By Kanghyun Kwon
The postponement of the Tokyo Summer Olympics proves to be an ironic critical blow to Shinzo Abe, who had declared the Olympics to be the “Recovery Olympics” that would represent the spirit of human perseverance against the pandemic [1]. Meanwhile, his dichotomous assumption of the Olympics and policies for COVID-19 as in a zero-sum game was not an adequate conclusion, but a faulty misperception that eventually led to the current explosion of COVID-19 in Japan.
Abe’s slogan for his response to COVID-19 had been to prevent the healthcare system from being overwhelmed. Thus, he made abrupt decisions of barring entry of people with a history of traveling to China and South Korea, two countries where the COVID-19 outbreak was believed to be the most serious in East Asia at the early stage of the pandemic [2]. Combined with additional domestic measures, Japan had been one of the successful countries in containingthe confirmed cases of COVID-19 to below one thousand by the end of February [3]. It had successfully maintained the good operational status of the public healthcare system which was capable of conducting an average of 7,500 to 8,000 tests a day [4].
Yet, Abe chose poorly for his next decision. He restricted daily testing of COVID-19 rather than keeping up with utilizing the best of the country’s infrastructure. Only an average of 1,190 tests had been conducted each day over the course of February in Japan – not reaching one-sixth of the country’s maximum capacity for testing. The total number of testing in Japan in February had only reached 32,125, while more than 200,000 tests were conducted in South Korea in the same month [5].
This only elucidates that the testing of COVID-19 which would secure the domestic healthcare system was not Abe’s primary objective. Rather, it was one of his political tactics to reach his priority of securing the Olympics which would have saved his political career from domestic scandals and economic recession. He thus downplayed the further threat from COVID-19 once he had found the number of COVID-19 cases to be statistically low enough fordismissal, and confidently insisted upon the country’s readiness for the Olympics based on thosedata.
Abe’s inexcusable fallacy stems from his underestimating of COVID-19 for the Olympics, in which he miscalculated that the successful Olympics and containment of COVID-19 were contradictory to each other. Despite being a trained politician with the top responsibility, Abe was too blinded by his personal objective and cornered by international and domestic crises to reach the obvious conclusion that Japan, given its economic capability and social infrastructure, was capable of containing the spread of COVID-19 while preparing for the Olympics on the other side. The cost Abe has to pay for such blindness is immense. In addition to challenges from his political rivals blaming his reluctance to implement tougher measures earlier, the domestic healthcare system on the verge of paralysis awaits him.
Japan could have remained as an exemplar state in containing COVID-19 infections if it had adopted and maintained the mass testing of COVID-19 simultaneously with its preparation for the Olympics. Conducting massive testing of COVID-19 would have been a risky political adventure for Abe, given the Japanese government’s relatively successful containment of COVID-19 infection at the early stage of pandemic. Nonetheless, as the “Recovery Olympics” would not have miraculously cured COVID-19, his ‘readiness for the Olympics’ should have been manifested differently than mere concealment of COVID-19. They could have coexisted if only Abe had taken enough time to contemplate the policies of sophisticated inter-sectoral cooperation and efficient utilization of domestic resources. Doing so would have proven Abe’s government transparency. He also could have secured and reinforced his leadership that would remain solid regardless of the postponement of the Olympics.
The world has seen South Korea successfully conducting its parliamentary election in April without aborting its mass testing of COVID-19, which resulted in zero cases of local transmission throughout the election period [6]. Given the Japanese government budget, financial stability, medical infrastructure, and human resources available in Japan that surpass the South Korean one, there was no way that Japan could not have done the same.
Kanghyun Kwon is a student at George Mason University.
Works Cited:
[1]: The Economist. (2020, March 26). Covid-19 forces Japan to delay the Olympics. The Economist. http://www.economist.com/asia/2020/03/26/covid-19-forces-japan-to-delay-the-olympics
[2]: Osumi, M. (2020, March 9). Japan tightens border controls over COVID-19, but power to quarantine limited. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/09/national/japan-border-controls-coronavirus/
[3]: Statista. “Japan: Coronavirus Cases by State of Health.” Database. Statista. Accessed May 14, 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1096478/japan-confirmed-cases-of-coronavirus-by-state-of-health/.
[4]: Reuters. (2020, March 18). Japan testing for coronavirus at fraction of capacity, data shows. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/18/national/japan-testing-covid-19-sixth-of-capacity/
[5]: Reuters. (2020, March 18). Japan testing for coronavirus at fraction of capacity, data shows. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/18/national/japan-testing-covid-19-sixth-of-capacity/
[6]: Guardian staff and agencies. (2020, April 30). South Korea records no new domestic cases of Covid-19 for first time since February. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/30/south-korea-records-no-new-domestic-cases-of-covid-19-for-first-time-since-february
*Image Source: Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gestures as he speaks during Tokyo 2020 kick off rally in Tokyo August 23, 2013. REUTERS/Yuya Shino/File Photo (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-olympics-tokyo/tokyo-governor-to-join-olympics-call-with-abe-ioc-boss-idUSKBN21B1JG)
