By Anvesh Jain
“What is being proposed by Russia? First of all, it is necessary to recognize the obvious: the emergence of a polycentric world architecture is an irreversible process, no matter how hard anyone tries to hold it back artificially.”
-Alexey Pavlovsky, Russian Ambassador to Australia
The early 1990s saw the climactic rupture of the Soviet Union, and with it a near total extirpation of Russian status on the world stage. That the federation has since managed to claw its way back from this decade in the backwaters of international affairs can be attributed to the ideas and vision espoused by the late Yevgeny Primakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 1998. The theorization of a ‘Primakov Doctrine’, based on a non-acceptance of American monopolarity and the desire to direct global order towards a state of concerted polycentrism has influenced Russian thinking and constituted the fundamentals of the federation’s grand strategy in the 21st century.[1]
Primakov’s postulation of Russian international affairs prioritizes the state’s independence as a great power in the federation’s decision-making, the pragmatic upgrading of conventional armed forces coupled with the boosting of asymmetric military capabilities, and the ushering in of a world defined by active balancing between competing loci of power. Russia’s global position will be secured by ensuring primacy in the post-Soviet space and the near-abroad, as evinced by its later actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. Finally, to engender such multipolarity, Primakov proposed the formation of a power triangle between Russia, India, and China, serving as counterweight against American hegemony.[2]In this way, Russia can crowd out American influence in the Indo-Pacific while freeing up resources to contest farther theatres such as Africa and the Middle East.
The erstwhile foreign minister has proven remarkably far-sighted in hindsight, his considerations effectively and propitiously guiding the contours of Russian foreign policy for the better part of twenty years.[3] The world stands more closely on the cusp of a multinodal order than at any point since the fall of the USSR, and perhaps a Primakovian conception of that order has already arrived. There are lessons for Western leaders in studying Primakov’s doctrinal understandings, and opportunities to employ a modified version of them in the conduct of their own 21st century statecraft. Doing so may just provide enough impetus for the kind of brilliant, daring, and creative diplomacy needed to arrest the trend of relative Western stagnation and successfully face the challenges of a new, more uncertain era.
Triangles in Diplomatic History:
The geometries of strategic triangles between countries have been of critical focus in modern diplomatic history. The most famous of these consisted of the trilateral relationship between the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States, constituting the major organizing principle of the 20th century.[4] In 1972, Nixon flew to Beijing and upended one end of the triangle, effectively capitalizing on the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s and bringing China into a position of neutrality and even competition with the USSR until the latter’s collapse.[5] As the disastrous invasion of Afghanistan unfolded in the 1980s, the Chinese and Americans collaborated to assist local mujahideen groups and check the Soviet military advance.[6] Experience demonstrates that triangles are unstable formations; they are meant to be in a state of constant flux and dynamism.
Primakov’s suggestion of a Russia-India-China triangle has in some ways borne fruit for the cause of a multipolar world, despite the antagonistic relationship between the latter two Asian giants. If the Primakov Doctrine intended to combine the energies of these three powers against American influence, then it may be worthwhile to consider the potential of a ‘Reverse Primakov’ triangle, consisting of the United States, Russia, and India, as a mechanism for disturbing Chinese ambition in the next two decades.
Yesterday’s enemies, today’s friends, tomorrow’s enemies––in geopolitics, allegiances may constantly shift in the maintenance and construction of a favourable ‘correlation of forces’.[7] If the 21st century is to be marked by the struggle between the United States and communist China, then there may be merit in re-examining the United States’ own diplomatic triumphs of the previous century. Although a ‘Reverse Primakov’ may seem incredulous given the current state of Russo-Western relations, there are certain conditions and trends that could induce policy coordination in the near future. These trends include temporal, structural, and geo-economic factors that might constrain and recalibrate the future calculus of the world’s four major power brokers.
Biden Goes to Moscow?:
Just as President Nixon’s famous visit to China precipitated a détente in U.S-PRC relations, could President Biden experience his own “Going to Moscow” moment and inaugurate a new era of mutual dialogue with the Russian Federation? Likely not, but given plausible conditions of the Eurasian strategic environment into the late 2030s, vulnerabilities in the Russo-Chinese entente could make the ‘Reverse Primakov’ a viable maneuver for Western tacticians. At the very least, such a playbook ought to be explored in the instance it ever needs to be dusted off.
On the other end of the equation, the question of leadership in the Kremlin is not a static one either. After recent constitutional changes, current Russian President Vladimir Putin has been granted the possibility of extending his tenure till 2036, when he himself will be the ripe age of 84.[8] Whoever comes after him may not be able to balance the tensions of Russian exogenous policy and consolidate endogenous power structures in the same calculating manner as Putin himself. The improvisatory and hybrid nature of Putin’s military-strategic reforms are in many ways unique and not easily replicable, especially by a less experienced successor.
The first steps towards rapprochement may come from a future Russian administration seeking to arrest the federation’s economic woes and generate goodwill with the West,[9] in the vein of the reformist Premier Gorbachev. By then, there might also be growing insecurity and anxiety from within the Kremlin ranks regarding their own relationship with an increasingly assertive Chinese state. Given the proud and emotive history of Russian statecraft,[10] and its own national role conception as a Eurasian power, the ‘apparatchiks’ and ‘siloviki’ of Moscow may not be so easily reconciled to the position of Beijing’s ‘junior partner’.[11]
Cracking the Entente:
History may not repeat itself, but surely it rhymes. Today’s Russo-Chinese entente seems air-tight; predicated on the inevitable convergence of the two usurper powers against waning American might. Let us not forget, however, that of the three previous alliances concluded between Beijing and Moscow (1896, 1945, and 1950), all three ultimately failed due to divergences in interests.[12] Internecine differences between Russia and China can arise again easily, and if they do, Western strategists should be willing and able to exploit them.
Differences may stem from the growing economic gap between Russia and China, the latter of whose GDP already surpasses the former by orders of magnitude in metrics of volume and trade. That gap is only set to grow further when projected into the 2020s and 2030s. Much of the trade between the two states focuses on energy and resource extraction from the Russian hinterland. In any case, China will not accept dependency on Russian energy, while Russia will strive to maintain financial sovereignty against Chinese corporate investments.[13] China’s signature Belt and Road project across Central Asia could serve as another possible avenue of friction in an already complicated geo-economic space.
Should Beijing become arrogant or invasive in its dealings with Moscow, it may mistakenly upset the thus-far careful management of the ‘New Great Game’ in Central Asia.[14] Any encroachments on Russia’s traditional primacy in its ‘privileged sphere of influence’,[15] including Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and the rest of the post-Soviet space, would constitute a fundamental violation of the Primakov Doctrine. Doing so may set off alarm bells in the Kremlin, especially in the further light of China’s determination to become an Arctic power with a crucial stake in the rapidly-opening ‘Polar Silk Road’.[16]
The precedent for mistrust extends deeper in the psyches of both Russian and Chinese observers, dating back to China’s ‘century of humiliation’ and Russia’s imperial meddling in the Far East. Chinese nationalists still nurse historical grievances over Tsarist Russia’s role in the Second Opium War, culminating in the cession of territories though the imposition of ‘unequal treaties’ upon the besieged Qing Dynasty.[17] For its part, Moscow is wary of Chinese immigration to the Far East and the potential––however unlikely––of demographic imbalances in the future. All this is compounded by Sinophobic sentiments in Russian localities increasingly experiencing an influx of Chinese businesses, workers, and investment into their neighbourhoods.[18]
Already, existing cracks in the relationship have been papered over by the strong personal friendship between President Putin and Chairman Xi Jinping.[19] Russia holds sturdy defense ties with Vietnam and India, both major opponents of Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific Region, and Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates “on Vietnam’s [maritime] shelf despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships”.[20] Just this past summer,[21] Russian security services accused a leading Arctic researcher of selling classified data on submarine-detection technologies to the Chinese. A future Russian leader may not as clemently overlook similar intrusions in a post-Putin federation, laying the pathway towards a re-evaluation of Russia’s continuing enmity with the West. Russia and China will find that in both rivalry and in partnership, as author Parag Khanna notes: “Everything seems stable until it is not”.[22]
Reversing Primakov’s Triangle:
Left to their own devices, these small gaps in Russo-Chinese communication may yet widen into a yawning chasm. As in the 1960s, it will take astute intelligence collection and the proper analysis of existing signals to skillfully manipulate a future Russo-Chinese split to the West’s favour. To successfully reverse Primakov’s Triangle will require the active participation and urging of India, as it occupies the centripetal pivot position in any triadic arrangement among the great powers.[23]
India stands to benefit the most from a reversed Primakovian order, due to its unique place in both the Russian and American strategic universes. If there is one player that can broker trust between the United States and the Russian Federation, it must be the Republic of India. India has long honoured its historical closeness with first the Soviets, and then the Russians, and its relationship with the United States has largely gone from strength to strength since the early 2000s.[24] Most importantly, India has refused to gain ground in one bilateral vector at the expense of the other, and has stringently sought to maintain its wider decision-making autonomy in a world of great powers.[25]
On the other hand, should the Chinese Communist Party continue to insist on its campaign of unabated revanchism,[26] it may inadvertently push the Russians, Indians, and Americans into a global anti-CCP condominium—in spite of each actor’s misgivings towards such a project. Long has there been a romantic notion in American strategic circles that it could bring India into its own orbit in the Asia-Pacific;[27] perhaps it will be India who might bring the United States closer to Russia instead, serving a similar go-between function as Pakistan did for the U.S and China in their seminal 1970s diplomatic breakthrough.
Conditions for Rapprochement:
True rapprochement between Russia and the West will require heavy concessions on both sides and may only become viable if each begins to view China as the greatest threat to their own strategic positions. An architecture of peace in eastern Ukraine will need to be drawn up, and the West must never sacrifice Kiev on the altar of reconciliation with Moscow. For their part, Moscow will have to make genuine overtures in eliminating disinformation and electoral interference as a strategy of disruption in European and North American democracies. From the Kremlin’s historical point of view, concessions to the West are usually followed by demands for further compromise.
Still, there are numerous areas of convergence that can be tentatively pricked until a change of leadership brings about better relations. Throughout the 2020s, there is scope for sustained confidence-building measures on questions of arms control and the development of new military technologies, nuclear non-proliferation, the preservation of stability in the Middle East, and the management of mutual competition in cyberspace and the planetary exosphere.[28] Just like the SALT treaties brought the hegemons to the bargaining table and facilitated Kissinger’s grand détente of the 1970s, so too could the pursuit of new arms control frameworks build the foundation for expanded cooperation in the 2030s.
Some of Washington’s transatlantic partners have already signaled a willingness to move towards some form of de-escalation with Russia, as is the case with President Macron of France. After a 2019 meeting with President Putin, Macron stated that Russia-EU relations would play a “key and determinative role”, and that Russia is at the heart of a “Europe extending from Lisbon to Vladivostok”.[29] There is some tacit recognition from the European leadership that while Western sanctions may have had a demonstrable impact on the Russian economy, they have also produced the unfortunate knock-on effect of pushing Moscow closer into the arms of Beijing.
With the eventual departure of Putin, a man who has so often personified the spectre of Russian expansionism, Western governments might be able to better sell the idea of rapprochement with Russia to their own publics. The language of defending Western civilization could be employed in the overarching struggle against the CCP menace.[30]After all, the Russians too claim a cultural and spiritual patrimony from Rome,[31] and the title of Tsar itself is a declension of the Latin ‘Caesar’. Conversely, softening rhetoric on Russia could be accompanied by popular backlash, as Nixon and Kissinger experienced for what was perceived to be their ‘amoral’ concept of foreign policy.[32] Hopes for rapprochement will have to be carefully packaged on both sides for domestic and external acceptance, to stand any chance in the contest of perception and optics.[33]
Conclusion: A Tall Ask
Primakov’s Doctrine portends a transition towards a world of polycentrism amid regional geographic spheres of influence. Not since the 19th century ‘Concert of Europe’ has there existed an international system marked by active balancing between several great powers of roughly comparable size.[34] The West must make difficult choices in confronting this unfamiliar state of affairs. Unipolarity and the bygone days of unchallenged hegemony can be clung to tightly with all the associated trappings of sentimentalism and nostalgia. Better yet, Western nations can marshal their advantages in resources and technology to pivot into the polycentric world, staking a foremost position for their bloc in the new epoch of global competition.
Through the study of Primakov, the prescient realization of his ideas, and the steady application of his theorems in reverse, the West can develop its own first-rate playbook for one of the many potential geostrategic scenarios it might be presented with in the 2030s.[35] There are, of course, stipulations attached. The United States would have to stagnate to a point that it accepts its status as merely a leading power in a system of several great powers, where it no longer possesses the capacity to enforce its will unilaterally outside its zone of preeminence. The Chinese would have to develop a posture threatening enough to all involved parties; pushing them to coalesce a triadic relationship between Russia, the United States, and India. India in particular would have to play an engaged role in militating against mutual suspicions and bringing its two major partners together, considering its robust ties with both ends of the triangle.
By the late 2030s, the West may become sufficiently fueled by the use of renewable energy sources that sanctions on Russian oil and natural gas no longer make sufficient punitive sense. A post-Putin administration in the Kremlin may feel desperate enough on multiple fronts to undergo reorientation and seek genuine reconciliation with its continental neighbours.[36]
These are but hypotheticals. Yet, all great endeavours begin with cogent and fruitful hypotheses. The forging of a ‘Reverse Primakov’ doctrine would require remarkable tenacity and diplomatic nous, and appropriate signaling at all levels of interministerial engagement. If pulled off, the construction of a Russia-India-United States strategic triangle would veritably represent the coup d’etat of this dynamic century, in the same way President Nixon’s visit to China functioned in the last.
Changing public perceptions of Moscow after nearly 90 years of anti-Soviet or anti-Russian rhetoric (briefly excepting the 1990s and very early 2000s) will perhaps be an insurmountable task. Times change, however, and strategic configurations change with them. The United States was on a war footing with Vietnam for decades. Today, the two are critical partners in the mission to preserve freedom and openness in the South China Sea.[37] If the conditions are suitable, a similar upending is plausible in the relations between Russia and the West - though by no means likely. In geopolitics, there is no permanence of love, and no permanence of enmity; only a permanence of covalent and countervailing interests.
Anvesh Jain is a senior at the University of Toronto studying International Relations.
Footnotes
[1] Eugene Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 5, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254.
[2] Amresh Chandra, “Strategic Triangle among Russia, China and India: Challenges and Prospects”, Journal of Peace Studies vol. 17, issue 2 & 3 (April-September 2010): 40.
[3] Sanu Kainikara, “Russia’s Return To The World Stage: The Primakov Doctrine - Analysis,” Eurasia Review, November 5, 2019, https://www.eurasiareview.com/05112019-russias-return-to-the-world-stage-the-primakov-doctrine-analysis/.
[4] Chandra, “Strategic Triangle among Russia, China and India,” 41.
[5] Julia Lovell, “Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World by Jeremy Friedman review – rethinking history,” The Guardian, November 21, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/nov/21/shadow-cold-war-jeremy-friedman-review.
[6] Melinda Liu, “Xi Jinping has Embraced Vladimir Putin—for Now,” Foreign Policy, October 3, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/03/xi-jinping-has-embraced-vladimir-putin-for-now/.
[7] The ‘Correlation of Forces’ refers to a former Soviet philosophical concept roughly congruent in meaning to the ‘Balance of Power’ notion that prevails in Western international relations thought. Julian Lider, “The Correlation of World Forces: The Soviet Concept,” Journal of Peace Research 17, no. 2 (1980): 151.
[8] “Russians clear way for Putin to extend his rule until 2036,” Al Jazeera News, July 2, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/2/russians-clear-way-for-putin-to-extend-his-rule-until-2036.
[9] Henry Foy & Max Seddon, “Rising poverty and falling incomes fuel Russia’s Navalny protests,” Financial Times, February 9, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/24b45679-ed22-4df7-89ab-f3d5fad71c95.
[10] Andrey Kortunov, “Russians Don’t Back Down,” Russian International Affairs Council, October 19, 2020, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russians-don-t-back-down/.
[11] “Russia - China’s Junior Partner,” Warsaw Institute, November 2, 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-chinas-junior-partner/.
[12] Artyom Lukin, “The Russia-China entente and its future,” International Politics (2020), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7.
[13] Vijay Gokhale, “China-Russia ties as a major determinant,” The Hindu, August 20, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/china-russia-ties-as-a-major-determinant/article32397585.ece.
[14] Xiangming Chen & Fakhmiddin Fazilov, “Re-centering Central Asia: China’s ‘New Great Game’ in the old Eurasian Heartland,” Palgrave Communications 4, 71 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0125-5.
[15] Emil Avdaliani, “A Russian-Western Rapprochement?,” The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, October 22, 2019, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/russia-west-rapprochement/.
[16] Elizabeth Buchanan, “Russia and China in the Arctic: assumptions and realities,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute - The Strategist, September 25, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities/.
[17] Neha Banka, “Explained: Why 160-year-old Vladivostok has a Chinese connection,” The Indian Express, July 7, 2020,https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-why-160-year-old-vladivostok-has-a-chinese-connection-6493278/.
[18] Yuri V. Kulintsev, Alibek A. Mukambaev, Kubatbek K. Rakhimov, Ivan Yu. Zuenko, “Sinophobia in the Post-Soviet Space,” Russia in Global Affairs no. 3 (July/September 2020), DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2020-18-3-128-151.
[19] Liu, “Xi Jinping has Embraced Vladimir Putin—for Now”.
[20] Lukin, “The Russia-China entente and its future”.
[21] “China’s assertiveness is becoming a problem for its friends, too,” The Japan Times, August 5, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/05/asia-pacific/china-bothers-friends-too/.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Chandra, “Strategic Triangle among Russia, China and India,” 44.
[24] Emily Tamkin, “Why India and Russia Are Going to Stay Friends,” Foreign Policy, July 8, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/russia-india-relations/.
[25] Manoj Joshi, “India’s strategy in the China-Russia-USA triangle,” Observer Research Foundation, December 20, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-strategy-in-the-china-russia-usa-triangle-59417/.
[26] Suman Sharma, “How China Used the Pandemic for its Expansionist Pursuits,” European Security & Defence, September 13, 2020, https://euro-sd.com/2020/09/headline/18823/how-china-used-the-pandemic-for-its-expansionist-pursuits/.
[27] Paul Staniland, “America Has High Expectations for India. Can New Delhi Deliver?,” War on the Rocks, February 22, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/america-has-high-expectations-for-india-can-new-delhi-deliver/.
[28] Richard Sokolsky, Eugene Rumer, “U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 15, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/15/u.s.-russian-relations-in-2030-pub-82056.
[29] P.S. Raghavan, “Inching towards a Russia-West rapprochement,” The Kootneeti, September 12, 2019, https://thekootneeti.in/2019/09/12/inching-towards-a-russia-west-rapprochement/.
[30] Anton Barbashin, “Russia-West in 2028: Counter Terrorism as a path to Rapprochement?,” Riddle, February 19, 2019, https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-west-in-2028-counter-terrorism-as-a-path-to-rapprochement/.
[31] Cyril Toumanoff, “Moscow the Third Rome: Genesis and Significance of a Politico-Religious Idea,” The Catholic Historical Review40, no. 4 (1955): 411.
[32] John Bew, “The Kissinger Effect on Realpolitik,” War On the Rocks, December 29, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-kissinger-effect-on-realpolitik/.
[33] Avdaliani, “A Russian-Western Rapprochement?”
[34] Chandra, “Strategic Triangle among Russia, China and India,” 52.
[35] Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action”.
[36] Sokolsky, Rumer, “U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030.”
[37] David Hutt, “US, Vietnam ties have never been better,” Asia Times, July 13, 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/us-vietnam-ties-have-never-been-better/.
