By William Southworth
Only one year ago, the UK was in a political meltdown after Theresa May’s Brexit Deal was rejected for a second time. A very large protest calling for a re-do of the referendum was teeming in the streets of London [1]. The EU applied pressure on the UK to pass the deal. A seemingly unified front of EU negotiators looked upon a squabbling, indecisive UK political landscape and at a British team with no visible mandate. As hopelessly interminable as Brexit might have sounded then, both sides of the Brexit equation are on radically different footing now. If one can look past the haze of the current COVID-19 pandemic, it becomes clear that the UK is riding a wave of electoral and economic mandates, while the EU is the one struggling to hold its head above water.
The UK officially left the EU on January 31st, 2020 after nearly 4 years of debate. The shift in power dynamic that made the exit finally possible was a long time in coming. The UK has always been an important contributor to the EU project as a much-needed donor and a check on EU integrationism. Evidently, the EU would be thrown out of balance if the UK were to leave. Indeed, that is precisely what has happened in the year between May’s defeat and Johnson’s current strong negotiating position. Johnson has aggressively pushed Brexit measures, exposing internal divides in the EU and highlighting the importance of Britain’s role. The EU, caught between converging crises, is now suddenly on the backfoot.
Some of the world’s worst current COVID-19 outbreaks are currently raging in the EU’s heartlands. Tens of thousands are dead in Italy and Spain. Viral spread continues and well over 100,000 are infected in Germany and France [2]. Entire countries are on lockdown and hospitals are stretched thin. Even if Brexit and the Coronavirus pandemic were the EU’s only problems, things would be looking grim for the bloc. The pandemic and Brexit have empowered skeptics of the EU’s freedom of movement and trade bloc projects. Unfortunately, the coronavirus crisis is hitting an EU that is already weakened by: slow economic growth, internal political turmoil, a post-Brexit financial crisis, and the beginning of another migration crisis. The sudden convergence of so many crises has forced individual member states to turn inwards, sidelining the bloc in a time of crisis. If the political body doing the heavy-lifting when push comes to shove is the nation-state, why answer to the EU?
Even before the current COVID-19 pandemic struck, economic growth had slowed to a dangerous crawl in various core European economies. The UK overcame Brexit fears with a decent economic performance in 2019, while many countries like Italy and the EU’s economic powerhouse, Germany, saw markedly reduced growth. According to the UK Office of National Statistics, the UK’s 2019 rate of 1.4% GDP growth [3] compares very favorably to Italy’s 0.3%, Germany’s 0.6% and France’s 1.3% GDP growth rates [4]. The UK is also on more stable ground when it comes to its 2020 economic outlook. The UK’s economy is expected to contract 3% before the year ends, considerably less than the Eurozone’s projected losses of 4-5% [5]. Even after the pandemic concludes, the UK is looking at a quick return to decent growth while the EU faces poor long term prospects.
While the UK is far from being an economic powerhouse towering over the EU, it is clearly on even economic ground with the EU and is actually outperforming core EU economies. The British economy was buoyed by the electoral victories of Boris Johnson and the political stability he has provided. This created a strong growth trajectory up until the current COVID-19 disruption. Seemingly, the fears of economic instability that had haunted Brexit had been put to trial and a strength was found where a weakness was expected.
The economy was not the end of the EU’s woes. Political stability was another issue. But not only does the UK stand on even ground with the bloc, it has the newfound advantage of being more politically stable. After a historically decisive December election win, the Conservative government has closed ranks and pushed its agenda through, in contrast to weakened governments in France, Italy, Germany and several other EU member states.
For example, consider Germany. Germany has seen its longstanding centrist grand coalition gradually lose ground to fringe parties like the populist AfD, the environmentalist Greens and the left-wing Die Linke. Elsewhere, the old political order is under threat from new populist and eurosceptic parties like France’s RN and Spain’s Vox [6]. For much of Europe, the generally centrist governmental solidarity that defined the 2000’s and 2010’s is one solid shove away from political irrelevance. For the UK, things could not be more different. The governing Conservative party continues to consolidate their already historical lead, according to recent YouGov voting intention surveys [7].
The political instability diffusing across Europe has also made its way up the political ladder to the EU itself. The EU parliament has seen a similar influx of populist parties and is facing a crisis of its own, specifically regarding its budget. As mentioned, the UK’s departure has left a hole in the EU 2021-2027 budget. Therefore, it is up to the EU to make up for the 11% of total budget lost [8]. In response, the members have sorted themselves into two camps. Five thrifty nations, misleadingly named the ‘Frugal Four’ (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark), propose making considerable cuts across the board and capping member state contributions to the EU at 1% of GDP. The other group, the 17 member ‘Friends of Cohesion’, calls for a more generous plan that would cap member state contributions at 1.11% to promote continued development in less-well-off member states [9]. The pandemic has only intensified differences between the parties, as hard-hit countries like Spain and Italy call for stimulus and aid packages that seem far too expensive for more frugal members. Caught between the present emergency and an imminent financial crisis, the EU struggles to keep up. Juxtaposed against the political situation in the UK, the UK clearly has a stronger political mandate supporting its future negotiations.
On February 28th, Turkey announced that it would no longer hold up its end of the 2016 Migrant deal and it would allow migrants to pass freely through its territory and into the EU. The Turkish government had agreed to prevent migrants from using Turkey as a route into the EU in exchange for 6.7 billion dollars of financial support, fast-tracked EU membership talks, and visa-free travel [10]. It is clear that there is political intent behind their decision. Greece already faced riots and social unrest related to refugees when Turkey announced its decision to allow migrants to proceed towards the Greek border. Not only did Turkey allow migrants through its territory, they actively transported them to the Greek border.
If they were planning to put political pressure on Greece and the EU, they could have hardly picked a better time. Thankfully for the EU, the border situation has de-escalated since mid-March. While the possibility of a 2nd migrant crisis may seem far off under the current global lockdown, it would prove catastrophic for the EU if it were to occur. The 2015-2016 migrant crisis heavily influenced events like Brexit and continental politics. More support for populist parties and nationalist movements would naturally come at the expense of the EU.
After four years of back-and-forth negotiation, an emboldened UK is looking to turn the tables on a beleaguered EU. That is because the UK has the advantage of a united government, better economic prospects, and political stability compared to the EU. The EU, already weakened by multiple crises and newly emergent divisions, is institutionally threatened by the political implications of the current pandemic. While nothing is certain with the pandemic looming over most political questions, the general trajectory is clear. The UK has the strong bargaining position they need to pursue the privileged mix of economic access and political sovereignty Brexiteers have long sought after.
William Southworth is an undergraduate student at Concordia College.
Works Cited:
[1] Rasmi, A. (October 19, 2019). “Hundreds of Thousands are Set to March in London for a Second Brexit Referendum”, Quartz. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From: https://qz.com/1731457/hundreds-of-thousands-march-in-london-for-new-brexit-referendum/
[2] “Communicable Diseases Report, 12-18 April 2020, Week 16”, ECDC. Retrieved April 18, 2020. From:
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/communicable-disease-threats-report-12-18-april-2020-week-16
[3] “GDP Quarterly National Accounts, UK: October to December”, UK National Office of Statistics. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/gdpquarterlynationalaccountsukoctobertodecember2019
[4] “Italy, Germany, France GDP Annual Growth Rate”, Trading Economics. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From:
https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/gdp-growth-annual
[5] “Deep Global Recession in 2020 as Coronavirus Escalates”, Fitch Ratings. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From:
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/deep-global-recession-in-2020-as-coronavirus-crisis-escalates-02-04-2020
[6] Penty, C. (April 20, 2019). “France’s Le Pen feels Great Friendship for Spain’s Vox Party”, Bloomberg. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-20/france-s-le-pen-feels-great-friendship-for-spain-s-vox-party
[7] “Voting Intention: Con 52%, Lab 28% (Apr 1)”, YouGov. Retrieved April 18, 2020. From:
https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/04/03/voting-intention-con-52-lab-28-1-2-apr
[8] Brattberg, E., Brudzinska, K., and Pires de Lima, B. (March 25, 2020). “Contending European Views on a New Post-Brexit Balance”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From:
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/25/contending-european-views-on-new-post-brexit-balance-pub-81354
[9] Istrate, D. (February 28, 2020). “What’s Next for ‘Friends of Cohesion’ in EU Budget Talks?”, Emerging Europe. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From:
https://emerging-europe.com/news/whats-next-for-the-friends-of-cohesion-in-eu-budget-talks/
[10] Cook, L., and Fraser, S. (March 9, 2020). “EU, Turkey to review migrant deal as border tensions simmer”, AP News. Retrieved March 30, 2020. From:
https://apnews.com/3f16b2288f45f95bb80d79c0aff09b4a
*Image Source: frontal shot of the EU Parliament in Strasbourg from Shutterstock
