By Mai Phan
As COVID-19 continues to ravage the globe, world leaders from Democratic enthusiasts to Communist figures are forced to meet in conjunction, promptly rolling out contact tracing apps which are claimed to curb community virus transmissions and to bring societies closer to a normal semblance.
China, where the first case of coronavirus was found, took the lead to launch a contact tracing system that is integrated into the country’s prominent payment apps such as Alipay and WeChat since early February. The system provides each person with a QR color code, ranking people’s risk of infection based on their travel history. Only the people being certified by the app can gain admission to working space, use public transportation, and basically enjoy life outside their cramping apartments. On the other hand, the app doesn’t seem like being welcomed by the majority of the public where the download of the contact tracing program is completely voluntary. In fact, concerns over data privacy and the absence of aggregated reports on those apps’ efficacy have critically ascribed to a low level of installments in those countries.
As students and scholars studying international relations, we must not resort to biased assumptions and cross out any potential resolution to the pandemic, but rather, build arguments from a comprehensive understanding of available strategies. This article attempts to encapsulate practical implementations of contact tracing app across the world. From there, the article aims to engage thinkers in untangling a critical question: Will health vs. privacy a zero-sum game which only allows one’s gain at the expense of the other’s loss?
1. China’s model
By far, China’s contact tracing program is considered as the most prevalent, at-the-same-time the closest embodiment of a surveillance system. With the help of the country’s two Internet giants, Alibaba (BABA) and Tencent (TCEHY), China has been able to promote such a system throughout the whole nation. [1]
To obtain the health code, citizens have to fill in their personal information, including their name, national identity number or passport number, and phone number on a sign-up page. They're then asked to report travel history and whether they have come into contact with any confirmed or suspected COVID-19 patients in the past 14 days. They also need to check the boxes for any respiratory symptoms, including fever, fatigue, dry cough, stuffy nose, running nose, throat ache, or diarrhea.
Although developers have denied providing any user data to the government and only do that with users’ consent, [2] the NYT team found that each time a person’s code is scanned, his or her current location appears to be sent to the system’s servers. [3] According to CNN Business, a person familiar with the development of the health codes on Alipay informed that the system was developed and operated by government agencies, and Alipay only provides the platform and tech assistance. As such, critics of China have warned about an exquisite surveillance system disguising the contact tracing program. No one knows what the government will do with the information that they have collected and how long it will be stored at the servers. But what we know for sure is that the Beijing government loves to keep eyes on its citizens.
To be fair, one feature of the app that distinguishes China from other countries, and thus, contributes to the country’s success is its agenda to push the program’s ubiquity. Before COVID-19, both Alipay and WeChat have already been used widely in China, accounting for 92 percent of the market share. [4] By integrating the contacting tracing program into existing familiar apps, China dodged costly measures of introducing it to the public. Importantly, we all understand that the more people download the app, the better it works. Therefore, China’s imposition of the contact tracing program, while being questioned by human rights critics, indeed maximizes its efficiency to curb the virus spread.
2. Singapore’s TraceTogether
Regarding Singapore’s handling of the pandemic, Western media had initially extolled the island-nation’s decisive and transparent efforts which didn’t require city lockdown or dictatorial orders similar to China. One of which “successful” approach includes Singapore’s version of the contact tracing app, TraceTogether. [5]
The app works on the basis of exchanging Bluetooth signal to detect whether the user was in close contact with a COVID-19 diagnosed person. According to Reuters, Bluetooth apps are generally more privacy-friendly than tracking traditions such as GPS or cellphone data. [6] They use Bluetooth to broadcast and receive an encrypted, pseudonymous signal from nearby phones and create a log of interactions that are store locally on the user’s phone; even the user can’t see that information.
When one user signs up, a random User ID is generated and associated with his/her mobile number. The Temporary ID that the user’s phone exchanges with nearby phones is refreshed at regular intervals. The lack of a persistent identifier makes it impossible for third parties to identify or track the user. Different than China’s model, Singapore’s TraceTogether only stores users’ mobile numbers and User IDs in a secure server.
If a user gets infected with COVID-19, he/she has an option to grant Minister of Health (MOH) access to his/her TraceTogether data. By then, this data will be used solely for notifying other people who have been in close contact with COVID-19 patients.
While Singapore’s TraceTogether seems to be superior to China’s contacting tracing app, meeting the double standards- assurance of users’ data privacy and alarm of exposure to virus carriers, Singaporeans remain skeptical of the use of data collected. In fact, approximately 25% of the population downloaded the app when it is known to work when at least 75% of the population download the app. [7] After all, Singapore’s model represents a tawdry model that is advocated by the Western media but stumbles in real life.
3. Australia-COVIDSafe [8]
Singapore’s model is adopted and ameliorated by Australia as the nation launched its first version of the contact tracing app on April 26, 2020. In parallel with Singapore’s TraceTogether, Australia’s COVIDSafe works on the basis of exchanging Bluetooth signal. The registry requires the provision of name, phone number, postcode, and age range.
Aside from registration data, the information remains on the phone until a user who tests positive with COVID-19 consents to upload it. In advance of TraceTogether, COVIDSafe’s developers plead to delete all collected data on a 21-day rolling cycle and urges people to delete the app as soon as the pandemic fades.
Nevertheless, the app also shares a modest result with TraceTogether. Even though the media generously lauds the app for attracting one-fifth of the population after a week of releasing, [9] the level of downloads tend to slow down after the first week. In the foreseeable future, the Australian government is expected to encounter great difficulty in meeting its minimum quota, variously estimated from 40% to 60% of the population. [10]
Conclusion
Now that we have an overview of how contact tracing apps are currently being implemented by countries around the world, the question stated earlier appears to be less challenging. The Singapore’s model and Australia’s model, TraceTogether and COVIDSafe, are exemplary contact tracing apps that not only secure user’s identity via a convoluted encryption system but also fulfill the purpose of alarming people who are at high risk of infection. Although technical operations may vary from app to app, both apps largely work on a decentralized mechanism that allows data to store locally on users’ phones and can only be accessed by authorized agencies if the users agree. Therefore, it is not a matter of whether health vs. privacy a zero-sum game, but under which circumstance the app becomes effective.
As a rule of thumb, contact tracing apps only work when there is a sufficient number of people installing the app; the amount depends on the population number, density, and the government’s strategy. Even though Singapore’s TraceTogether and Australia’s COVIDSafe meet privacy standards, their apps fail to work because of the lack of people signing up.
Lessons from China tends to teach governments around the world an urgent need for existing infrastructures to booster the use of contact tracing app in practice. Since the beginning, China has already integrated the contact tracing program into widely used payment apps, a move that I consider marvelous. This way, people don’t feel like they are forced to download the app, but they still have the app uploaded and ready to work. Similarly, Google and Apple are working on a contact tracing program that is currently accessed by 22 governments and likely to be incorporated into iOS and Android devices in the future. [11] One thing to reinstate is that Singapore and the Australian government should remain their way of operating the program. This way, people’s data won’t be used for political purposes in the post-COVID era.
In short, data privacy is not the central issue revolving around the implementation of the contact tracing app, but it is about how to get people to install the app. World leaders ought to be more flexible in the battle against this invisible enemy.
Mai Phan is the 2019-2020 Assistant Editor of the Sigma Iota Iota’s Online Journal. She is currently studying Global Studies and Political Science at Lebanon Valley College.
*Image Source: China’s imported COVID-19 cases on the rise. Caribbean Business Report (https://caribbeanbusinessreport.com/world/chinas-imported-covid-19-cases-on-the-rise/)
[1] Gan and Culver, "China Is Fighting the Coronavirus with a Digital QR Code. Here’s How It Works”, CNN Business, April 16, 2020.
[2] Ankel, “As China Lifts Its Coronavirus Lockdowns, Authorities Are Using a Color-Coded Health System to Dictate Where Citizens Can Go. Here’s How It Works”, Business Insider, April 7, 2020.
[3] Mozur, Zhong, and Krolik, “In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags”, the New York Times, March 1, 2020.
[4] “China’s Alipay and WeChat: Reaching Rural Users”, CGAP, December 2017.
[5] “TraceTogether”, Tracetogether.gov.sg.
[6] Aravindan and Phartiyal, “Bluetooth Phone Apps for Tracking COVID-19 Show Modest Early Results”, Reuters, April 21, 2020.
[7] “TraceTogether”, TraceTogether.gov.sg.
[8] “COVIDSafe App”, Health.gov.au.
[9] “Coronavirus Tracing App COVIDSafe Hits 5 Million Downloads as Government Concedes Incompatibility with Older Phones”, ABC News, May 6, 2020.
[10] Leins, Coghlan, and Cheong, “Do We Really Need a Tracking App and Can We Trust It?”, Pursuit- University of Melbourne, April 24, 2020.
[11] O’Neill, “How Apple and Google Are Tackling Their Covid Privacy Problem.”, MIT Technological Review, April 14, 2020.
