By Albert Vidal
1. Introduction
A seismic shift is sweeping the Middle East as the Trump administration undermines U.S. military involvement, leaving space for China’s growing influence in the region. And what happens there has substantial impacts on the worldwide energy supply and the global economy. Even though the Middle East has long earned the notoriety for terrorism, proxy wars, and civil wars, the region itself is a good piece of cake where interests of great powers may clash as well as those of regional powers. It is expected that China’s deepened ties to the region will offer a very different type of engagement, which is will eventually reshape the regional political arena.
Since the Middle Eastern affairs have grown in sophistication and involved multifarious subsets of topics, I have chosen to untangle three questions: (1) whether the U.S. is leaving a power vacuum in the Middle East, (2) what China’s response has been, and (3) how China’s strategy has been successful so far. To find answers to such questions, I used articles from think-tanks, news outlets and long reports.
2. Will the US troop withdrawal create a power vacuum in the Middle East?
Before engaging in the issue of China’s response and its success in altering the power balance in the Middle East, we need to see whether the status quo power, the U.S., is leaving a power vacuum or is firmly maintaining its position in the region.
There are four premises that justify the argument for the creation of such power vacuum. First, the U.S. dramatic increase of shale oil production[1] has sharply reduced its dependence on energy imports from the Middle East given Washington’s expectation to become a net energy exporter by 2020. Second, the U.S. rising tensions with Turkey due to the purchase of the S-400 have curbed its credibility, alienating one of the U.S. key allies in the region and pushing Turkey closer to the Kremlin[2]. Third, the Trump administration’s capricious announcement to withdraw troops from Syria without consulting its regional allies and some of its own top officials[3] has caused immense confusion. Even if the decision was later reversed, the damage was already done. Fourth, the lack of a resolute punishment against Iran’s recent attacks in the Gulf (following salami tactics), “has undermined Arab monarchies’ confidence in the U.S. security guarantee”[4].
On the other hand, there are diametrically opposed views on the issue of U.S. apparent retreat from the region. First, the recent withdrawal move in Syria was quickly followed by a redeployment of troops in a nearby area, raising the final number of U.S. forces in Syria to about 900, close to the initial 1,000 troops[5]. Second, Washington is currently enhancing its naval presence in the region through the newly launched Operation Sentinel to patrol Gulf waters. Specifically, the U.S. led a naval coalition on November 2019 to protect shipping in the Gulf region, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb, and the Sea of Oman. Additionally, Washington has deployed more than 14,000 additional US troops[6],bringing the number of U.S. troops in the Middle East to around 70,000, an aircraft carrier, two Patriot batteries and THHAD in the Gulf since May 2019[7]. Third, the U.S. has entered an escalation spiral with Iran by killing Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in an airstrike in January 2020[8]. Further to this, it has deployed almost 4,000 fresh troops to the region in that same month[9]. After these bold moves, it is hard to see how the U.S. is planning a retreat from the Middle East, as this will probably demand a greater American involvement to face the more than likely reactions of Iran’s proxies throughout the region, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and multiple PMF factions in Iraq.
In my view, the unpredictability of the U.S. military engagement in the region has significantly deteriorated its image in the perspective of the regional allies, especially after Trump said that troops in Syria are there only for the oil. The U.S. is showing signs of Middle Eastern fatigue. This is being materialized in several developments given that the UAE is showing signs of overture toward Iran by engaging in multiple joint coastguard meetings, freeing up exchange and promoting regional dialogue [10]. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), strange though it may seem, is also cultivating new ties with Iran, departing from the harsh line adopted by Washington. Examples of it include the release of 200 Houthi prisoners[11] and the talks behind-the-scenes to end the war in Yemen[12]. Notably, Saudi and Iranian high officials have exchanged multiple statements and messages hinting at the beginning of talks and cooperation through intermediaries[13]. Additionally, Turkey’s relations with Russia seem to be improving, as noted by Putin recently. Both presidents have met 10 times in 2019 alone and held 12 phone talks. The alienation of a key NATO partner will prove significant, and this has become even clearer after the S-400 deal and the construction of Turkstream[14]. Third, KSA recently appointed a new Minister of Foreign Affairs that is fluent in German[15], hinting that the KSA might be trying to diversify its foreign policy options after the backlash in the U.S. that followed the murder of Jamal Khashoggi or the disastrous war in Yemen, especially with the uncertain support of a post-Trump administration. Fourth, Saudi and Emirati flirtation with Russia and China has become tangible with Putin’s visit in October 2019[16], and with the China-KSA naval exercises that began in mid-November[17]. Washington has also begged Riyadh to avoid Huawei hardware and ICTs, but the Saudis have ignored such pleadings[18].
3. What is China’s scheme in the Middle East?
In light of the U.S. deteriorating role, China may take advantage of this opportunity to strengthen its own position in the region. Beijing needs to protect and further several key interests. First, securing the supply of energy (in particular, oil) is arguably Beijing’s top priority. According to ECFR[19], in 2015 China became the largest importer of crude oil, with half of its supply coming from the Middle East, especially the KSA. Second, the Middle East holds a strategic position within China’s BRI, and thus, tightening its grips on the region is crucial for Beijing to secure and develop trade routes and sea lanes. To do that, China is investing billions[20] in countries in need of infrastructure, who are absorbing China’s excess of industrial capacity and overproduction[21].
Now that China’s vital interests have been exposed, the paper will analyse China’s specific strategy to attain them. The first strategy is to build relations with individual countries rather than with the region as a whole[22]. Such strategy allows China to simultaneously maintain positive and substantive relations with most, if not all, countries in the region[23] while avoiding entanglements with the region’s blocs. A proof of such strategy is that China has already developed ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’, which is regarded as one of the highest levels of bilateral relations for China, with the KSA, UAE, Egypt, Iran and Algeria, as well as ‘strategic partnerships’ with Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey[24]. Besides, leaders of multiple countries including Qatar, the KSA, the UAE and Egypt visited China in 2019, pursuing stronger bilateral relationships[25].
The second strategy is to promise economic development without requiring political reforms or respect for human rights, following China’s wholehearted principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Middle Eastern leaders tend to prefer this approach to the Western one, which is often regarded to have strings attached such as advocating for democratic reforms[26]. Not only do they prefer such type of partnerships, but many also admire the Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism and perceive cooperation with China as a way to get around Western pressure to pursue political reforms[27].
The third strategy is to continuously increase its economic footprint. Economic cooperation is central in China’s engagement strategy in the Middle East[28], which is reflected in the 2016 “Arab Policy Paper” and the 2015 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”. This can be seen through the growth in Chinese financial institutions[29] and the rapid development of infrastructure construction projects such as the ‘industrial park-port interconnection, two-wheel and two-wing approach’[30], which will grant China’s access to key ports in the UAE, Oman, the KSA, Djibouti and Egypt. Chinese FDI in the Middle East has grown tremendously[31], as well as the volume of trade, which reached US $197 billion in 2017[32]. These graphs [see Appendixes A, B and C] show how China has overtaken the U.S. as the biggest trading partner with almost every country in the region.
The fourth strategy is based on a slow increase of China’s security footprint given its cautious attempt to avoid any early provocation toward the U.S. That is, China is not directly challenging the U.S.-led security architecture, but slowly marching toward its dismantlement. As of today, Chinese military involvement is minimal. This is even recognized by U.S. officials, when they say “[…] the good news is that China does not seek to usurp our self-appointed role as the protector of the Middle East”[33]. But a moderately growing rising involvement should be expected, given the necessity to protect an increasing number of Chinese citizens and assets in the region. This new attitude can be traced to some developments: first, China has begun substituting the U.S. in certain sectors of the weapons sales markets, in particular, drones[34]. This has happened, in part, due to the U.S. self-limiting restrictions on drone exports. Second, China has stepped up in its maritime security operations. The Chinese ambassador to the UAE announced in August 2019 that China might participate in maritime security operations in the Strait[35]. Also, Iran and Russia declared that China would be involved in a joint naval drill in the Sea of Oman (although China has not confirmed it yet)[36]; and China is participating during November 2019 together with the KSA in the mixed naval drill Blue Sword 2019[37]. Third, China is already participating in anti-piracy missions and the PLA Navy has recently began visiting ports on the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf of Aden[38]. In June 2019, Trump tweeted that China should be protecting its own ships and sea lanes[39], in an ironic and counter-intuitive message reinforcing China’s growing security involvement in the region.
4. Has China been successful so far?
Perhaps a more appropriate question would be whether such strategies have proven to be successful. Undoubtedly, I would argue that China has crafted a set of efficient strategies to preserve both of its two key interests. Aside from the constant flow of oil to China, Chinese companies are thriving throughout the region, developing massive infrastructure projects in line with the BRI. Trade and investment figures are breaking historical records [see Appendixes A, B and C], and visits, exchanges and partnerships have become a habitual element of China’s relationship with the Middle East.
For more specific examples, the KSA and the UAE recently announced that they would introduce Chinese-language studies in their national curriculums[40]. The Saudis are aligning their Saudi Arabia’s 2030 Vision with China’s BRI[41]. Most countries in the Middle East have defended China’s prosecution of its Uighur population (which are Muslim), something that the West has harshly condemned[42]. Most importantly, China has successfully avoided any major political and military entanglements in the Middle East.
5. Prognosis and conclusion
My personal prognosis is that China’s approach is unsustainable in the long term. Increasing assets and the need to protect its own citizens, energy sources and investments will eventually lead to a stronger security presence. Politics and economics cannot be forever separated; they are essentially intertwined. That’s why a deeper economic engagement will be translated into political entanglements, which may escalate military involvement.
I hope that the arguments listed above clarify how China has quickly filled the vacuum in the economic field, and how it is slowly doing so in the security sphere. Beijing’s current success does not guarantee for future stability, especially when it faces a region full of power struggles and most importantly, a declining superpower that is no stranger to the use of force.
About the author: Albert is an International Relations senior at the University of Navarre. His areas of interest and research include geopolitics, security and diplomacy in the MENA region. Albert collaborates with several think tanks in Spain, such as Artículo 30 – Política y Defensa and Global Affairs and Strategic Studies, where he has published multiple articles. He has been trained at several universities around the world such as Yale, Princeton, the Catholic University of America, Tongji University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Albert is also fluent in Spanish, Catalan, English and French, has a working knowledge of German, and is currently studying Arabic. Throughout his undergraduate studies, he has also developed other interests in Human Rights advocacy, political philosophy and the impact of technology in society.
[1] Ellyatt, Holly, The US shale revolution won’t stall despite headwinds, global oil experts say, CNBC, November 11-2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/11/us-shale-oil-revolution-will-continue-despite-headwinds-experts-say.html
[2] Lucinda, Hannah, Turkey tests Russian S-400 missile system on US-made F-16 jets, The Times, November 26-2019, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/turkey-tests-russian-s-400-missile-system-on-us-made-f-16-jets-tz2lf9ckm
[3] Hansler, Jennifer; Browne, Ryan & Gaouette, Nicole, Trump’s special envoy on Syria wasn’t consulted on Syria decision, CNN Politics, October 22-2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/22/politics/jim-jeffrey-syria-us-kurds/index.html
[4] Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang, Al-Tamimi, Naser, China’s great game in the Middle East, October 21-2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_great_game_middle_east
[5] Schmitt, Eric & Cooper, Helene, Hundreds of US troops leaving and also arriving in Syria, The New York Times, October 30-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/world/middleeast/us-troops-syria-trump.html
[6] Gibbons-Neff, Thomas & Schmitt, Eric, Despite vow to end ‘endless wars’ here’s where about 200,000 troops remain, The New York Times, October 21-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/middleeast/us-troops-deployments.html
[7] Seligman, Lara, Top US general: it’s very possible Iran will attack again, Foreign Policy, November 23-2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/23/very-possible-iran-will-attack-again-top-us-general-says/
[8] Iran’s Qassem Soleimani killed in US air raid at Baghdad’s airport, Al Jazeera, January 03-2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iraq-3-katyusha-rockets-fired-baghdad-airport-200102232817666.html
[9] Soleimani killing: US deploying 3,000 more troops to Middle East, Al Jazeera, January 03-2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/3000-additional-troops-heading-middle-east-officials-200103175502486.html
[10] See: Staff writer, Iran, UAE hold routine coast guard meeting regarding fishing zones, Al Arabiya, July 30-2019, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2019/07/30/Iran-UAE-renew-annual-coast-guard-meeting-regarding-fishing-zones.html; TOI Staff and Agencies, UAE frees millions in frozen funds amid warming ties, Iran says, October 21-2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/uae-frees-millions-in-frozen-funds-amid-warming-ties-iran-says/; Iran, UAE stress dialogue as only way to end tensions in the region, Radio Farda, November 14-2019, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-uae-stress-dialogue-as-only-way-to-end-tensions-in-the-region/30270015.html
[11] Yemen: Saudi-led coalition says it released 200 Houthi prisoners, Al Jazeera, November 26-2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/yemen-saudi-led-coalition-released-200-houthi-prisoners-191126142735162.html
[12] Al-Haj, Ahmed & Michael, Maggie, Saudi Arabia Yemen’s Houthi rebels in indirect peace talks, Associated Press, November 13-2019, https://apnews.com/cb393079f7be48d2951b3ae3f2d4361b
[13] Saudi Arabia considering improvement of relations with Iran, Radio Farda, December 13-2019, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/saudi-arabia-considering-improvement-of-relations-with-iran/30324569.html
[14] Russia marks significant success in ties with Turkey, Hurriyet Daily News, December 30-2019, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-marks-significant-success-in-ties-with-turkey-150438
[15] Moubayed, Sami, Who is Saudi Arabia’s new foreign minister Faisal al Saud?, Gulf News, October 24-2019, https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/who-is-saudi-arabias-new-foreign-minister-faisal-al-saud-1.67354918
[16] Roache, Madeline, 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia is only pretending to be a major power, Time, November 09-2019, https://time.com/5720730/russia-berlin-wall-anniversary/
[17] Cadell, Cate, China, Saudi Arabia launch joint naval exercise-media, NYTimes, November 20-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/11/20/world/middleeast/19reuters-china-saudi-military.html
[18] Calabrese, John, Intersections: China and the US in the Middle East, MEI, June 18-2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/intersections-china-and-us-middle-east
[19] Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang, Al-Tamimi, Naser, China’s great game in the Middle East, October 21-2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_great_game_middle_east
[20] Fulton, Jonathan, China is becoming a major player in the Middle East, Brinknews, September 19-2019, https://www.brinknews.com/china-is-becoming-a-major-player-in-the-middle-east/
[21] McGurk, Brett, China’s risky Middle East bet, The Atlantic, April 29-2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/chinas-risky-middle-east-bet/588166/
[22] Alterman, Jon B., China’s Middle East Model, CSIS, May 23-2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-middle-east-model
[23] Freeman, Chas W., The United States, the Middle East and China, Middle East Policy Council, https://mepc.org/speeches/united-states-middle-east-and-china
[24] Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang, Al-Tamimi, Naser, China’s great game in the Middle East, October 21-2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_great_game_middle_east
[25] Fulton, Jonathan, China is becoming a major player in the Middle East, Brinknews, September 19-2019, https://www.brinknews.com/china-is-becoming-a-major-player-in-the-middle-east/
[26] Ibid.
[27] Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang, Al-Tamimi, Naser, China’s great game in the Middle East, October 21-2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_great_game_middle_east
[28] Fulton, Jonathan, China is becoming a major player in the Middle East, Brinknews, September 19-2019, https://www.brinknews.com/china-is-becoming-a-major-player-in-the-middle-east/
[29] Fulton, Jonathan, China is becoming a major player in the Middle East, Brinknews, September 19-2019, https://www.brinknews.com/china-is-becoming-a-major-player-in-the-middle-east/
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang, Al-Tamimi, Naser, China’s great game in the Middle East, October 21-2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_great_game_middle_east
[33] Freeman, Chas W., The United States, the Middle East and China, Middle East Policy Council, https://mepc.org/speeches/united-states-middle-east-and-china
[34] Calabrese, John, Intersections: China and the US in the Middle East, MEI, June 18-2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/intersections-china-and-us-middle-east
[35] Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang, Al-Tamimi, Naser, China’s great game in the Middle East, October 21-2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_great_game_middle_east
[36] Pinghui, Zhuang, China, Russia, Iran ‘plan joint naval drill in international waters, SCMP, September 21-2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3029819/china-russia-iran-plan-joint-naval-drill-international-waters
[37] Saudi Arabia, China kick off naval drill, Asharq Al-Awsat, November 18-2019, https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1996576/saudi-arabia-china-kick-naval-drill
[38] Lons, Camille; Fulton, Jonathan; Sun, Degang, Al-Tamimi, Naser, China’s great game in the Middle East, October 21-2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_great_game_middle_east
[39] Trump, Donald J., Twitter, June 24-2019, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1143128642878410752
[40] Dalay, Galip, Why the Middle East is betting on China, Asia Times, August 23-2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/08/opinion/why-the-middle-east-is-betting-on-china/
[41] Chen, Juan; Shu, Meng & Wen, Shaobiao, Aligning China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Saudi Arabia’s 2030 Vision: Opportunities and Challenges, World Scientific, 2018, https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S2377740018500203
[42] Dalay, Galip, Why the Middle East is betting on China, Asia Times, August 23-2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/08/opinion/why-the-middle-east-is-betting-on-china/
