By Kavya Singh
Often to be European is to be simply a collection of values. Enshrined in the foundation of the European Union, the values of democracy, liberalism, freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are conveyed to transcend national identities. In a portrait of what it is to be European, the rest of the world is knowledgeable to drawing a landscape that is limited to tea, the Eiffel tower, football, and royalty. Yet, to Europeans, their homeland is built by many national heroes and moments, despite its history of creating and being unable to escape the bloodshed. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the psychological and physical gap between Western and Eastern Europe still rages. Author, Dragomir Draganov, predicted well in his newspaper opinion article for Trud (a Bulgarian newspaper for trade unions) published on 14th November 1989, “From now on, people will talk much more about the division than has been the case until now”, he is right in his sentiments as the eastern side scrambles to rise out of the shadows of its western frenemies, who have launched unto their peaks, marking the invisible division deeper into the ground.
As once, one East German visiting West Berlin in 1988 was quoted saying, "The streets don't look any different than in [East Berlin district] Prenzlauer Berg. Sure, the shops are more colourful, and the selection is much bigger. But at home, on the other side, I have my work, a nice apartment, a kindergarten spot for Nicole.” In the contemporary world, nothing much has changed except fully-fledged capitalism has taken over the entirety of Germany as well as Poland and embody a picture-perfect version of Europe that often the West cites as a success of their involvement.
Yet the differences between are huge in terms of both, economic and political attributes. This paper focuses on the reasons of failure as to why Eastern Europe (some many more than others) failed to prosper citing three main arguments of intergenerational politics, ethnic mix, and western behavior. It further discusses and heavily focuses on its consequences from a broader perspective as illiberal democracies rise and present the paradox that the East faces.
Though many use the former Soviet bloc as Eastern Europe, since the geographical context, in this case, is abstract, this paper recognizes the United Nations Statistics Division of Europe. Hence, Eastern Europe comprises of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, as well as the republics of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.
“Why have we not made it?” Eastern Europe’s Dilemmas
The divergence of Eastern Europe from its counterparts is open to popular interpretations based on religious, historical or economic fronts. Many researchers and experts who have travelled across eastern Europe believe that Poland has ‘made it’ as it becomes one of the strongest regional economies. Many others have successfully lobbied and achieved EU membership yet, the affluence hasn’t reached all. This section refutes the argument that ‘looking west’ would lead to better times for the Eastern European front. It draws three elements from spheres of life to bring to light deeper issues that could be crippling their box-office success story.
Politics: Domestic and Intergenerational
Living Better?
In a survey led by Open Media Research Institute in 1995 with voters from 12 countries from Central and Eastern Europe, at least 80% from 10 countries had voted for a free market economy or a mixed one, the only outliers being Ukraine and Russia. Furthermore, in all countries, more people had thought that economic reforms had rolled out too slowly and in the Slavic trio of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, more than 90% of the people said they had become worse off now than a year or so before. In regarding this as the true will of the people, it would be fair to assume that citizens would be inclined to vote for leaders who were not ex-communists and were favourable towards forging better relations with the EU, i.e., leaning west. Yet, in 1996, in Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma was elected president (former head of the Communist Party) who though won based on his pro-market reforms, favoured stronger Russian relations. His Janus-faced reforms in the second term eventually led to the formation of oligarchy and labelled Ukraine as a semi-authoritarian regime. Whereas in Belarus, President Lukashenko, who should have been up for re-election, had been allowed to extend his term for an additional two years based on a referendum. Almost 25 years later, he still serves as the President and retains a Soviet-era symbolism in his decision-making.
So why did the temptation to restructure the economy overcome the concerns about such ‘dodgy’ leaders?
One of the most convincing explanations to this can be based on the argument by Sachs that elections (if they are even held and fair) are “not referendums on the virtues of capitalism but contests dominated by interest groups” based on the ultimate prize: the social safety net. Reformed Communist leaders have led successful campaigns to increase the provisional welfare state and this has earned them brownie points with the older generation, as a bigger amount moves to live off pension. Since 1989, social expenditure in the cases of early-income support, retirement, and health care programs has seen an increase in Eastern Europe but with rising inflation and a decline in GDP, it has led to a serious deterioration in living and movement below the poverty line. In terms of Sachs again, “Much of social spending has gone to buy off an entire generation - those of 45 or older who have had the toughest time adjusting to capitalism.”
Living Differently?
In a survey led by Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2009 with voters from 6 countries from the former Soviet bloc, the results offer a contrasting view. The similar end of communism that was cheered in 19991, is riddled with reservations about democracy and capitalism. This is consistent with the argument that capitalism has given rise to the elitism, making ordinary people worse off. Furthermore, in the case of age gaps, the younger ages were more inclined towards a shift to the western ideals however since, a big amount of the youth from these countries move across borders for a freedom of opportunity, their voices have diminished due to the presence of an older generation which is burdened with memories of the past.
In simpler words, they tend to vote for leaders who will offer them a life in comfort and these leaders, by the means of populist nationalism, cannot help themselves by pulling strings to stay in power. Hence, presenting the first Eastern European paradox: voting for ex-communists while shopping till they drop.
Ethnicity, Minorities and Linguistic Divides
Echoes of torture and lives lost
As the pathway between Europe and Asia, millions of traders, nomads, migrants, and armies have walked the lands of Eastern Europe since history could be remembered. It is compilation of complex ethnic groups who share various beliefs and strive for the recognition they have struggled for their entire lives. As Huntington put it, “clash of civilisations” was inevitable to occur as ideologies for each minority differed and given Eastern Europe’s track record, is rightly known as an ethnic checkerboard as cultural crossroads clash along the lines of ethnic cleansing and torturous agendas.
Thanks to Hitler, who manifested the complete destruction of ethnic groups as the goal of a state, and his megalomaniacal effort that wiped away nearly 12 million people from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia post WWII. Over the years, the “Hungarian problem” in Czech which was handled by Stalin’s consent, Yugoslavia’s degeneration into a crimson pool of wars, killings within Russia’s own borders, and as other horrors filled the beautiful tapestry of Eastern Europe, it broke down the sizable minorities in specific countries to almost zero. Though no one may ever accept it due to its ultimate disgrace to humanity, this allowed the countries with huge majorities to soar better in establishing democracies and economic reforms since catering to minorities was off the charts. Poland, Hungary, and to an extent, the Czech Republic had an easier time as compared to Romania or Bulgaria, who saw sizable minorities of Hungarians and Turks respectively still alive within its borders.
Look the same but ‘sound’ funny!
Similarly, in the case of Ukraine, linguistic divide draws an imaginary line across the country and political spectrum. The Russian speaking vote different, think different, feel different and in sharp contrast, have a different understanding of their heritage and identity as to the Ukrainian speaking population. Hence, every vote cast is on the grounds of the identities they belong to, making it broken and harder to emerge from deadlock as one united state.
Western Behaviour
Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the evilest of them all?
Often there is misconception that Eastern Europe is one bloc (basically Russia) that opposes the West when in reality, Eastern Europe is in itself a complex maze with fault lines and as many states see EU membership as the ultimate win of their journey, the West’s orientation and support is critical. It would be expected that the West would embrace the idea of creating more democracies and trade as a purposeful way to shove it into China and Russia’s face, yet the enthusiasm is sluggish and inadequate and often times, comes off as an act of superiority that they love to uphold as tradition. In the case of Ukraine, it can be argued that one of the reasons why presidents turn to Russia is because the West is unwilling and unmotivated to give them a seat at the elders’ table. Similarly, it can be seen from the paradoxical stance that Russia’s presents – it is highly unwelcomed, its values interpreted as different, and always bullied so it did exactly what kids sometimes do – it became a bully to others, blackmailing and preventing its former territories to walk into a deal that could make them better off so it isn’t hated alone or all by itself .
Another aspect of the West that is discouraging is the policy of selective engagement. Though it hails humanitarian intervention, promotes Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ideals and stands on frontlines of most battles, embodying a realist perspective, it only does what is right for itself. As Ash (1997) writes,
“This was particularly true of Western Europe, which fiddled over the Treaty of Maastricht while Sarajevo began to burn. Within its sluggish response, the West certainly favoured some. This favouritism, and particularly the carrots of NATO and European Union membership, have clearly helped the transformation in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic Without those manipulative, post-communist politics, the ethnic divisions would not have turned into open sores or, in the case of Yugoslavia, to rivers of blood. Precisely because the West was, alas, more reacting than acting, what made the crucial difference to these former communist countries was the quality of the domestic politics - and, of course, the way in which those politics were sold in the West.”
Though the West may not all be a bad guy, in this story, it isn’t a superhero either. At the end of the day, prosperity is the end goal and the myth that accession of post-communist countries could obstruct EU development and result in fragmentation is outdated as well as refutable by any aspect of higher economic returns, creating an ‘ever closer union’, and building a deeper identity.
Which European are you?
Another aspect that hinders Eastern Europe’s incorporation in the EU is the interpretation of the institution’s history and perception itself. To the West, it is a collective effort that stemmed out of the WWII, a battle against fascism and a war that will always haunt Europe. However, to the East, it is a guarantee of safety against tyrants, protection of democracy, freedom from corruption, and sound institutions. This emotion is what distinguishes East from West. It is the fact that will create an ‘in’ vs ‘out’ group feeling, mark the demise of any agreement, and hence the feeling of any hope.
“Where to next?” Legacy of the Past
Eventually, the relations between, within, and outside of these countries have severe implications relevant to all and the future of Europe. This is being realised as over the past couple of years, global scenario has changed as Zakaria’s prophecy of ‘illiberal democracies’ turns to reality, budding particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Being hailed as the biggest crisis of liberalism, an anti-western ethos is standing on the porches of democracy and its presence is asking a big question: what went wrong?
Fake it till you make it
The history for these states begins in 1989, after the fall of Berlin Wall and the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the East was independent: broken but free. Contrary to perceived notions of utopia, this period was marked with nervousness. The race to join the West had just begun, and the East, seeing the joyous sophistication that came from embracing liberalism, followed the alleyway, apprehensive but with the optimistic idea that in the next 10 years or so, they will be happy too. Yet, as Hungarian sociologist Elemér Hankiss observed:
“People realised suddenly that in the coming years, it would be decided who would be rich and who would be poor; who would have power and who would not; who would be marginalised and who would be at the centre. And who would be able to found dynasties and whose children would suffer.”
And that is where it went all downhill. Soon, the ‘imitation’ game wasn’t a win-win basis at all. In order to be normal, Eastern Europe had forgone its originality and the effects on its moral psyche were devastating. It continued to drown in the feelings of inferiority, dependency, debt, identity crisis, and nothingness. Realising that they had willing walked into the colonial project of Westernisation, to justify and shake off the deep-seated humility, rose xenophobia, authoritarian regimes, and chauvinism . Apparently, they learnt our truth: we weren’t all living wealthily or cheerfully either and most importantly, that they had been duped by the shattered ideology that was so cunningly wrapped in pretty pastel illusions.
Hence, 30 years later; as Turkey, Hungary, and Poland backslide on the Western model and reshape the eurozone; the bittersweet reality of 1989 is that the liberal, democratic chants of “we the people” have in a surprising turn of events turned populist, aligned to the far right, and become more conservative. Feffer (2018) writes critically,
“for the World War II generation in Eastern Europe, communism was the god that failed. For the current generation in the region, liberalism is the god that failed.”
Is old the new black?
The above narrative, in a nutshell, brings the final paradox to this: to be prosperous, Eastern Europe wants to be a part of the EU which is built on the ever-ringing foundations of liberalism and democracy but also rejects those very ideals as it brings less prosperity.
As the European topography pivots to laments of moving to their older way of life, the consequences are unknown and unventured. For the first time, the truth is out there, an untethered generational voice rises to echo the anger, the rage of simply having had enough with reforms that are further dividing the continent than integrating it under the pretense of making lives better. For the European Union’s liberal project to become attractive again and for Europe to catch its second breath, they must restructure the institution and form a new dialogue with engagement and care for all while fully taking into account the psychology of each country. Whether the EU moves the world into a new world order or shifts the frame back to older times, they have to figure it out together. Eastern Europe plays a critical role in deciding if the heart of Europe is big enough for all of them.
A new phoenix
Bearing in mind the immense intergenerational differences of the European population, interestingly, a timid voice breaks through under the thick canopy that covers Eastern Europe. Optimism is rare in the young cohort, but it is there. It is mobile, driven, and most importantly, asking for a way life that they can pass onto their children. Many are moving away from the perceptions their parents built and each voice is changing the dynamics of the political community: it is no longer about being Western or Eastern, it is now about on whose behalf we talk, about how we describe the society we want to belong in.
Spectre of Tomorrow
Drawing to a close, this paper agrees with Krastev & Holmes (2019) assessment that
“The ultimate revenge of the Central and East European populists against Western liberalism is not merely to reject the “imitation imperative,” but to invert it. We are the real Europeans, […] and if the West wants to save itself, it will have to imitate the East.”
The East is no less European to the West, it is equal; nothing less and nothing more. Each state is constantly revamping its own history, nationalistic attachment, and identity. For the Eastern Europeans, they have struggled to live up to the domineering Western ideals and are on a journey to find their own way of living. This is in contrast to most of Europe, who ventured out to other lands to actually find and then impose their gentlemanliness. So, maybe the Eastern ideology of self-discovery is not entirely wrong. If the ideals of liberalism and democracy could withstand the tiring trials of time and humanity, they will soon find their way into the not-yet discovered Eastern model. As Orbán famously said in a speech in July 2017, “Twenty-seven years ago here in Central Europe we believed that Europe was our future; today we feel that we are the future of Europe.”
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