By Maggie Sparling
Abstract: Ever since the formation of NATO in 1949, European security has been heavily dependent upon U.S. military capabilities and assistance. However, due to the recent fissures in the trans-Atlantic alliance, the existing relationship requires restructuring. If European countries want to maintain global influence, be able to act autonomously, and develop an effective ‘insurance policy’ as the United States pivots towards Asia, they should pursue and the United States should encourage increased EU integration on foreign affairs and a policy of strategic autonomy. This policy is essential in making the EU a stronger NATO partner and in protecting European security.
The diplomatic challenges that U.S. President Donald Trump’s Administration created through their various foreign policy decisions ignited much scholarship and debate over the future of trans-Atlantic relations. Some argued that this was just a fad unique to the Trump presidency and that under Joseph Biden, relations with the United States’ European allies could return to normal. Others argued that it was time for Europe to give up on the United States and begin to develop its own military capabilities. Both arguments have deep flaws yet simultaneously contain elements of truth. The trans-Atlantic partnership has its cracks, but those began many years before Trump arrived in Washington. European security is weakened by its overdependence on U.S. military capabilities and assistance. Given that European security is the most at stake by the evolving nature of the trans-Atlantic relationship, Europe needs to be the one to act. It is time for a more coordinated foreign policy approach within the European Union (EU). In order to promote long-term European and U.S. security interests and to preserve the trans-Atlantic alliance, the EU should pursue and the United States should encourage a policy of European strategic autonomy.
PART I: THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE STATUS QUO
The trans-Atlantic relationship is a key element in U.S. and European security planning. This relationship manifested itself in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an integrated alliance born in 1949 in the face of perceived Soviet aggression. It included a mutual defense obligation and offered security protections for the United States’ Western European allies.[1] After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, NATO continued to be a key element in U.S. and European security planning. For the United States, NATO ensures access to European bases and provides a structure for coordinated military action. For its European partners, the alliance places Europe under the U.S.’s security umbrella—and with the exception of France and the UK who possess their own nuclear weapons, the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without NATO, European countries lack critical security and defense capabilities. Despite the alliance’s importance for both centers of power, the trans-Atlantic partnership has, in recent years, begun to fracture. These fractures precede the election of Donald Trump. Even during the Cold War when NATO played, arguably, its most important role, there was conflict between European and U.S. interests as seen in the 1956 Suez cri sis. In the post-Cold War years, one of the most notable fissures occurred over the U.S.’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.[2] The 2011 Libyan crisis further illustrates this fragmentation.[3] Under the Trump Administration, little attempt was made to hide the fissures. His administration’s decision to pull the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) while European powers opted to remain was one of many actions that sowed further division.[4] Trump also derided NATO as “obsolete”, abruptly pulled U.S. troops out of Syria to the surprise of its European allies, and called for a reduction of U.S. troops in Germany.[5] The soundness of these policies can be debated. However, the manner in which Washington made these decisions—that is, without consulting its European allies—left lasting damage on trans-Atlantic relations.
The U.S.-European relationship faces more structural challenges than simply the diplomatic fallout from the Trump Administration’s foreign policy decisions. There is an underlying power asymmetry that has characterized the relationship since the end of the Second World War. This is most clearly illustrated by Europe’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Beyond the nuclear issue, European military operations rely heavily on the United States for critical operation support; European powers are incapable of acting independently. European leaders were reminded of this dependence during the 2011 military intervention in Libya where they found themselves incapable of conducting crisis management operations or collective defense independently.[6] More specifically, most European countries purchase their defense products, such as the U.S.-made Reaper drones, from the United States. However, in order to use these drones, they must first seek permission from Washington. Additionally, all data related to F-35 operation and maintenance must pass through U.S.-based servers.[7] These operational limits are damaging to European powers because U.S. and European interests do not always align; some issues simply geopolitically affect Europe more than the United States. One only has to look to the historical examples of the Balkans in the 1990s, Libya in 2011, and Ukraine in 2014 in order to see this divergence.[8] Such examples highlight Europe’s limited capabilities.
Beyond operational limits, European disunity over foreign policy makes a preservation of the status quo dangerous for European security as it gives foreign powers like China and Russia the opportunity to take advantage of this disunity and further divide the continent. Huawei’s efforts to build part of Europe’s 5G network offers one example of this internal division. U.S. officials have warned that Huawei’s technology could give the Chinese government backdoor access to critical infrastructure, thus posing a threat to security interests.[9] In the UK, U.S. pressure succeeded in banning Huawei’s equipment from the UK network.[10] But in mid-December, the German government inched closer to allowing a limited use of Huawei’s technology.[11] Europe is divided over how to respond to a possible Chinese threat. This division prevents a unified response and weakens subsequent efforts. Disunity over the response to China is further illustrated over the extent, if any, that Europe will participate in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Economically weaker countries like Greece and Italy are more inclined to accept China’s investment offers much to the derision of their northern neighbors.[12] Disunity over foreign policy responses is also visible in the Russian angle over Germany’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. This pipeline will double Russian natural-gas deliveries to Germany. Countries like Poland and the Baltic states strongly oppose the project citing their historical interactions with Russia where energy supplies became a tool of political pressure.[13] Without more unity on such key issues, European countries will lack the ability to effectively counter external pressures.
PART II: CHANGE IS NEEDED – LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION
The fissures in the trans-Atlantic relationship and the challenges of the status quo arrangement show that change is needed; it should come in the form of increased European integration. The most obvious and viable mode for this change is through the EU. Although some argue that Brexit and the populist wave that emerged in the mid-2010s spelled the end of the European experiment, European integration is still alive and well. A 2019 Pew Research Center survey found that most member nations had a favorable view of the EU with double-digit increases in the period from 2016 to 2019. Large majorities say that EU membership generally benefited their country and strengthened their national economies. The EU’s future viability is ensured by the more favorable opinion of the EU among young Europeans.[14] The EU is posed to continue to survive and provide the means for greater integration.
Although integration cannot solve every issue that plagues Europe, it is necessary for foreign policy and security issues. A collective approach is vital if Europe wishes to have an impact on NATO and international policies. No European power is strong enough to maintain a full-spectrum force of any significant size.[15] Collectively, they carry great political and economic weight that enables them to wield greater influence. Additionally, many threats are not confined by state boundaries and the activities needed to combat them involve extensive overlap. Counter-terrorism and response to hybrid attacks are some of the most cited examples.[16] This makes an EU-centered approach to foreign policy advantageous for European security interests.
Simply accepting that the EU needs to close capability gaps and boost unity on foreign policy does not provide information on the manner in which that change will happen. French President Emmanuel Macron offered one vision. In light of the deepening fissures in the trans-Atlantic partnership throughout the Trump presidency, Macron declared in a fall 2019 interview with the Economist that NATO was experiencing “brain death” and questioned the validity of collective defense.[17] His words ignited much condemnation across the western hemisphere but also sparked extensive scholarship and debate about the future of European security. Some turned to the notion of a “true, European army” that Macron had floated around the previous year.[18] Few people, if any, really know what a European army would look like, much less how it would be constructed. But it quickly became clear that this was not a viable option—at least in the near future. Germans, for example, are concerned that such a force would drag them into France’s African wars.[19] Other states are similarly worried that this force would involve putting their citizen’s lives on the line for their neighbor’s pet projects. But more immediately, EU member states lack the full range of capabilities needed to be an independent actor.
PART III: A POLICY OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
Thus, EU interests, at this point, are best served by pursuing a policy of working towards strategic autonomy. A 2019 SWP research paper defined strategic autonomy as:
“the ability to set one’s own priorities and make one’s own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through—in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone. Strong strategic autonomy means being able to set, modify and enforce international rules, as opposed to (unwillingly) obeying rules set by others”.[20]
Strategic autonomy is focused on giving the EU the “freedom to conduct missions and operations autonomously rather than the freedom from dependencies on the hegemon.”[21] This is a key distinction. The focus of strategic autonomy is not a decoupling from the United States. Rather, it focuses on increasing European capabilities. There are two additional points to note. First, strategic autonomy is a spectrum, not a binary issue of whether to have or not to have strategic autonomy.[22] Second, this is not a zero-sum game. A policy of strategic autonomy does not strengthen the EU at the expense of NATO.[23] Addressing EU operation weaknesses and working towards strategic autonomy strengthens NATO and addresses U.S. concerns over burden sharing. These increased capabilities can easily plug into the existing NATO framework while also giving the EU the freedom to conduct independent missions.
There are many possible areas to focus strategic autonomy defense and security planning on, but the three most important are intelligence, strategic transportation, and the defense-industrial base. In the intelligence realm, there is a need for greater coordination and intelligence sharing among thematic and geographic priorities, program development to work with and analyze the large amounts of collected data, and a mobilization of technological and human resources to assist with the boost in intelligence capabilities.[24] The EU currently relies on the United States to provide much of the equipment and resources for intelligence gathering. Procuring its own resources is critical if the EU aims to develop the capacity to conduct independent operations. Additionally, there is the need to increase intelligence sharing and coordination. Siloing information at the national level slows the EU’s ability to respond to the increasingly cross-border nature of crises. If the EU wishes to be a strong foreign policy actor and strengthen its defense capabilities, improving its intelligence operations is a critical initial step.
There are many areas within the realm of transportation where the EU faces critical capability shortfalls. One in need of the most attention is in Air-to-Air Refueling where the EU’s operations in Mali, Libya, and Kosovo exposed Europe’s heavy reliance on the United States. The EU should acquire the refueling pods needed to improve existing capabilities without having to purchase additional aircraft.[25] Additionally, to better address cross-border threats, the EU must work to speed up cross-border movement permissions for troops and military goods.[26] There are many additional transportation projects in need of attention, but resources are not limitless. The EU should assess the most pertinent threats and ensure that it develops the capabilities needed to address them in the most cost effective, cohesive, and timely manner possible.
But in order to develop these transportation systems and advance intelligence capabilities, the EU needs to strengthen its defense-industrial base. Third-country dependencies are not inherently problematic and play a part in maintaining peaceful relations. However, the conditions associated with some of these dependencies can create a power imbalance that limits the EU’s ability to act autonomously. At present, the EU is heavily dependent on the United States for many things including artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, communication systems, and satellites.[27] This creates inefficiencies in operations as seen in the previously discussed Reaper drone situation and the running of data through U.S. servers. The first step in addressing these inefficiencies is to centralize the procurement process. At present, 80 percent of EU member states’ military equipment is obtained on the national level.[28] By centralizing this effort through the EU, the procurement of defense equipment will be more cost-effective, facilitate the necessary collaboration to address cross-border challenges, and strengthen the EU’s weight in the purchasing negotiations. The second step is to step up the investment in the projects outlined by the EU’s European Defense Fund (EDF). These projects are designed to fill the gaps in intelligence and strategic transportation and to fill them in a way that strengthens Europe’s defense industry. This is critical in filling EU capability gaps.
Despite the good that increased European capabilities would do for the overall health of NATO and the trans-Atlantic partnership, the United States has a history of actively opposing such efforts. Some in Washington fear that EDF initiatives would limit U.S. defense contractors’ access to the European market.[29] Others are concerned that a stronger EU would undermine U.S. dominance in NATO. [30] This is a short-sighted fear and runs counter-productive to long-term U.S. objectives. U.S. security interests are best served by having a strong and capable European partner as the United States learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. For years, U.S. presidents have derided their European allies for failing to carry their burden within NATO. But when European countries started to improve their capabilities, the United States tried to shut down these operations. This is paradoxical and damaging to the overarching goal of a stronger and more effective NATO. The United States cannot demand that Europe does more without giving them a greater role in the decision-making process and in leadership capacities. This is the price that the United States should pay—and not fear—for keeping NATO viable and its European partners relevant. If the United States really sees China as a strategic competitor in the next few decades, it will need every partner it can get; the United States is delusional if it thinks it can counter Chinese influence alone. The United States should encourage European strategic autonomy.
In recent years, many foreign policy experts have emphasized the world’s pivot to Asia. Although Europe is facing relative decline, it is far from irrelevant. The EU has given European countries a global voice and their policies to carry global implications. Continuing and expanding European-wide operations is necessary if the EU wishes to be a key actor in the international arena. To do so, the EU must pursue a policy of strategic autonomy. This will not only strengthen NATO but will also act as a sort of insurance policy as the United States increasingly directs its resources away from Europe. By encouraging this policy, the United States can safely redirect its resources towards the Pacific and do so with the knowledge that the United States has a capable partner facing Russia’s western flank. The power dynamics of the international arena are changing. Countries and multilateral organizations must change with it. In order to remain relevant and viable, the EU must pursue a policy of strategic autonomy.
Maggie Sparling is a sophomore at the University of Virginia studying Economics and History.
Footnotes
[1] Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History (Basic Books, 2017), 118.
[2] Terry Young and Peggy Crawford, “Hands Across the Atlantic?,” International Business and Economics Research Journal (IBER) 3, no. 1 (2004): 90, https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.v3i1.3657
[3] Ruth Hanau Santini and Arturo Varvelli, “The Libyan Crisis Seen from European Capitals,” Brookings, June 1, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-libyan-crisis-seen-from-european-capitals/.
[4] Ellie Garanmayeh, “The Coming Clash: Why Iran will Divide Europe from the United States,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 25, 2017, https://ecfr.eu/publication/why_iran_will_divide_europe_from_the_united_states_7230/.
[5] Marc Santora, “Trump Derides NATO as ‘Obsolete.’ Baltic Nations See It Much Differently.,” New York Times, July 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/world/europe/trump-nato-summit-latvia-baltics.html.; Steven Erlanger, “Trump’s Syria and Ukraine Moves Further Alienate America’s Already Wary Allies,” New York Times, October 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/world/europe/trump-syria-ukraine-europe.html.; Michael R. Gordon and Gordon Lubold, “Trump to Pull Thousands of U.S. Troops from Germany,” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-directs-u-s-troop-reduction-in-germany-11591375651.
[6] Alice Billon-Galland and Adam Thomson, “European Strategic Autonomy: Stop Talking, Start Planning,” European Leadership Network (2018): 1, doi:10.2307/resrep22125.
[7] Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker Perthes, “European Strategic Autonomy: Actors, Issus, Conflicts of Interests” (Berlin: German Institute for International Security Affairs, March 2019), 19, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2019RP04_lpt_orz_prt_web.pdf.
[8] Daniel Fiott, “Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), November 2018, 2, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2012__Strategic%20Autonomy.pdf.
[9] Bojan Pancevski, “U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-say-huawei-can-covertly-access-telecom-networks-11581452256.
[10] Adam Segal, “The United Kingdom Bans Huawei From 5G Networks,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 14, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/united-kingdom-bans-huawei-5g-networks-0.
[11] William Boston and Stu Woo, “Huawei Gets Conditional Green Light in Germany as Government Approve Security Bill,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-gets-conditional-green-light-in-germany-as-government-approves-security-bill-11608117504.
[12] Theodore Pelagidis, “China’s Backdoor to Europe,” Brookings, April 15, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/04/15/chinas-backdoor-to-europe/.
[13] RFE/RL, “Work Resumes on Controversial Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, Gazprom Says,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 11, 2020 https://www.rferl.org/a/nord-stream-2-pipeline-gazprom/30996434.html.
[14] Richard Wike et al., “The European Union,” Pew Research Center, October 14, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/the-european-union/.
[15] Sven Biscop, “The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance: Now Without the European Union,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (Fall 2020): 85, 90. doi:10.2307/26937412.
[16] Lippert, von Ondarza, and Perthes, “European Strategic Autonomy,” 18.
[17] “Transcript: Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words (English),” The Economist, November 7, 2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-english.
[18] “France’s Macron Pushes for ‘True European Army’,” BBC, November 6, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46108633.
[19] “The Paper Euro-Army: France and Germany Are Pushing Rival Models for Defence Co-Operation,” The Economist, February 2, 2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/02/02/france-and-germany-are-pushing-rival-models-for-defence-co-operation.
[20] Lippert, von Ondarza, and Perthes, “European Strategic Autonomy,” 5.
[21] Fiott, “Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?,” 2.
[22] Fiott, “Strategic Autonomy: Towards ‘European Sovereignty’ in Defence?,” 7.
[23] Biscop, “The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance,” 82.
[24] Lippert, von Ondarza, and Perthes, “European Strategic Autonomy,” 21.
[25] “Air-to-Air Refueling,” European Defence Agency, October 6, 2020, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/air-to-air-refuelling.
[26] Tania Latici, “Military Mobility,” European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/635570/EPRS_ATA(2019)635570_EN.pdf.
[27] Marta Kepe et al., “Exploring Europe’s Capability Requirements for 2035 and Beyond,” European Defence Agency, June 2018, 37, https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/cdp-brochure---exploring-europe-s-capability-requirements-for-2035-and-beyond.pdf.
[28] Lippert, von Ondarza, and Perthes, “European Strategic Autonomy,” 19.
[29] Lippert, von Ondarza, and Perthes, “European Strategic Autonomy,” 27.
[30] Jack Thompson, “European Strategic Autonomy and the US,” Center for Security Studies, 2019, 1, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse248-EN.pdf.
