By Nicholas Castillo
Introduction
Long politically dominated by outside groups, the Kurds form the largest stateless people in the world. Internationally, there are anywhere between 20 and 40 million members of the ethnic group. The population is mostly split between four Middle Eastern states: roughly 15 million in Turkey, seven to nine million in Iran, four to five million in Iraq, and one to two million in Syria.
Kurdish nationalism has been a feature of Middle Eastern politics since the 1920s, when the first plans for a Kurdish state were made after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However, since its inception, Kurdish nationalism has come into conflict with those countries that house a Kurdish population and would stand to lose territory to a Kurdish state. The competing interests of Kurdish nationalists and the states in which Kurdish communities reside had led to a multi-decade conflict involving periodic rebellions, state repression, and long running guerilla conflicts, especially in Turkey.
While the recent years have borne witness to advancements in the Kurdish drive for statehood, a fully independent Kurdish state remains highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. Instead, recent advancements by the Kurdish movement have been met with new Syrian, Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian resistance, ushering in a new stage of the Kurdish conflict.
New Centers In the Kurdish Conflict - Iraq and Syria
The Kurdish movement has had its greatest successes in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, the Kurdish autonomous zones in these states have remained precariously situated and are now the new centers of action in an expanded Kurdish conflict.
The civil war with ISIS provided Iraqi Kurdistan with its greatest degree of independence in its history. Iraqi Kurdistan has been a semi-independent political entity since 1991 under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), but ISIS’s expansion during the earliest years of the war cut off the influence of the central government, leaving the Kurds of Iraq independent. During the ensuing years of fighting with ISIS, Kurdish soldiers took control of lands past the official boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Syrian Kurdistan acquired its autonomy more recently than Iraqi Kurdistan. Just as the Iraqi Civil War provided increased independence for the Kurds of Iraq, the Syrian Civil War provided Syrian Kurdish separatists with the opportunity they had been waiting for. As government forces left northern Syria in 2011, Kurdish forces seized control, eventually taking charge of education, taxation, and security. Like Iraq’s Kurds, Syria's Kurdish forces became a key ally in the western coalition against ISIS and made territorial advancements throughout the conflict. Kurdish forces now control broad swaths of northeastern Syria.
In Iraq, the post-ISIS period has seen steady encroachment on Kurdish autonomy. Beginning in 2017 the federal government has reasserted its authority over disputed areas held by the KRG, forcing the withdrawal of Kurdish troops. The situation escalated with the 2017 non-binding independence referendum. Initiated by Masoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party, the referendum was meant to give the Kurdish government a mandate to negotiate independence, but was opposed not only by Baghdad but internationally as well. While the referendum passed with 92 percent support for independence, it was internationally unrecognized. The result also received condemnation from the central government, with then Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi saying he would “never have a dialogue” on independence with the KRG and that “we will impose Iraq's rule in all districts of the region.”
The referendum accomplished nothing but politically isolating the KRG and providing the federal government with an excuse to quicken encroachment on Kurdish territory. Shortly after the referendum, Baghdad’s forces seized the city of Kirkuk and its oil-rich surrounding area, violating a 2014 treaty between Baghdad and the KRG that promised to maintain joint control of disputed territories. After a three-hour battle, Iraqi forces expelled Kurdish soldiers from the strategically and economically crucial city. The U.S. The State Department responded with a carefully worded statement, maintaining Kirkuk’s “disputed” status.
Iraqi Kurdish autonomy has not only faced resistance from Iraq, it has increasingly faced aggression from two major regional powers: Turkey and Iran. Both states view Kurdish separatism in Iraq as a potential catalyst for their own states’ Kurdish movements. Turkey in particular is concerned with Iraqi Kurdish ties to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish guerilla group active within Turkey. At the same time, Kurdish territories in both Iraq and Syria have become the battle ground on which Turkey and Iran wrestle for influence in the Middle East.
Iran and Turkey have increasingly pursued their interests in Iraqi Kurdistan, launching attacks directly or through proxies. In 2017, Iranian-funded militias, in coordination with the Iraqi government, took the strategic border region of Sinjar from Kurdish forces in a move that prevented a similar Turkish attack in Sinjar. Such indirect actions have been supplemented with direct Iranian attacks, such as the June 2020 bombing of Kurdish positions in the north of the country. Turkey has been bolder, threatening to openly invade Iraqi Kurdistan and has launched both ground and air attacks. These strikes show no sign of abating, with Turkish pro-government outlets reporting 25 PKK militants killed in airstrikes in the last week. At the same time, Turkey has been forming alliances with Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party, the long-term rivals of PKK-affiliated Iraqi Kurdish groups, and has offered an economic lifeline to the desperate KRG through oil sales.
More so than in Iraq, Turkey has viewed Kurdish groups in Syria as a threat. In particular, Ankara views the YPG, the main Kurdish Syrian militia, as little more than a Syrian offshoot of the PKK. Since 2016, Turkey has launched three military invasions of northern Syria, effectively creating three Turkish spheres of influence within the country: the Afrin region, Al-Bab region, and the countryside north of the Kurdish city of Raqqa. Turkish presence within these spheres is now entrenched, as Turkey has worked with local proxies to build state security institutions like local police and has established more than thirty military bases strewn throughout its territories. Turkey was also accused of allowing and aiding the expulsion of Kurdish communities by Turkish-allied militias.
While Kurdish forces still control large amounts of territory in northern Syria, their position is reliant on American military presence and support. The United States still has troops stationed in the territory, acting as a powerful deterrent to Turkish and Syrian forces. Crucially, these are oil rich territories that supply Syrian Kurds with steady incomes. However, as evidenced by President Trump’s 2019 removal of troops from the Turkish-Syrian border region and the fast-paced Turkish invasion that followed, this is an inherently precarious situation for Syrian Kurds.
Fearing increasing Turkish advances, Syrian Kurds initiated talks with Damascus after the U.S. withdrawal from the border zone. The agreement allowed the redeployment of some regime forces to northeastern Syria to further deter Turkish attacks, making it the first time federal soldiers would have a presence in the area since 2011. However, talks have stalled since with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad vowing to restore federal control to Kurdish areas and even giving public support to the Turkish incursions into Syrian Kurdish territory.
Future Prospects
The breakdown of authority in Iraq and Syria allowed for unprecedented degrees of Kurdish autonomy, yet this has not produced a stable Kurdish state. Iraq's attempts to build on the momentum of Kurdish successes in the civil war failed as Baghdad consolidated power and regional powers ratcheted up attacks on perceived threats. In Syria, Kurdish autonomy is in a state of perpetual limbo, with increasing pressure from Ankara and Damascus. The best ally of the Kurds, the United States, had little appetite for another Middle Eastern war and has stood by as Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran chipped away at Kurdish political autonomy.
It is highly unlikely that an internationally recognized Kurdish state will appear in the near future. In Iraq, the most likely outcome will be the steady reincorporation of Iraqi Kurdistan as a quasi-autonomous territory but without full independence. Iran and Turkey will likely continue to target Kurdish militias even as Turkey forms ties with more amenable Kurdish political factions. In Syria, the future is less clear. American military withdrawal would likely spark intensive violence, with either Syrian or Turkish forces unilaterally attempting to take Kurdish-held territory.
While we have not seen the emergence of a viable Kurdish state, the conflict over Kurdish statehood has entered a new phase. Despite its comparatively small Kurdish population, the center of the conflict is now Iraq and Syria, where, even under outside pressure, Kurds have achieved new degrees of political independence. A defining trait of this new phase of the conflict is a resurgent Turkey, looking to expand its influence and deter its own Kurdish movement. Likewise, Iran’s newfound influence has been detrimental to the Kurdish movement, using powerful militias to encroach on Kurdish territory.
Nicholas Castillo is a sophomore at George Washington University majoring in political science with a double minor in international affairs and history with areas of interest including nationalism, the post-Soviet space, and the Middle East.
