By Mary Elise Pieters
The Islamic Republic of Iran poses security, military, and intelligence threats to the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Iran is an asymmetric power and its most threating capabilities include its backing of proxy groups in the region, its military capabilities to include its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and its naval power, and its intelligence threat through the channels of its Quds force. The GCC states have advantages over Iran spending significantly more on their military and having conventional military forces that are armed with much more modern and capable military hardware in comparison to Iran. Despite these advantages, the GCC has been unable to effectively combat Iranian challenges due to political differences between GCC states and some states sharing more friendly relationships with Iran, like Qatar. While Iran poses a credible threat to GCC nations through asymmetric means, Iran’s strategic approach to conflict is one which avoids direct confrontation, which it views as lose-lose, and instead pursues military, security, and intelligence capabilities which allow it to deter regional actors while ensuring its freedom of action to further its interests and guarantee regime survival.
Overview
To provide a brief background on the GCC, the Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981 and is a political and economic alliance of the six GCC States: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. The GCC formed in the two years after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. In the last decade, Gulf states have shown considerable strength and stability during a period in which the rest of the Arab world has experienced great tumult. Political scientists have coined the phrase “Gulf moment” saying, “the implosion of some, previously strong, regional actors (such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt) has given way to other players—all of which are now located in the Gulf. In terms of regional relations, the Arab world has therefore entered a Gulf moment, and is likely to remain in it for the time being.” GCC states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar now represent the most influential powers in the Middle East and increasingly see themselves as a model of stability for the rest of the Arab world. Notably, the Charter which establishes the GCC does not have any article similar to NATO’s Article 5, describing the organization’s collective defense. Absent a unified GCC collective defense policy, Iran continues to threaten regional security.
Facing GCC states over a narrow sea, Iran is a large country both in terms of population and geography with 83,024,745 million people and a land area of 636,313 square miles. Iran has the largest Shia majority of any country at nearly 90% of the population. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran has been led by a highly conservative clerical elite under Supreme Leaders Ruhollah Khomeini (1979-1989) and the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (1989-present). Descendants from the ancient Persian Empire, Iran is the largest state since the 16th century following the Shia creed, and its denunciation of Sunni beliefs isolates the state from its Arab neighbors.
No experts believe that Iran poses a conventional threat. Iran is unable to conventionally compete with GCC powers like Saudi Arabia and its allies like the United States. Knowing this, Iran has developed its asymmetric capabilities to deter regional actors through three primary methods: propaganda, supplying money, and supplying arms to its proxy groups. Iran has exploited conflicts throughout the region, often utilizing Shia militant groups in different countries and channeling propaganda, money, and arms, in attempt to foment insurrection like Iran has done countless times in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, Lebanon, etc.
Through these methods, Iran acts a credible asymmetric threat and it uses these methods in pursuit of its security, military, and intelligence capabilities. Iran has created military threats though its ballistic and cruise missiles and its naval capabilities, security threats through its backing of regional terror groups and proxies, and intelligence threats through the channels of its Quds force. The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ report Gulf Security after 2020 argues, “Iran’s military doctrine, way of war and emphasis on asymmetric tactics is likely to persist, with few exceptions. However, Iran will also seek to modernize its military and fill capability gaps through prioritized acquisitions of advanced weaponry. The need to address social and economic shortfalls caused by mismanagement and sanctions will likely constrain Iran’s military modernization efforts.” Iran is a country with few allies and after years of imposed sanctions, Iran has no choice but to pursue asymmetric capabilities by using propaganda, giving money, and supplying arms to proxies, creating security, military, and intelligence threats to deter regional actors, while avoiding direct confrontation which it views as a lose-lose.
Proxy Warfare
Iran’s use of proxies to develop security threats by moving money and arms was instrumental in Iran’s performance in the Iran-Iraq war, and changed Iranian strategy in the long run. Experts argue that, “It is hard to overstate the importance of the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War in shaping Iran’s approach to warfare. The conflict cemented Iran’s doctrinal focus around three main axes – proxy warfare, asymmetric warfare (especially in naval defense) and ballistic missiles – in addition to internal defense and regime preservation.” The Iran-Iraq war of 1988 showed that Iranian conventional units performed poorly under a much smaller Iraqi force, but Iran surprised Iraq by finding its niche in asymmetric warfare.
When Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, he assumed that the divided Iran population after the chaos of the Iranian Revolution would quickly falter to Iraq, and not be able to put up much of a fight. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), established during the Iranian Revolution as an internal security force transformed into a second military. Seth Jones, Director of the Transnational Threats project says that, “Iran’s comparative advantage became its ability to work with state and non-state actors—an irregular approach led by the IRGC, including the IRGC-QF, rather than conventional Iranian military forces (Artesh).” Iran switched to a strategy of aiding Shia Iraqi militant groups, the most famous of which was the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Hakim’s Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The Iran-Iraq war showed Iran that its threat was not in conventional warfare, but asymmetrical warfare. By exploiting the fact that Iraq is mostly a Shia majority country, Iran trained and supplied arms to Shia Iraqi groups, posing a security threat to target Iraqi forces, and later on, to target U.S. soldiers.
Those lessons learned during the Iran-Iraq war informed Iran’s use of Iraqi Shia militant groups during the Second Gulf War, targeting U.S. soldiers in order to tie down the United States military in Iraq by continuing to fund and arm Iraqi Shia militant groups. President Bush had reports in 2007 of, “evidence of Tehran supplying material support, including mortars and elements of sophisticated roadside bombs, to insurgents in Iraq who in turn target and kill U.S. forces.” The United States has attributed the death of 600 soldiers in Iraq to Iranian backed groups and holds Iran’s IRGC-QF responsible for these deaths. Iran’s strategy in Iraq involved covert action through proxy groups to prevent the U.S. from directly accusing the Iranian government of backing Iraqi Shia militant groups to target U.S. forces. Professor Beehner at the Modern War Institute at West Point reinforces this idea saying, “U.S. officials have said they can trace serial numbers on mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and EFPs to sources across the border but have resisted blaming the Iranian leadership." Iran used Iraq as a buffer zone and a first line of defense against foreign invasion. Iranian actions in Iraq were designed to exploit an existing conflict through proxy groups, and bleed out U.S. forces, so that the U.S. wouldn’t turn to Iran next after they were finished trying to stabilize Iraq.
An article on the Council of Foreign Relations reinforces this idea saying, “Some have called Iran’s policy one of “managed chaos”—enough instability to eject U.S. forces from Iraq but not enough to engulf Iraq’s neighbors in a wider sectarian war. Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy says of such a policy: “To a degree, this keeps [U.S. forces] tied down and not available for use in Iran.” Iranian strategy throughout its time in Iraq demonstrates Iran’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with powers like the United States, and instead shows its use of asymmetric warfare to deter actors and guarantee regime survival by arming Shia proxy groups with mortars, grenades, and arms. Iran’s approach in Iraq is similar to its approach in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, and revolves around exploiting the conflict by funding and arming proxies, to deter regional actors threating to Iranian regime survival like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States.
Iran’s strategy in Yemen, like Iraq, has involved funding and arming Shia proxies to exploit an existing conflict, to deter regional actors like Saudi and UAE, the GCC states most hawkish toward Iran. The conflict in Yemen has its roots in the Arab Spring uprisings that forced Yemen President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to transfer power in 2011 to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Hadi has dealt with a variety of issues in Yemen including the Houthi movement run by Yemen’s Zaidi Shia Muslim minority. The Houthis took control of the Northern Province heartland of Saada province and later tried to take control of the entire country, forcing President Hadi to flee. Members of the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and other Sunni Arab states have begun a military campaign in Yemen to restore Hadi’s government, receiving intelligence and logistical support from the United States, the UK, and France. Iran’s IRCG and Quds Force have aided the Houthis, with Iranian missile and drones being used by the Houthis to threaten shipping near the Bab el Mandeb Strait and conduct attacks against land-based targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Located at the Southern end of the Red Sea between Yemen and Djibouti, the Bab el Mandeb Strait is strategically important as five million barrels of oil pass through the strait every day. Seth Jones, Director of the Transnational Threats Project, argues that, “Iran’s objectives in Yemen include retaining—and perhaps increasing—Iran’s influence along the Red Sea as well as weakening Saudi Arabia and the UAE.”
The war in Yemen intensified in 2016 after increasing involvement of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran increased its aid to the Houthis providing, “anti-tank guided missiles, sea mines, aerial drones, 122-millimeter Katyusha rockets, Misagh-2 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), RDX high explosives, ballistic missiles, unmanned explosive boats, radar systems, and mining equipment.” The IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah provided training to the Houthis in Iran and Yemen. Iran’s strategy in Yemen mirrors its strategy in Iraq. While Iran did not start the conflict, it has taken advantage of it by aiding the Houthis, to weaken Saudi Arabia, Iran’s biggest threat within the GCC, and exhaust GCC states resources so Saudi Arabia and the UAE cannot turn to Iran next. Iranian strategy in Yemen involves creating regional security threats by funding proxies to tie down powers threating to Iranian regime survival, while avoiding direct conflict which Iran views as a lose-lose.
Iran also deters regional actors and guarantees its freedom of action through its funding of the Hezbollah terror group and using Hezbollah to create security threats throughout the Gulf. Lebanon’s Hezbollah is the IRGC-QF’s chief partner. With the help of Iran, “Hezbollah has amassed a range of weapons and systems, such as the Fateh-110/M-600 short-range ballistic missile, Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 short-range ballistic missiles, Toophan anti-tank guided missiles, Kornet man-portable anti-tank guided missiles, M113 armored personnel carriers, T-72 main battle tanks, Karrar unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and Katyusha rocket launchers.” Additionally, because of Iran, Hezbollah’s armed droned capabilities are among the most advanced of any terror group, using such drones in Syria to destroy the Islamic State. Iran views Hezbollah as part of its “Axis of Resistance,” and continually uses Hezbollah to achieve its interest in the region. Even before Iran’s use of Hezbollah in Syria, Iran nurtured Hezbollah from very early on, and the state was instrumental in the 1983 bombings of U.S Marine barracks and embassy in Beirut. Data shows that prior to 9/11, “Hezbollah had killed more Americans than any other international organization.” Along with utilizing Hezbollah to achieve its anti-Israeli interests in the region, “One of Tehran’s objectives in Syria and Iraq has been to create a land bridge linking Iran to Hezbollah’s stronghold in south Lebanon and, by proxy, to the Lebanon-Israel border. Hezbollah and its supporters have been integral to this endeavor.” Iran’s use of Hezbollah is further evidence of Iranian strategy through terror financing to threaten GCC states, the U.S., and Israel to deter these powers while avoiding direct confrontation, which it views as a lose-lose.
Iran’s Military Capabilities
Apart from its use of terror and proxy groups, Iran is a threat to the region and GCC states through its asymmetric military capabilities mainly, its naval and missile forces. After years of sanctions, Iran, unlike its Gulf neighbors, has no choice but to dedicate itself to building up its military capabilities through domestic production and clandestine acquisition of key pieces of foreign military hardware. Iran’s population of 82 million means it has an incredible amount of manpower to rely on. Iran has an estimated 534,000 active personnel in the army, navy, air force and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Apart from the Artesh, Iran’s conventional military power, “the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran's elite military force responsible for protecting the Islamic regime from internal and external threats. A 125,000-man force, it also controls the paramilitary Basij militia, which has about 90,000 active members, and runs the foreign special operations Quds force.” Iran’s sheer size, man-power, and ruthless IRGC forces is a key reason why Iran’s military although not conventionally strong, poses a credible threat to GCC states.
Iran’s two primary military means to inflict harm in the region are from its missile capabilities and its navy. According to the CSIS Missile Defense Project, “While Iran has not yet tested or deployed a missile capable of striking the United States, it continues to hone longer-range missile technologies under the auspices of its space-launch program. In addition to increasing the quantity of its missile arsenal, Iran is investing in qualitative improvements to its missiles’ accuracy and lethality.” Iran has gravitated towards focusing on new missile capabilities including moving towards solid fuel, precision and accuracy, and anti-ship (ballistic and cruise missiles. Iran has become a center for missile proliferation, aiding its proxies in Syria, Yemen, and supplying it chief terror group, Hezbollah, to weaken Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and its allies. The CSIS missile defense project holds that, “Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, with thousands of short-and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking as far as Israel and southeast Europe. Missiles have become a central tool of Iranian power projection and anti-access/ anti-denial capabilities in the face of U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council naval and air power in the region. Ballistic missiles are essential to Iran’s defensive and deterrent strategy and have been ever since Iran used Scud- B missiles to attack Iraq, stunning Saddam Hussein.
After the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, Iran sought to increase its missile capabilities after seeing how useful they were to its defense in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran turned to North Korea and China for its missile capabilities, purchasing 200-300 Scud-B and -C missiles, with the -C missiles having enough of a range to threaten GCC states and its U.S. allies throughout the region. In the 1990s, Iran turned again to North Korea, allowing it to purchase more missiles with the capability to target Turkey, Israel and the western part of Saudi Arabia. Iran also perfected its Shahab-3 missiles, now called Ghadr, increasing its range by 1,600km, which can be used to threaten any of Iran’s regional adversaries, reaching as far as Israel. Additionally, Iran has spent the last decade moving its missile-development efforts away from focusing on increasing range, to enhancing the precision of its missiles. In line with Iran’s need to develop precision and accuracy missile capabilities, the state has been working on the development of the Fateh-110, a semi-guided rocket, and has been trying to perfect this for the past twelve years. Despite however an improvement in accuracy, the first generation on Fateh-110 lacks the precision to consistently strike military targets. The Fateh-110’s range is limited to 200-250km. The only countries that are reachable for the Fateh-110 are Kuwait, and portions of Iraq and the UAE. The later development of the Fateh-313, still cannot reach most targets in Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the western portion of the UAE. Despite their current lack of missile precision, this is likely to change as, “…development of the Fateh-110 family of missiles, including the optically guided anti-ship Khalij Fars and the anti-radar Hormuz systems, as well as the Fateh-313, suggests that Iran seeks to produce and field highly accurate missiles capable of shaping the outcome of future military conflicts.” Experts estimate that based on the time it took other countries to develop precision-guided ballistic missiles with a range greater than 300km, Iran will not develop this before 2025. Iran also lacks a targeting and damage assessment missile capability, as evidenced in June 2017 when Iran launched seven Zolfaqar missiles against ISIS in Syria. Only two of the missiles landed in the suspected areas. Despite the missile’s poor performance, Iran proved it was capable of flying surveillance drones over above the suspected target and relaying this information to distant launch crews.
In recent years Iran has focused on developing missile precision, not long-term range. Senior Fellow for Missile Defense at IISS, Michael Elleman, states that, “The ‘mosaic defense’ strategy, authored by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), establishes three asymmetric operational tactics to impede conventional military advances by an attacker: proxies provide a forward-based fighting force; guerrilla warfare at sea threatens enemies and impedes a navy-supported invasion; and the implicit threat of extraterritorial attacks with ballistic missiles deters adversaries.” Iran’s arsenal of lethal ballistic missiles encompasses all three approaches to Iran’s asymmetric warfare. Heavy artillery rockets and short-range missiles would be capable of denying an enemy access to Iranian territory along its borders. Short and medium range missiles would threaten the security of key ports servicing the navies of GCC states and their allies like the United States. Iranian ballistic missiles could also strike airfields critical to the operations of Gulf States and the United States, if their missiles struck with precision. Also, assuming Iran develops accurate and precise missiles, Iran could use these missiles to strike key military and civilian infrastructure, such as targeting the UAE’s desalination plants, which would cause a majority of the country’s water to vanish. The GCC and its allies should focus on developing a strategy to counteract the effects of Iranian missiles should Iran develop highly accurate ballistic missiles and technologies like real-time targeting and damage-assessment capabilities.
Iran’s naval capabilities are a significant challenge, characterized by distributed firepower through the use of small boats and fast attack capabilities, and anti-access, area denial capabilities. Iran has developed its navy by procuring modern mines and anti-ship missiles, and many small boats, fast attack crafts, and midget submarines. Iran operates several classes of submarines including the Russian produced Kilo craft, the North Korean designed and indigenously produced Ghadir submarines, and Iranian designed and produced Qaaem, Fateh, and Nahang boats. Iran wants to maintain its ability to influence the maritime environment and to that end they have, “invested significantly in asymmetric capabilities, including hundreds of lethal small craft and a network of coastal-defense cruise missiles, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can potentially support the accurate targeting of adversary naval forces.” Iran’s navy seeks to maintain influence in the Gulf, especially in the Straits of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints. The Straits of Hormuz are incredibly important as 30 to 35 percent of the world’s oil passes through them. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the straits upon imposition of U.S. oil sanctions. Despite these credible threats, Iran is not a maritime force capable of operating globally and has only ever roamed as far as China and South Africa.
Retired Vice Admiral John Miller reinforces this idea arguing, “The IRGCN has been built specifically for its primary purpose: protecting the regime. The force has achieved most regime goals effectively and at relatively low cost by mass producing small, fast craft. These vessels can be used to swarm larger boats, deploy small numbers of troops ashore and to oil platforms, plant mines, patrol the Strait of Hormuz and harass commercial ships.” Iran’s current naval capabilities consist of protecting the state of Iran and its regime and protecting Iranian interests in the Gulf, acting as a maritime presence strong enough to limit or deny access of foreign powers to the Straits of Hormuz, and supplying Iranian proxies in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. If Iran wants to remain a threating naval force however, the navy will have to modernize as most of their ships are 38 years old. Iran has produced two ships since 2006, which are equipped with “SM-1 anti-aircraft missiles; Noor anti-ship missiles; torpedoes and a helicopter for anti-submarine warfare; a 76mm multi-purpose gun; and several smaller caliber guns for point defense. The ships’ ability to operate helicopters suggests that they are also able to operate UAVs for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as over-the-horizon targeting.” Despite the development of these two ships, Iran is unlikely to develop a navy that would allow it to operate global waters as Tehran is unlikely to afford these capabilities. Moving forward, Iran will seek to maintain freedom of action within the Gulf, and will commit some funds to growing the capabilities of their navy and, “It is possible, if not likely, that Iran will gain access to unmanned, high-speed, explosive-laden surface craft supported by armed UAVs that provide over-the-horizon targeting and ISR. The country may also acquire modern smart mines that can be covertly deployed – and whose deployment only becomes known when a ship strikes one.” Iran’s navy is one of their most threating capabilities, and the GCC states and its allies should make sure to cooperate together to ensure maritime stability in the Middle East.
In February 2019, Iran posed a new maritime threat to Gulf security after their claims to have successfully launched an anti-ship cruise missile from an indigenously produced submarine. The launch of this missile poses an increased risk to any ships sailing in the Gulf. Iran claims to have launched a Nasr-1 anti-ship missile from a Fateh submarine. This is concerning as, “the Nasr-1 has a range of about 30km and can cripple ships of up to about 1,500 tonnes, such as a corvette or coastal merchant ship.” The claim of Iran to have launched an anti-ship missile from a submarine is threatening to Gulf security, especially as Iran has been subject to years of international sanctions designed to limit its military capabilities, yet it has apparently managed to accomplish this military feat.
Iran’s navy and ballistic and cruise missle powers characterized by small boats and fast attack capabilities, and anti-access, area denial capabilities pose a credible threat, but unlike the GCC nations, Iran lacks the wealth and access to acquire advanced weaponry from the U.S. and Europe. For that reason, Iran has developed its asymmetric powers by supplying its proxy and terror groups with it ballistic and cruise missiles, and using its naval powers to transport weaponry to its proxies. The civil war in Syria has especially allowed Iran to utilize its military threats by training, arming, and deploying its Shia foreign legion to defend the Assad regime, while trying to have as few Iranian ground troops in Syria as possible, to minimize direct conflict. An article examining Gulf Security after 2020 argues that Iranian action in Syria is because, “many in Tehran saw the uprising against the Assad regime as part of a US–Saudi–Israeli conspiracy to undermine the ‘Axis of Resistance’, whose core members are Iran, Hezbollah and Syria. The war threatened both the survival of the Assad regime and Tehran’s air bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Iran has created a legion of Shia fighters recruited from Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to fight in the Syrian war. Iran has deployed as few ground troops as possible to protect the Syrian regime, with data showing Iran has 1,500 troops in Syria. Iran has tried to give most of the war fighting burden to its “Shia foreign legion,” to minimize risk and direct conflict. Director of the Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program argues that, “Iran knows – based on bitter experience and observation of US campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan – how costly and difficult it can be to end a war. As a consequence, Tehran seeks to avoid conventional wars at almost any cost.” Iran has sought to protect its allies or its Axis of Resistance- the Hezbollah and the Syrian regime but aims to do so with as little risk to the state itself as possible. It has therefore trained and armed a Shia foreign legion to deploy in Syria and carry the brunt of the war, while Iran guarantees its survival by minimizing direct conflict with conventional powers.
Iran uses its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities to pose a military threat by arming its proxies around the region. Iran has become a center for missile proliferation, aiding its proxies in Syria, Yemen, and supplying it chief terror group, Hezbollah, to weaken Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and its allies. Iran has also used its naval powers to supply Iranian proxies in Yemen. Reports of the IRGC using “waters further up the Gulf between Kuwait and Iran as it looks for new ways to beat up an embargo on arms shipments to fellow Shi’ites in the Houthi movement.” Iran supports security threats around the Gulf by utilizing its military capabilities, to arm and move weaponry around the region to its various proxies, deterring regional actors while avoiding direct confrontation with conventional powers.
Iran’s Intelligence Capabilities
Lastly, Iran poses a threat to GCC states through its use of its intelligence forces. The IRGC has a large intelligence operation with 5,000 men in the IRGC assigned to unconventional warfare. Additionally, the IRGC has a special Quds force that plays a big role in giving Iran the ability to conduct asymmetrical warfare overseas through its use of proxies. The Quds force have supported Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Shia militias in Iraq, Hamas, Syria, and Yemen. Chairman of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman explains how, “The Quds troops are divided into specific groups or “corps” for each country or area in which they operate. There are Directorates for Iraq; Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula…” Iran’s Al Quds force is one of their strongest capabilities and is the Iranian intelligence unit designed to specialize in unconventional, asymmetric warfare, that exploits existing conflicts overseas though their use of proxy groups. The Quds force has allowed Iran to meddle in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and keep close ties with Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Iran’s Quds force poses an intelligence threat by dispersing propaganda throughout the region, which has been especially evident in the case of Saudi Arabia. Iran has utilized the Shia population in Saudi Arabia to foment unrest within Saudi. Although Saudi’s population is only 10% Shia, the Shia are concentrated in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. After the Iranian Revolution and fall of the Shah, Iran’s new ruler, Ayatollah Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader of Iran, criticized Saudi Arabia for having pro-Western ties. Khomeini further provoked Saudi Arabia by criticizing Saudi of being an unfit guardian of the holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina, and questioned Saudi Arabia’s Islamic religious legitimacy. Some of the Shia population in Saudi began to speak on behalf of Khomeini and from 1979-80, Shia and Saudi security forces fought in the Eastern province. Iran has long engaged in a political, propaganda war with Saudi Arabia, creating security crises within the Saudi state, by exploiting the discontentment within Saudi’s Shia population.
Iran also succeeded in fomenting unrest in Saudi in the Eastern province in the Arab Spring of 2011-2012 with the eastern province witnessing, “continuous, low-level unrest in an unending cycle of detentions, shootings, and demonstrations”. In a Sunni dominated country, the Shia population of Saudi Arabia have faced discrimination, but the unrest in Saudi from 2011-2012 can also be attributed to Iranian covert action. Iran used propaganda to exploit the discontentment of the minority sect in Saudi, to pose create a security threat within the borders of Saudi Arabia and engage in a propaganda war. The Arab Spring uprisings provided the perfect opportunity for Iran’s intelligence forces to covertly stoke unrest across the region, using the same propaganda through its intelligence capabilities to foment unrest in Bahrain’s Shia population.
GCC Conventional Capabilities
Despite these threats, the GCC states have numerous conventional advantages over Iran’s military capabilities with their, “modern and effective weapons available from the U.S. and Europe and would be supported by the U.S., Britain, and France in any serious warfighting contingency.” Additionally, the Gulf states far outspend Iran in regard to military expenditures. Data estimates that Arab GCC states spent $95 to $128 billion on military forces in 2017. Iran is estimated to have spent $15 to $16 billion. Iraq, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have spent more than 10 percent of their economies on military forces. Although the UAE and Qatar have provided no official data on their military spending, it is likely they also spent more than 10 percent, driven especially by the UAE’s fighting of the war in Yemen. Overall the Arab Gulf states spent 11.3 times more than Iran has spent, due to the constraining of Iranian military modernization efforts after years of imposed sanctions.
Apart from the GCC having more major weapons in most areas of conventional arms, the GCC weapon systems are far more modern and efficient than Iran’s with “close examination of Iran’s land, air, and sea-based military modernization efforts reveal that key Iranian force systems are obsolete, obsolescent, or of relatively low quality. Many systems date back to the Shah or were worn during the Iran-Iraq War.
With weapon systems far more modern than Iran’s, the GCC has the advantage of buying high-tech weapon systems for its allies like the United States. In 2013, Abu Dhabi bought Patriot missile batteries as well as two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries. Saudi Arabia is also incredibly well off, possessing the biggest and oldest missile defense capabilities. Today the Saudi’s has numerous capabilities including Hawk surface-to-air missiles (MIM 23B I-Hawk and MIM J/K Hawk) and Patriot batteries, which include Pac-2 and Pac-3. Saudi and the UAE represent the bulk of military capabilities and defensive capabilities, possessing arsenal like missile defense capabilities.
The GCC states with their spending significantly more on their military and having conventional military forces which are armed with much more modern and capable military hardware, still have been unable to affectively combat Iranian challenges, due to political differences between GCC states, and some states sharing more friendly relationships with Iran like Qatar. Iran has repeatedly tried creating instability in the GCC as evidenced in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and breaking up the unity of GCC states, as evidenced in Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar who have resisted the Saudi led call for greater regional integration.
Exploiting Instability within the GCC
GCC states have faced a variety of security threats from “encroachment by Iran and Saudi Arabia to sweeping regional civil unrest.” Iran has increasingly exploited instability within GCC states, fomenting unrest whenever possible. Iranian strategy in Bahrain included exploiting the discontentment among Bahrain’s Shia population, using propaganda and arming Shia groups to create instability within the GCC. Bahrain is ruled by an Arab Sunni Royal family, but a majority of Bahrain’s population are Shia and have faced discrimination for their religious differences with Sunnis. Like in Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring came to Bahrain and demonstrations in February 2011 by Shia protestors were viewed by Bahrain’s royals and Sunni as a Shia uprising. Like Saudi, “the Bahraini authorities, plus the Saudis and Emiratis, saw an Iranian hand in these protests.” Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent troops to Bahrain in March of 2011 to help Bahrain squash the protests with force. As the situation escalated, “some radical elements of Bahrain’s Shia community have indeed sought some clandestine assistance from Iran.” Iran used its intelligence capabilities to exploit grievances in Bahrain’s Shia population, and later escalated the situation by arming Shia groups, in effort to ignite GCC instability and break up the unity within the GCC. This has proved an effective tactic for Iran as Bahrain still struggles with Iranian backed Shia groups within its population with reports released on April 16 stating a court in Bahrain had sentenced 139 people to prison and revoked the citizenship of all but one. The people were accused of “setting up a cell linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Bahrain has accused Iran of fomenting unrest among its Shia community since 2011, and Iran has continued this practice if effort to create instability within GCC states.
When the Arab Spring came to Egypt, like it did to Bahrain and Saudi, the event started the pull away of Qatar from the GCC. Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt showed that its foreign policy revolved around building ties with groups and actors throughout the region including Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Taliban, which Qatar views as allies to increase its influence throughout the region. In 2011 relations between GCC started to fracture when Qatar supported the Arab Spring Uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by supporting Muslim Brotherhood member, Mohammed Morsi, who briefly came into power. In 2014, Qatar continued its support of such groups and gave its support to the Muslim Brotherhood again and Salafi extremists in Syria. These actions stood out as Qatar’s main “foreign policy pivots” in the year 2014. Senior Analyst Aida Arosoaie stated, “While the Saudis and its close allies perceive the Muslim Brotherhood to be a direct threat to their domestic security, Qatar has generously extended it support for conflicts occurring from Libya to Egypt, and from Tunisia to Syria.”
After the Qatar rift in 2017, Qatar-Iran relations grew increasingly stronger. The rift occurred between Qatar and GCC states when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE formed a blockade around Qatar and submitted thirteen demands to the state, holding that Qatar supported terrorism. Although the GCC demanded that Qatar sever ties with Iran, Iran was quick to offer support offering Qatar use of its airspace and supplied food in order to prevent food shortages occurring as result of the blockade. The GCC remains at odds with Qatar to this day, and Iran’s asymmetrical strategy to break up GCC unity has proven to be effective. After the Qatar rift, “there has been greater cooperation between Qatar, Iran and Turkey. In November 2017, they signed a transportation pact to boost trilateral trade, with Iran connecting the other two countries.” Qatar’s desire to maintain a close relationship with Iran is echoed in Qatar’s Prime Minister Hamad Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani statement that, “Qatar will not allow any country to interfere in its relations with Iran.”
GCC members Oman and Kuwait have also demonstrated the breaking apart of the GCC over Iranian foreign policy. Smaller GCC states Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait have long resisted the Saudi led call for regional integration, repeatedly disagreeing with Saudi’s desire for an aggressive Iranian stance. In 2017, Iranian President Rouhani visited Kuwait in February 2017, stating that “there are vast potentials for deepening and cementing relations between Iran and Kuwait.” Oman has also maintained a friendly relationship with Iran, and in 2017 was the only GCC country not to downgrade it relations with Iran. The war in Yemen has further created disunity between Oman and its GCC counterparts. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have formed a Saudi led coalition to defeat the Houthis, Oman has faced international criticism for its position regarding the war in Yemen. In September 2016, weapons smuggled through Oman, meant for Houthi rebels, were intercepted in Yemen. Oman has used its various close ties to mediate between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, choosing not to join its GCC counterparts in the Saudi led coalition against Iranian- backed Houthis.
Hybrid and asymmetrical warfare are especially effective for states who are overmatched by the conventional forces of their foes, as is the case for Iran when facing the modern militaries of the GCC. Iran poses a credible security, military, and intelligence threat through its use of proxy groups, its ballistic and cruise missiles and its distributed naval firepower which utilizes small boats and fast attack capabilities, and its intelligence capabilities through the channels of its Quds force. Iranian strategy combines using propaganda, funding and arming proxy groups throughout the region, while avoiding direct conflict, to deter regional actors and ensure its freedom of action in the region. GCC states have numerous advantages over Iran with their modern and efficient weapon systems to include modern airframes and missile defense systems, their ability to significantly outspend Iran on military hardware, and their allies like the United States and Europe. Despite these advantages, Iran’s strategy of creating GCC instability and breaking up GCC unity has proven to be effective in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and Oman, Kuwait and Qatar. While Iran poses credible asymmetric threats to the GCC and its allies, perhaps its most dangerous capability is the slow burn of the political threat to member states of the GCC. If Iran continues to break up GCC unity, this could very well pose an existential threat, making the future of the GCC, non-existent.
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