelensky's statement that he would back the Steinmeier formula, bringing elections to areas controlled by the separatists.[5] The formula is a package directly tied to Minsk II, named after the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The formula refers to a political and legal settlement in the Donbass region by holding local elections in D/LPR. Such elections are to be held in line with Ukrainian legislation and according to the standards set by the OSCE. The Minsk Trilateral Contact Group -- representatives from Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE -- were meant to develop a bill on local elections in D/LPR, while the Verkhovna Rada, the parliament of Ukraine, was to adopt the bill within four weeks,[6] with the elections being held within 90 days. On the election day, a law was supposed to be enacted on giving autonomy to the two regions in Donbass.[7]
However, the law was never passed by the Verkhovna Rada in the previous years because according to Ukraine, the conditions for the elections were never met as the region is occupied by what it sees as Russian forces. From Kiev’s perspective, a disarmament and withdrawal is necessary for the elections to be valid. After President Zelensky agreed to follow the formula in the fall of 2019, nationalists rallied in Kiev with banners saying, “no capitulation.”[8] As a result, the president redefined his support and stated that the elections would only be held when Russian forces leave the area. As the Steinmeier formula allows for local elections in the presence of such foreign forces, making Ukraine’s actions contradictory towards the formula and the Minsk II overall. According to the agreement, there is no need for the separatists to disarm or for any foreign troops to leave. Such actions, although carrying domestic support for the president, make Ukraine lose its credibility in the Normandy Format, a diplomatic effort involving Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine to end the war.
Despite President Zelensky’s attempt to simultaneously engage in negotiations and shore up support for himself and his party, Servant of the People (SVP), he has managed to do neither. One of the president’s election promises which made him win the election in a landslide against Poroshenko (his predecessor and former incumbent) was that he would end the war in Donbass. So far, President Zelensky has not made a great step towards achieving this goal. This can be a contributing factor along with other reasons as to why his party had mixed results during the 2020 local elections. Servant of the People did not win any mayoral races in oblast centers, its popularity has declined to 34 percent, and Zelensky’s popularity declined from 73.2 percent to 31.8 percent.[9] His loss of support may lead to further instability and delay in reintegration if the separatists themselves, or Russia for that matter, do not see Zelensky as being politically capable of implementing Minsk II.
After years of propaganda, the way the two sides perceive each other, along with the institutional, structural issues, will be crucial in reincorporating separatists’ areas back to Ukraine. After years of war where thousands have died on both sides and extensive misinformation and the attribution of blame is central to conflict resolution, shaping the possible outcome of the war.[10] In D/LPR, around 43 percent of people believe that the Ukrainian government is to blame for the war, while only around 13 percent in government-controlled territories in Donbass place the blame on Kiev. 32 percent of the gov-controlled Donbass believed that both Russian and Ukrainian governments are to be blamed equally, while only 14 percent believed the same in separatist controlled areas.[11] There is a discrepancy in the perception of who is the perpetrator of the war between the two sides; this is a major obstacle to reintegration.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s leadership seems to be stuck, being unable to make compromises with the opposing side without losing political support. At the same time, as long as the conflict remains frozen and unresolved, Ukraine will continue to suffer economically and politically as it would be viewed as an unstable country, fraught with civil strife. It is also highly unlikely that the separatists would lay down their weapons after years of fighting and reunify with Ukraine without having reached some political settlement first, one which allows for elections. An important question to answer would be how Ukraine would reconcile the populations of Donetsk and Luhansk, bringing the rest of the region back into Ukrainian society. After seven years of war, division, and propaganda, unity would be difficult to achieve without change, such as military takeover.
Scenario III: Ukrainian Takeover of Donbass
As mentioned, this solution was attempted in 2014 and Ukraine was almost successful, having captured most of the territory belonging to the separatists. However, after the pro-Russian forces with Russian help counterattacked, they managed to recapture much of the lost territory. Currently, Ukraine controls the smaller cities and towns in the western parts of Donbass, while the separatists control the eastern areas bordering Russia. The situation in terms of who controls what territory has remained the same since the signing of the Minsk II. Although Ukraine has invested in its military and has received support from the West, specifically training and weapons from the US, it is unlikely that the Ukrainian military would be able to retake separatists-controlled areas.
A short analogy between the Nagorno Karabakh War (2020) and the War in Donbass further elucidates the situation Ukraine finds itself in. During the last months of 2020, in the Nagorno Karabakh War, Azerbaijan managed to retake parts of the enclave using military force after more than 20 years of failed negotiations. Azerbaijan’s actions leave a precedent for other countries to act in a similar manner. There are similarities between the case of Karabakh and Donbass; both regions declared unilateral independence, were a part of the Soviet Union (shared history), entail ethnic strife, and have engaged in conflicts involving Russian military and diplomatic participation.
International recognition are other important similarities. The Republic of Artsakh, a quasi, breakaway state from Azerbaijan encompassing the Nagorno-Karabakh region, is internationally recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan. Baku’s military seizure over the parts of the region has some credibility as the territory is considered as its constituent part. This is the case with the D/LPR; they are regarded as belonging to Ukraine by the international community, including Russia. Not one UN member state recognizes these entities as a country. Therefore, Kiev’s potential use of armed force in recapturing separatist areas may be seen as a justifiable act.
The main difference between the case of Karabakh and Donbass is that Russia would not allow Ukraine to simply take over with the use of force. Russia is much more intricately involved in Donbass, where many people identify as Russians, to let Ukraine have its way. As the frontline is near the Russian border, it is easier for Russia to react and prop up the separatists. Russia has shown that it can intervene on behalf of the separatists, and not doing so would damage the image that Moscow has constructed as being the protector of Russians living in foreign countries. Furthermore, a military offensive led by Ukraine would likely not find international support, something that Kiev desperately needs in terms of financing and arming its troops. It’s unlikely that the EU or the US would openly support Ukraine’s actions if this occurred, especially since EU members -- Germany and France -- are involved in the Normandy Format. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, used its oil and gas wealth to modernize its military, while at the same time had diplomatic and weapons support from Turkey, meaning that it was not alone in recapturing territories of Karabakh. Without international support, the country would have to act alone against Russia, which has one of the largest militaries in the world and nuclear deterrence. Thus, it is unlikely that Kiev would choose the military option.
Scenario IV: Russian Occupation or Annexation of Donbass
Moscow has a dual role in Ukraine – a diplomat and a potential aggressor. This gives Russia flexibility in its policy making towards Ukraine. It has influence on the diplomatic process, crafting the Minsk Agreement, and shapes the domestic situation in Ukraine, either through escalation or de-escalation. This makes Russia the most important actor in determining the future status of Donbass.
Ukraine is partially surrounded by the Russian military, from the south (Crimea), east, and north east. At the beginning of April and December 2021, it was reported that Russia was building up forces on Ukraine’s western border, numbering at around 100,000 troops.[12] This current military buildup may be a sign of a Russian intervention. As stated previously, Russia helped the beleaguered separatists in 2014 when they were near defeat, propping up their forces. Now, in what is the largest movement of troops since the annexation of Crimea, the question is what Moscow’s intentions are.
One can infer that the current predicament relating to the status of the Minsk II is not in Russia’s interests, and that the escalating military situation is an attempt to change the status-quo. Why escalate if the situation is in one’s favor? The answer could be to gain an even more favorable position or to change adverse circumstances. On July 22nd, 2020, the Trilateral Contact Group reached an agreement to strengthen the ceasefire. The agreement banned offensive operations, firing, and the deployment of heavy weapons. These provisions were never fully implemented as violations continued throughout 2020 and continue to this day. To get a scale of the violence taking place, there were 663 ceasefire violations and 104 recorded explosions during one day.[13] This high number of violations, relative to the preceding months when there were in tens and not hundreds, showcases the dire, escalatory situation on the ground. If the old adage “violence begets violence” holds true, then the situation will continue to worsen. Further, the current deployment of Russian troops may signal Moscow’s disapproval of the current position of the non-existent ceasefire and a show of support for the separatists.
There is variation with regards to how the occupation of Donbass could look like. Moscow may take parts of Donbass or the rest of it, pushing the frontline further west, and strengthening the position of the separatists. This would likely draw further concessions from Kiev, possibly leading to another Minsk agreement favoring Russia’s interests. As a reminder, the current gridlock relates to giving D/LPR special status (autonomy within Ukraine), the legitimacy of the elections in Donbass, and the disarmament of the separatists. With the Russian intervention and redrawing of the current map, Ukraine’s hesitation in implementing the agreement may be annulled. However, the nationalistic reaction in Ukraine could have the opposite effect, further radicalizing the domestic politics within the nation, and strengthening the anti-Russian sentiment.
There is a difference, however, between Russia launching an offensive, occupying Donbass, and annexation of Ukraine’s territories; annexing it would mean the region would become the constituent part of Russia, while a taking over the region militarily would not necessarily mean annexation. D/LPR, although becoming larger in this situation, would remain as quasi states supported by Russia. The separatists have long wanted to be a part of Russia, but Moscow has so far refused to annex D/LPR. While Crimea offers a strategic advantage due to the peninsula’s position on the Black sea, Donbass does not. Annexation of the region is also unpopular among the Russian citizenry: only 29 percent of Russians want Donetsk and Luhansk to become a part of Russia. This is a big difference compared to Crimea, where 62 percent continue to support Russia’s annexation.[14] Furthermore, annexing Donbass would mean losing even more influence in Ukrainian politics by removing the ethnic Russian voice and weakening the pro-Russia parties in Ukraine. Thus, annexing D/LPR could be a costly move for Putin, not only in terms of rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure but also in political capital.
The dire economic situation needs mentioning. If Russia annexed Donbass, it would have to rebuild it, making budgetary considerations problematic. As D/LPR are not recognized by any country, doing business with these entities is illegal. Thus, the entities rely on the black market as a function of their economy. Furthermore, the seven years of war have produced billions of dollars of damage. The dire economic situation creates the impression that the “losing state” would have to shoulder Donbass’ reconstruction efforts and expenses.[15] Russia is currently spending around two billion dollars a year on the de-facto republics, covering 50 percent of the DPR’s budget and 80 percent of the LPR’s.[16] With continuing US and EU sanctions against Russia, Moscow’s budget is very tight. This may be one of the reasons as to why Russia is threatening to invade Ukraine: in order to speed up the Minsk II reconciliation process and avoid the financial burden of rebuilding the D/LPR.
The region is seemingly set to become, or already is, like Transnistria, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia. This would mean that D/LPR would remain unrecognized entities, which are for the most part controlled by Moscow. Russia would also use these territories to destabilize Ukraine, so that it cannot join organizations that hinder Russia’s interests.
There are some similarities between what occurred in Georgia in 2008 (the breaking away of South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and what happened in Ukraine – in order to destabilize the country and prevent the expansion of NATO eastward, Russia intervened and supported the irredentist movements there. This precedent indicates the possible future and current status for D/LPR as unrecognized states. As Russia stationed over 100,000 troops near Ukraine’s border, Zelensky requested to speed up Ukraine’s request for NATO membership, stating “NATO is the only way to end the war in Donbass.” [17] This likely agitated Russia as the nation has shown before that it will not allow Ukraine to join NATO, that it will sacrifice thousands of lives for that effort. Ukraine joining NATO is for Russia an existential threat.
Moscow also views itself as the protector of Russians abroad, and has given Donbass residents hundreds of thousands of Russian passports since 2019. [18] This gives Russia the pretext to intervene in Ukraine as Ukrainian citizens are also Russian citizens. Any NATO expansion could be framed as a threat to their citizens abroad, thus legitimizing intervention.
Ultimately, the Russian annexation of Donbass remains unlikely; however, another military intervention is not unlikely for several reasons: Russia’s desire to stop the expansion of NATO, speed up the Mink II implementation, and keep Ukraine unstable. Ukraine banning pro-Russia television stations may also have contributed to the current escalation. On February 2nd, Zelensky shut down three Kremlin linked channels in order to prevent what he sees as Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine. Kiev also sanctioned Viktor Medvedchuk, a key Kremlin ally in Ukraine who is the owner of those programs and financier of pro-Russian political parties. [19] This aspect points to the information war between the Kremlin and Kiev, where an attempt to control the dissemination of information by one side causes a military escalation by the other.
Conclusion
The War in Donbass is nowhere near ending. There is still a heavy Russian military presence on Ukraine’s borders, there are daily ceasefire violations, and tensions are at an all-time high since 2014. The Minsk II Agreement and other diplomatic initiatives, such as the Normandy Format and the Steinmeier Formula, have so far failed to bring peace to Ukraine. The agreement has been gridlocked for years due to disagreements over the disarmament of separatists, the autonomy of Donbass, and the legitimacy of the elections being held there. Furthermore, as this study has shown through its scenarios, Zelensky’s government does not have the domestic support to enact such provisions in the agreement, with protests occurring when the government tried to implement them. Ultimately, the issue can be described as being one over sovereignty and self-determination: Sovereignty for Ukraine and self-determination for the people of Donbass. The question remains how to balance or find a solution between such competing views.
For Kiev, the issue of sovereignty has several connotations; it does not only mean bringing separatist held areas back into its fold, but how to do so and integrate them within the Ukrainian system. There are fears that if such areas were to be reintegrated into Ukraine, Russia would undermine Ukrainian sovereignty by having control over the domestic political scene in the country, controlling the pro-Russian politicians in the east who could veto Ukraine’s acceptance into Western institutions. Thus, the problem of sovereignty for Ukraine does not end with the rebellion but continues in other circumstances.
The status quo has continued for seven years now, and despite the buildup of Russian troops, the status quo has not been broken; as of January 17th, 2022, Russia has not launched a new offensive. It is difficult to know what exactly Moscow’s intentions are, but why escalate if all is well. Why change the situation if the conditions are favorable? Gridlock must not be in Moscow’s interests. The increasing ceasefire violations and the high death tolls on both sides does point towards renewed violence, and perhaps another Russian offensive. The offensive would change the situation on the ground, likely in the favor of the separatist position, instigating another round of Minsk negotiations and forcing Kiev’s hand in accepting the provisions.
Mateja Nikolic graduated from the University of Texas at San Antonio with a degree in Global Affairs.
Footnotes
[1] Ferguson, Niall. “Is Paranoia the Key to Pandemic Preparedness?” Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-05-18/paranoia-key-pandemic-preparedness.
[2] OSCE. “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 52/2021 Issued on 5 March 2021 - Ukraine.” ReliefWeb. OSCE, March 5, 2021.
[3] OSCE. “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 106/2021 Issued on 10 May 2021.” OSCE. OSCE, May 10, 2021. https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/486047.
[4] UN. “Minsk II Agreement .” Peacemaker. UN, February 15, 2015. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf.
[5] Fisher, Jonah. “Ukraine Conflict: Anger as Zelensky Agrees Vote Deal in East.” BBC News. BBC, October 2, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49903996.
[6] Peters, Tim B., and Anastasiia Shapkina. “The Grand Stalemate of the Minsk Agreements - Kas.de.” KAS. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung , February 1, 2019. https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/4520172/The+Grand+Stalemate+of+the+Minsk+Agreements.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Fisher, Ukraine, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49903996
[9] Kiev International Institute of Sociology. “Electoral Sentiments of the Population Regarding the Election of the President of Ukraine.” KIIS . Kiev International Institute of Sociology , September 21, 2020. https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=969&page=1&fbclid=IwAR1px_dZAM9WmdtvQMhuZsQwSc-bZ1XI9uW27y5tatvXZl5w1wwVAv3iuIE.
[10] Loughlin, John, Gwendolyn Sasse, Gerard Toal, and Kristin M. Bakke. “Analysis | A New Survey of the Ukraine-Russia Conflict Finds Deeply Divided Views in the Contested Donbas Region.” The Washington Post. WP Company, February 12, 2021.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Reuters. “Official Russian Military Build-up near Ukraine Numbers More than 100,000 Troops, Eu Says.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, April 19, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-build-up-near-ukraine-numbers-more-than-150000-troops-eus-2021-04-19/.
[13] Stastoli , Andris. “Press Statement of Special Representative Grau after the Regular Meeting of Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020.” OSCE. OSCE Chairmanship , July 23, 2020. https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/457885.
[14] Stepan Goncharov, Denis Volkov. “Russians Want Crimea; Prefer Luhansk and Donetsk Independent.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, April 3, 2019. https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/russians-want-crimea-prefer-luhansk-and-donetsk-independent.
[15] Motyl, Alexander J. “It's Time for Ukraine to Let the Donbass Go.” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy , December 6, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/ukraine-better-without-donbass-costly-reconstruction-pro-russia-west/.
[16] International Crisis Group. “Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas.” Crisis Group. International Crisis Group , July 28, 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/261-peace-ukraine-iii-costs-war-donbas.
[17] Deutsche Welle. “Ukraine Urges NATO to Set up Membership Path: DW: 06.04.2021.” DW.COM. Deutsche Welle , April 6, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-urges-nato-to-set-up-membership-path/a-57110384.
[18] Dickinson , Peter. “Russian Passports: Putin's Secret Weapon in the War against Ukraine.” Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council , April 13, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russian-passports-putins-secret-weapon-in-the-war-against-ukraine/.
[19] Yermak , Andriy. “Why Ukraine Sanctioned Putin's Ally Medvedchuk.” Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council , February 26, 2021. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-ukraine-sanctioned-putins-ally-medvedchuk/.
