By Kathryn Dura
From an alleged Chinese breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management data, to an alleged Russian hack of the DNC, to the WikiLeaks release of various Clinton emails, hardly a day goes by without a mention of hacking or cyber-attacks. Aside from cyber capabilities, other forms of technology, such as nuclear strength, space, and guided munitions, dominate the media’s discussion. In a rapidly evolving defense environment, we tend to prioritize technological advantage.
In 2014, the Obama administration, through then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, announced the launch of the Third Offset Strategy, a part of the Defense Innovation Initiative. The Third Offset Strategy seeks to “maintain U.S. military superiority over capable adversaries through the development of novel capabilities and concepts.” [1] In other words, the initiative addresses the erosion of U.S. technological superiority by investing in technology, such as artificial intelligence, guided munitions, submarine and undersea, anti-access/area denial, space, and cyber. It also involves cooperation between the defense contractor community, the military and the private sector to further defense innovation. [2]
However, maintaining a technological advantage should not be the sole focus of defense planning. More traditional threat conceptions have begun to emerge as well. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and illicit activities in Ukraine exemplify the continued importance of land occupation – a conventional tactic. Similarly, China’s aggression in the South China Sea is ultimately about sea power. Conflicts involving land and sea, occupation and passage, harken back to traditional security concepts. While technology will undoubtedly play a crucial role as these events develop, one cannot discount the importance of U.S. military personnel.
Traditional conflicts require personnel to finish the job. Autonomous technology equipped with weapons, such as UAVs, has proven incredibly useful in modern conflicts, especially in combatting ISIS in Syria. However, as the residual forces in Germany and Japan post-World War II demonstrated, personnel are required to physically occupy and recreate order after the job of war and weaponry is completed. A traditional, physical, and temporary military presence lends the region a period of relative stability to recover and prevents the defeated from reemerging.
Granted, U.S. military personnel are incredibly expensive. From the approximately 3% of GDP that the United States spends on defense, “roughly one-quarter…is for military personnel.” [3] Much of that cost stems from salaries and benefits, which is why spending on military personnel was greatly reduced after the Budget Control Act of 2011. To compound the problem, the DOD is estimating relatively flat budgets for 2016 to 2020 with an ever-growing weapon modernization problem. [4] Navy ships have an average age of 35 years while Air Force bombers average 34 years. [5] Thus between sequestration, slow economic growth, and weapon modernization issues, it is no wonder that personnel spending was reduced.
To tackle the reduced number of personnel, the Army (the branch with the most personnel and thus most impactful reductions) dramatically cut the number of active duty soldiers from 566,000 in fiscal year 2011 to 490,000 in fiscal year 2015 and increased its reliance on smaller, more versatile special forces. [6] Other branches followed suit. With tight budgets and more cuts to come, further reductions in personnel are dangerous, especially in the face of conventional conflicts. All the weaponry in the world cannot replace a physical, steadying presence.
Aside from military personnel’s importance in foreign conflicts, they are also crucial to U.S. national security. For years, defense experts have lamented the decreasing readiness of the armed forces. This criticism intensified after the sequestration of 2011 with many claiming that the cuts to military spending hurt preparedness. Should the U.S. be attacked, some are worried the country would not be capable of mounting the necessary defense. While experts such as David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon are quick to reassure, [7] further cuts could be hazardous. For example, the previously mentioned cuts to active duty personnel place more emphasis on the reserve, members of which are simply not as prepared for active combat. Similarly, having fewer personnel makes rotations much more difficult, resulting in problems such as cutting the number of active soldiers at a time in region, extending tour times, etc. Both examples lead to a more taxing system.
No one would argue that defense could function without either technology or personnel. Similarly, maintaining a technological advantage is important for the future of defense. However, the role and importance of personnel should not be forgotten in this tech-driven world. A delicate balance must be maintained for optimal national defense.
Kathryn Dura is a junior studying International Relations and Math at the University of Pennsylvania.
[1] http://csbaonline.org/about/news/securing-the-third-offset-strategy-priorities-for-next-us-secretary-of-defe.
[2] http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/from-strategy-to-execution-accelerating-the-third-offset/.
[3] https://www.cbo.gov/topics/defense-and-national-security/military-personnel.
[4] https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51050.
[5] http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-cuts-to-the-defense-budget-necessary/cutting-defense-spending-is-short-sighted.
[6] http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/assessments/us-military-power/us-army/.
[7] http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-myth-of-a-u-s-military-readiness-crisis-1470783221.