Last updated: Dec. 4, 2022
Introduction
In the fallout from his 2013 coup d’état, General Abdel Fatah el-Sisi enacted a number of counterterrorism policies harsher than those employed by his predecessors. While conventional wisdom would posit that these laws were in response to threats of terrorism, little evidence suggests this. Rather, the lack of increased counterterrorism operations or resulting decreases in terrorism levels in Egypt suggests an alternative explanation. As wider American security objectives in the region often dictate Egyptian counterterrorism policy, this paper considers the relationship between the United States and Egypt as a motivating factor for increased counterterrorism policies, more specifically, the military funding received by Egypt from the United States (“U.S.”). The Foreign Military Financing (“FMF”) program represents Egypt’s largest source of foreign military funding, providing over $1 billion of American military equipment each year.[1] This paper argues that Egypt’s hardening of counterterrorism policy since 2013 correlates to the funding received from the FMF program. Counterterrorism policy serves as a ‘signaling’ mechanism to the U.S. that actions will likely fall in line with American security objectives,
Conventional understandings of counterterrorism policy posit that these kinds of policies serve to respond to a particular terrorist threat. While this research does not aim to challenge these theories, it aims to make a specific claim about Egypt in particular. As one of the U.S.’s largest security partners in the region, Egypt’s counterterrorism policy has influence on the wider American security policy. Thus, if Egypt underrepresents or overrepresents the terrorism threat level in the region, through its counterterrorism, it has the influence to change American behavior. It can also influence the behavior or legitimize the behavior of autocratic regimes in the region. Finally, the findings of this research join a wider discussion about the need to reform FMF funding to Egypt, particularly in light of human rights violations. A cross-case analysis of Egypt’s and Tunisia’s counterterrorism policies provides evidence to support this theory. In process tracing the development of counterterrorism policy in each country, paying particular attention to major terrorism attacks, counterterrorism operations, and the amount of FMF funding received, it shows that Egypt does behave in a non-conventional way. As the control group, Tunisia’s counterterrorism policy proves this by responding to terrorist threats as they evolve.
The first section of this paper assesses the existing literature regarding counterterrorism policy development, foreign military aid and recipient state behavior, and the US-Egypt relationship. It demonstrates that little academic scholarship has explored the intersection between foreign military aid and counterterrorism policy in the US-Egypt relationship. The second section outlines the causal mechanism that undergirds this paper's theory. Then, I explain the use of process-tracing and other research design elements. Next, I describe and evaluate the case study evidence from Egypt and Tunisia. This section also summarizes the results and offers some analysis and implications for the theory. Finally, I revisit my theory in light of the analysis and outline the research’s significance and avenues of future research.
Literature Review
While the study of counterterrorism has yielded icy-oriented element of counterterrorism implementation is more uniform than the scholarly understanding of counterterrorism policy itself. First, we must consider the literature on the development of counterterrorism itself as this helps shed light on how Egypt’s post-2013 policies deviated from prior policy. Since counterterrorism needs vary across different countries and regions, scholars agree that establishing a single policy process has little usage.[2] The most comprehensive classification comes from the work of Crelinsten and Schmid. In this study, they categorize counterterrorism policies along two dimensions– ‘war’ approaches and ‘criminal justice’ approaches. Other scholars have called these ‘hard’ (coercive) and ‘soft’ (non-coercive) approaches.[3] In the former, scholars treat terrorism as a form of war, so the army is considered the main driver of counterterrorism policy. In the latter, scholars consider terrorism a law enforcement issue. Therefore, the rules of the criminal justice system apply – courts, police, rules of evidence, and laws.[4] Adapting the Crelinsten and Schmid categorization, we might observe different facets of Egypt’s counterterrorism policy as falling out of either ‘war’ or ‘criminal justice’ approaches. The policy may veer too far into ‘war’ approaches that it does not meet assigned objectives.
In the face of the challenges posed by establishing a standard counterterrorism policy development process, other scholars have attempted to group different approaches of the policy development process instead. One of these scholars, Teun van Dongen, based on an analysis of ten EU countries, concluded that states employ one of four approaches to develop a counterterrorism policy – prevent, pursue, protect, and respond.[5] Van Dongen’s research complements Sandler and Siqueira’s categorization, which considers deterrence and preemption as the two modes of creating a counterterrorism policy.[6] Further research has attempted to imagine counterterrorism policy as an evidence-based process, this process recognizes that we determine state behavior by a quantifiable threat to itself informed by data collected on previous terrorist attacks.[7] The present research considers these various counterterrorism policy development processes to demonstrate that Egypt deviates substantially.
A smaller body of literature has assessed the relationship between foreign aid and military behavior. These scholars have explored the abuses of foreign aid and its effect on military spending, military intervention, and terrorism.[8] These findings make two important contributions to the literature. Firstly, they show that foreign aid generally promotes development in democracies, not autocracies. Secondly, foreign aid can increase terrorist incidents and foreign military aid may hamper developmental aid. This scholarship lends validity to the arguments that suggest American foreign aid to Egypt does not fulfill a specific objective, but rather keeps the Egyptian autocratic regime in line. Interestingly, Sullivan et al. find that increasing cooperation from the recipient state is likely to lead to a reduction of US military assistance.[9] As an underlying element of the US-Egypt relationship is cooperation, uncovering the effect of complete cooperation of the Egyptian state on US military assistance can provide evidence to contradict Sullivan’s findings.
The U.S. Egypt Relationship: A Brief History
Many historians have explored the relationship between the United States and Egypt in the context of security policy, and we can understand their research to fall into three periods – before 1970, between 1970 and 2011, and the post-2011 time periods. Historians and political scientists alike agree that the modern markings of the US-Egypt relationship began under the leadership of Anwar Sadat.[10] Before Anwar Sadat’s leadership, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s first President and the stalwart leader of the Pan-Arabist movement, undertook a policy of non-alignment limiting cooperation with the United States. Nonetheless, the United States attempted to provide economic aid to “moderate the behavior of the Egyptian government”[11] and force attempts at peace with Israel, thereby achieving an American security objective. Additionally, scholars began navigating the politics of U.S. aid in authoritarian governments in this period.[12] Even before the Camp David Accords, Egypt received several American military planes as part of a $2.5 billion Congressional package in 1978.[13] Despite a tense Egyptian Israeli relationship, the Sadat government argued that they served as America’s “policeman in the area”.[14] The 1980 Egypt-Israel peace treaty cemented the U.S.-Egypt military alliance. That summer, Egypt received hundreds of missiles, personnel carriers, air-defense missiles, and fighter-bombers.[15] Scholars conclude that Sadat’s aggressive efforts to receive American military assistance illustrated clearly that Egypt’s efficient autocracy was a viable way to achieve American security objectives in the region. In large part, this relationship between successive U.S. Administrations and the sitting Egyptian autocrat cemented a culture of dependency on American security objectives and Egyptian military interests.
Since the early 2000s, scholarship has explored the US-Egypt relationship more critically. Take Youmans’ and Carothers’ research on Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s longest-reigning president, and his relationship with George Bush in the early 2000s for instance.[16] Their research shows that America’s security objectives have dictated the relationship, despite the Egyptian regime’s increasing repression campaigns that violate human rights. Youmans emphasizes the influence of the ‘War on Terror’ in creating a higher tolerance for turning a blind eye to such repression.[17] Carothers notes that even in the Clinton years, U.S. security interests trumped the interests of democracy in the regions with reliable U.S. allies, like Egypt.[18] Nonetheless, the U.S. periodically signaled its condemnation of repression campaigns by postponing aid or temporarily lowering it.[19] Despite this ebb and flow of aid, its amount ballooned and plateaued around the 1-billion-dollar mark since 2001 through the FMF program.[20] With increasing repression, some have argued that American democracy promotion in Egypt is unrealistic and that the fundamental security goals remain supreme.[21] Beyond drawing the connection between American security interests and their dependency on Egypt, which plays an important role in this paper, Youmans and Carothers’s research does not address the individual motivations for the Egyptian military establishment. This research attempts to fill the gap left by Youmans and Carother to explain why the FMF funding implications for counterterrorism policy is unique to Egypt.
The post-2011 era has brought turbulence to the U.S.-Egypt relationship. Researchers of this period have underscored the need to reform the politics of U.S. aid more broadly, in the wake of the Arab Spring. After abandoning the democracy promotion agenda in the early 2000s, the Arab Spring reignited this democratic ambition. However, with an existing security dependency predicated on efficient authoritarianism, some have noted that it may not be possible.[22] American policymakers and military officials made recommendations about reforming the U.S.-Egypt relationship, including continuing military-to-military contact, encouraging Egyptian military officers to visit U.S. institutions, and avoiding the discussion of domestic politics.[23] Critics have recommended that the FMF undergo periodic evaluations and assessments to ensure that the U.S. defines specific objectives for American security and foreign policy.[24] The limited research on the effectiveness of Egyptian counterterrorism since 2011 comes from the Washington Post. This research has found that Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s crackdown has not helped the fight against terrorism, and that the country has seen a rise in terrorist acts.[25] Amnesty International and other NGOs have also written about the state of human rights violations in Egypt and the use of emergency laws and dubious regulations to that effect.[26] Unfortunately, however, there is a lack of first-hand reporting on the effectiveness of these laws due to the closed media environment of Egypt.[27]
While the existing literature makes a connection between American security objectives and dependency on Egypt to achieve them, no research has methodically established Egypt’s deviation from standard counterterrorism policy. Additionally, no research has established the connection between Egypt’s deviation from standard counterterrorism policy and the repressive use of counterterrorism laws to crackdown on dissidents. The present research attempts to reconcile the scholarship on counterterrorism policy, the U.S.-Egypt relationship, and Egyptian counterterrorism. Informed by this scholarship, this paper will attempt to fill in the gap between the use of foreign military aid to achieve counterterrorism objectives and the actual use of military aid in autocratic regimes like Egypt.
The Foreign Military Aid Argument
As historians of the U.S.-Egypt relationship and scholars of counterterrorism policy have each provided their explanations for what motivates the use of counterterrorism policy altogether, I propose an alternative theory. Scholars of counterterrorism policy, despite their disagreement on the policy development process, concur that counterterrorism laws and policies serve to deter, prevent, protect, or respond to some threat. By this logic, Egypt’s post-2013 decision to enact harsher and stricter counterterrorism laws should respond to a terrorism threat of some sort. However, the lack of increasing counterterrorism operations, particularly in less stable regions like Sinai[28], suggests an alternative explanation. Egyptian security policymakers derive counterterrorism policy from the $1 billion dollar U.S. Foreign Military Financing Program. This is a constant of Egyptian security policy through the years. The term ‘hardening’ is used to refer to counterterrorism policy which grows in scope and mandates stricter punishments by the state.
Before outlining my argument, I should discuss the justification for examining counterterrorism policy since 2013 only and not through an earlier and longer period. Although Egypt’s authoritarian regime has reigned for decades, stricter counterterrorism policies have developed since the Arab Spring. Following General el-Sisi’s coup in 2013, he made the argument that the military had a mandate to address the dangers ‘facing the homeland’.[29] Observers have noted that this perceived mandate served as a pretext for using national security as a tool of state violence and authoritarianism.[30] Before the 2011 Revolution, while repression ran rampant, counterterrorism laws were not enacted as frequently. Fewer observable variables could assist this study’s research.
In his study of the Egyptian military establishment, Hicham Bou Nassif writes that all of Egypt’s military leaders throughout history have enacted a patronage system that ties themselves to an ideational goal or material benefit.[31] He found that the late Hosni Mubarak’s regime relied heavily on financial rewards to keep his senior military brass in line.[32] This is significant because under this system, Egypt’s current military leader and autocratic leader, Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, emerged. Some have argued that the Mubarak-Sisi transition protected the existing patronage network designed to keep the Egyptian military regime in power.[33] Since the Egyptian military regime crafts Egyptian counterterrorism policy, it follows that they have a vested interest in keeping themselves in power. Foreign military aid provides a lucrative opportunity to fulfill this goal and sustain the financial rewards patronage system.
American foreign military funding in particular serves an important role for the Egyptian military regime because it comes with a historic security policy objective – achieving peace, security, and stability in the Middle East with Egypt as the centerpiece of these objectives.[34] In return for achieving those objectives, the U.S. provides Egypt with approximately $1 to $1.3 billion in military financing to buy American weaponry, planes, and other military equipment. Egypt receives one of the largest military funds from the U.S. in the world, second only to Israel.[35] In my theory, this military aid serves as an ideal opportunity for the military government in Egypt to ‘signal’ its support for achieving American security objectives without actually undertaking such efforts. Since scholars and policymakers cite terrorism as the biggest hurdle to stability and security in the Middle East[36], the Egyptian government has enacted stricter counterterrorism policies to cite as evidence of achieving American security objectives. As the Government Accountability Office has written extensively about, the FMF program’s funding to Egypt has set few specific objectives and lacks oversight.[37] Thus, the Egyptian military government benefits from the FMF program without substantially deviating from the currently profitable ‘status quo’.
I theorize that Egypt’s autocratic military state, due to its dependency on foreign military aid, engages in whatever policies necessary to continue receiving that aid, as foreign military aid serves two important functions. Firstly, it funds the intricate patronage systems that exist in these countries, often funneling into the wealth of individual senior-ranking officials. Secondly, it legitimizes the campaigns and operations conducted by these governments. We can understand funding and legitimacy to be the two key causal links that undergird the causal variable, U.S. military aid.
I hypothesize, then, that the Egyptian military government engages in the necessary counterterrorism policies to continue receiving its approximately $1 billion check and the attached legitimacy from the U.S. Government. As foreign military aid from the United States remains unchanged, Egypt will continue its harsh counterterrorism policies. I do not posit that an increase in foreign military aid will necessarily lead to harsher counterterrorism policies. Rather, the persistence of foreign military aid, and its associated funding and legitimacy guarantees, necessitates a hardening of counterterrorism policy.
Research Design
To test this hypothesis, this paper utilizes a qualitative research method–process tracing–to observe the influence of American foreign military aid on the ‘hardening’ of counterterrorism policy in two countries – Egypt and Tunisia. It employs a cross-case and over-time case selection with two ‘most-similar cases’ to effectively distill the influence of the variable of interest – U.S. foreign military aid. This methodology and case selection can lead to the strongest causal argument because it relies on reliable government sources who have worked in the area of US-Egypt relations and scholarly secondary-source material to illustrate the influence of foreign military aid. As opposed to a quantitative analysis, this methodology allows us to depict the full scope of the FMF influence without neglecting the specific, and critical, elements of FMF. While Tunisia’s counterterrorism policy is not the subject of this research, I use it as a reference point for the ‘primary hypothesis’. Contrasting the findings from the Tunisian case with that of Egypt will clearly illustrate the causal link in the Egyptian case. Thus, the analysis elaborates less on Tunisia’s process-tracing exercise and more on the Egyptian example. While a quantitative assessment would be useful, the unreliable data sources for counterterrorism and counterterrorism operations make that a difficult task. Counterterrorism data sources in authoritarian countries, like Egypt, are particularly difficult to ascertain. Nonetheless, effective and clear qualitative assessments should produce clear results. To supplement the lack of quantitative analysis, I rely on quantifiable data sources like the Department of Defense’s (DoD) foreign assistance datasets.
Process tracing is a qualitative method that, despite being deprived of a concrete checklist, rests upon the establishment of six main exercises.[38] To process-trace, researchers should identify a hypothesis, establish timelines, construct causal graphs, identify alternative choices, consider counterfactual outcomes, and finally find evidence for both the primary and rival hypotheses.[39] For our purposes, we define the ‘primary hypothesis’ as the established understanding of the uses of foreign military aid for counterterrorism. Namely, that foreign military aid is used to successfully defend against some terrorist threat. We define the ‘rival hypothesis’ as this paper’s argument. To establish causation, I will illustrate causal graphs for both the primary and rival hypotheses alongside timelines of FMF funding in Egypt and Tunisia over 10 years. This will help visualize our variable of interest – U.S. foreign military aid. The use of Department of Defense data in this visualization will also help bolster the findings, as the identification of alternative choices and counterfactual outcomes aids in eliminating other theoretical explanations.
To observe the influence of foreign military aid on the ‘hardening’ of counterterrorism policy, I rely on several operationalizations. The dependent variable serves as the number and scope of counterterrorism laws implemented over time, between 2013 and 2019. International NGOS like Amnesty International and Human Rights watch have adequately evaluated the scope of counterterrorism laws during this time period. I rely on these sources for a comprehensive evaluation of the scope of such laws. The causal variable, U.S. foreign military aid, serves as the amount of U.S. Department of Defense’s funding provided to Egypt through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program over time, between 2013 and 2019. The FMF program is not a direct sales program. Instead, it serves as a unique financing program which allows the Egyptian military to purchase American military equipment under a waived payment agreement. While I have explained in the previous section why I selected 2013 as the starting point, I should explain why the observations stop in 2019. The COVID-19 Pandemic distorts the Department of Defense’s allocation of foreign aid – since 2020, virtually all countries have seen a reduction of military aid and in its place an increase in health and economic aid.[40] For our purposes, the unit of analysis is the behavior of the Egyptian military government over a 10-year period.
To effectively present evidence from the case design selected, we must first consider how these cases are considered most similar. We define the most-similar case as the references to a minimum of two cases that are similar in all respects except the variables of interest.[41] The Egyptian military government took control in 1952, following the Free Officers revolution against the British-installed monarchy.[42] Under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president assumed executive power devising the state’s policies and vetoing legislation.[43] Similarly, following its independence, the Tunisian republic saw one-party rule under Habib Bourguiba until 1987.[44] Like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Bourguiba created a type of personalistic rule that allowed him and his allies to control all levers of power.[45] Through the 1960s and 1970s, authoritarianism intensified in both countries – political parties were stifled, free speech was restricted, and opposition was jailed.[46] In all respects, both countries were autocratic regimes. Like Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, Ben Ali of Tunisia relied on internal security and intelligence to target the opposition.[47] The common strategy of stifling opposition and using state power to do so means that Egyptian and Tunisian civil-state relations have much similarity--so much so that some have thought Tunisia followed the Egyptian model in the 1990s and 2000s.[48]
Secondly, Egypt and Tunisia share similarities in the behavior of the state security apparatus, including both internal security and military, following the Arab Spring. Many tout Tunisia as the only successful democratic society born out of the Arab Spring, however, its security apparatus did not democratize. Decades of dysfunction and a lack of accountability resulted in repressive and authoritarian internal security forces in Tunisia.[49] I am cognizant that in the case of Egypt, the behavior of the state security apparatus largely concerns the military. Meanwhile, in Tunisia the behavior of the state security apparatus concerns the internal security forces such as the Ministry of Interior. While these are different entities, they display similar behaviors in the fight against terrorism. The Egyptian military apparatus, like the Tunisian Ministry of Interior forces, has suppressed civilians, journalists, and civil organizations amongst others.[50] Tunisia’s Internal Security Forces have jailed thousands of citizens in terrorism-related cases with little cause.[51] In the same way, the Egyptian government applied counterterrorism laws to jail dissidents and journalists in 2015.[52] Most striking is the fact that the inadequacies in Tunisia’s counterterrorism apparatus are connected to the systemic problems of the internal security forces.[53] As such, we can understand both the Egyptian military apparatus and the Tunisian internal security apparatus to have the same motivations and similar behaviors, particularly concerning counterterrorism.
Finally, both Egypt and Tunisia are recipients of the Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Financing program. On average, Egypt receives $1 billion in FMF funding each year, while Tunisia receives an average of $65 million in FMF funding annually, increasing each year.[54] The reason for the discrepancy in funding lies in the size of Egypt’s economy and its armed forces in comparison to Tunisia. The United States has had a cordial relationship with Tunisia since its independence, commending the nation for its ideological moderation in the region, in comparison to its more troublesome neighbors in Libya and Egypt[55] The size of foreign military funding should be understood relative to the size of the economy, as the Department of Defense website shows, which makes both countries similar recipients of FMF. This quantitative metric can be tracked over time to show when and how it affects the counterterrorism policy.
Egypt and Tunisia: A Tale of Two Policies
In this section, we test the aforementioned hypothesis using a most-similar case selection design and process tracing. We define the ‘primary hypothesis’ as the established understanding of counterterrorism and foreign military aid. This hypothesis emerges from the conventional understanding of the development of counterterrorism policy discussed in the literature review and foreign military aid, from the U.S. in particular.[56] This hypothesis posits that foreign military aid has not affected counterterrorism policy itself, but the Egyptian government uses it for counterterrorism operations where applicable. In other words, foreign military aid will increase as the need for counterterrorism increases. The ‘rival hypothesis’ serves as the hypothesis presented in this paper – that foreign military hardens counterterrorism policy in Egypt because of the associated funding and legitimacy that it provides and not because of some threat level posed by terrorist activity. Figure 1.1. and Figure 1.2. illustrate the causal logic of each hypothesis.
Egypt: The Treatment Group
In Egypt, counterterrorism policy development saw a deviation since the ascension of General Abdel Fatah el-Sisi to the Presidency in 2013. While we should expect to see El-Sisi enact counterterrorism legislation in response to an increase in terrorist threats, that is not the case. It would be expected thatEgypt’s previous autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, did enact his counterterrorism, or anti-terror, legislation loosely after major terrorist attacks. The 1980s terrorist attacks were followed by a 1992 policy, the attacks in 1997 were followed by the 2000 policy, and the 2004 attacks were followed by a 2007 policy.[57] Since 2013, however, in el-Sisi’s 9-year reign, the government has forced through the expansive law number 94 in 2015. Scholars have suggested that this expansion of counterterrorism policy represents an attempt to reconstruct a national security state with “little tolerance for dissent, political debate or the questioning of official policy”[58]. El-Sisi further amended the 2015 law (law no. 8) that a UN Special Rapporteur said would “profoundly impinge on a range of fundamental human rights”[59] and two other pieces of legislation that, in part, target “terrorism” or “terrorist objectives”.[60] Figure 2.1. illustrates the dates at which these laws were enacted and the major terrorist activity that occur in the same period.
The United States responded to the 2013 coup d’état by expressing “deep concern”  and, in 2014, temporarily slashing the Foreign Military Financing Program by nearly 50% to $500 million. However, as noted in the previous section, these temporarily harsh reactions act as nothing more than lip service to the dormant “freedom agenda”. As seen in table 1.1, the FMF program bounced back to $1.3 billion in the following year. The only exception to the approximately $1 billion annual finding seen below occurred in 2017 when the Trump administration withheld the funding in return for ending cooperation with North Korea, resolving foreign NGO convictions, and repealing a 2017 NGO law.[61] While El-Sisi did not meet the final condition, the program, once again, resumed in 2018.
Since we’ve established that el-Sisi’s counterterrorism policy has expanded far beyond the conventional understanding of counterterrorism and the FMF program has not deviated in large part, we must now consider alternative choices or events. Since 2013, Egypt’s counterterrorism policy could have directly targeted the country’s most terrorism-prone region, North Sinai.[62] Targeting North Sinai would support our primary hypothesis. However, according to former Director for Egypt and Israel Military Issues in President Obama’s National Security Council Andrew Miller, this policy would not require a $1.3 billion check. He notes that when he was in government, “there was a general recognition” that Egypt had enough weaponry to defeat its terrorism problem, particularly to tackle terrorist threats of interest to the United States.[63]
Alternatively, the Egyptian government could use counterterrorism policy to target terrorism more broadly in the country, given the spike in 2016.[64] However, interestingly, El-Sisi’s own Minister of Interior stated in 2016 that “99% of terrorism was eliminated.”[65] This suggests that senior government officials did not believe that terrorism posed a serious threat requiring actionable effort by the government. On the other hand, the desire to further restrict civil society and dissidents in Egypt results in the hardening of counterterrorism policy. This is not entirely viable because the Egyptian state has already enacted other legislation, not related to terrorism, that targets civil society, journalists, and NGOs.[66] Scholars and activists alike are generally agreed upon the fact that El-Sisi has solidified his grip on power in Egypt[67]. Thus, the Egyptian government does not need to incur the additional cost of enacting new policies to infringe on the rights of civil society.
With evidence that could support the ‘primary’ and ‘rival hypothesis’ and considered alternative outcomes, we can reasonably establish that Egypt’s hardening of counterterrorism policy correlates to the desire to maintain funding from the FMF program. Returning to the theoretical framework posed by this paper, evidence suggests that both the material and legitimation mechanisms of the FMF program play a role. Firstly, as a source of funding, the FMF program serves as a “subsidy to the Egyptian military,”[68] a military with vested interests in many facets of the Egyptian economy, including cars, food, hotels, and resorts.[69] Bloomberg estimates that the military own between 5 to 40% of the Egyptian economy.[70] As one scholar explains, Egypt’s regime “...is run by an elite set of actors willing to seize state power to further their economic interests and patronage networks.”[71] As a subsidy, then, the FMF sustains the Egyptian military’s political economy and the vested interests that its senior officials have in the broader Egyptian economy. Secondly, as a source of legitimacy, the FMF program does not only provide Egypt with top-of-the-line military equipment; it affords them the additional privileges of special procurement priorities with American officers and defense contractors. In addition to “early disbursement”, Egypt represents one of only two countries that receives its entire payment waiver at the beginning of the year.[72] Additionally, Egypt receives a special provision called “cash-flow finance,” which allows it to purchase equipment in advance of any payment.[73] Some of Egypt’s FMF purchases include over 1,000 M1A1 tanks, over 200 F-16s, 10 Apache helicopters and “whatever highly sophisticated weapons it requests”.[74] Together, these special accommodations legitimize the Egyptian military and preserve its right to argue that their counterterrorism efforts are genuine.
Tunisia: The Control Group
Turning to Tunisia as the control group, we expect to see its counterterrorism policy follow the logic of our conventional understanding of counterterrorism. As the control group, the Tunisian case will follow the ‘primary hypothesis’ given the similar behavior of its security apparatus to that of Egypt and its sizable FMF program funding. However, the Tunisian security apparatus does not follow the ‘primary hypothesis,’ even when presented with the same tools and similar incentives to harden its counterterrorism policy. Although it acts as a junior partner in fulfilling American security objectives in North Africa, Tunisia’s security apparatus has centered around counterterrorism efforts to target the Islamic State.[75] One analyst writes that this region serves as the “informal headquarters” for jihadist groups.[76] Figure 2.2. shows that terrorists targeted Tunisia with a string of attacks from 2013 onward, with attacks peaking in 2015.[77] The figure also tracks major counterterrorism operations and initiatives enacted in that time period.
Tunisia’s share of the FMF program has steadily increased since 2009, and although it has a substantially smaller figure than Egypt’s, it reflects a different pattern. This poses the question, why did its funding increase from $18 million in 2009 to nearly $95 in 2017? Before assessing the influence of the funding on counterterrorism policy, we must take the first step of Rick and Liu’s checklist for process tracing: dispel the counterargument that its democratic transition plays a part in the increased funding.[78] Tunisia transitioned to a civilian democratic government in 2012. In that year, the country received roughly the same amount that it did in previous years. Only since 2015 did Tunisia receive a substantially larger amount.
As the control group, Tunisia’s share of the FMF program does influence its decision to harden its counterterrorism policy. Since their government crafts counterterrorism policy to meet a particular objective–to prevent or respond to a terrorist threat– foreign military funding unlikely influences that decision. So, why did Tunisia’s FMF funding increase since 2015? As the ‘primary hypothesis’ would suggest, funding increases because of an increased terrorism threat. Figure 2.2 shows that Tunisia has suffered the assassination of two politicians and two major terrorist attacks in Tunis and Sousse. The 2015 attacks in Tunis and Sousse killed 60 people.[79] That year, 12 officers died in an attack on the Presidential Guard’s bus. Attacks on the National Guard in 2016 and again 2018 killed over a dozen people.[80] The Global Terrorism Database lists at least 56 incidents of terrorism that have resulted in at least one death or injury since 2013.[81] This evidence of a clear terrorism problem necessitates a counterterrorism solution. Thus, the U.S. has gradually increased the FMF funding for Tunisia to focus on counterterrorism and border security.[82] It has done so as part of US foreign policy objectives in the Sahel region, particularly as they relate to counterterrorism. Given that no evidence exists to suggest that FMF funding increased for another reason, such as a closeness in US-Tunisian relations or the strength of Tunisia’s geopolitical position, the U.S. increases FMF funding to assist Tunisia’s counterterrorism operations in an effort to meet its own security objectives.
The above evidence supports the ‘primary hypothesis’ presented in this paper. To further bolster this evidence, we can consider what effect the increase in FMF had on terrorism in Tunisia. This exercise shows that counterterrorism policy completed its desired objective, in contrast to Egypt, where counterterrorism has had no effect on terrorist activity.[83] In Tunisia, the security apparatus has improved its capacity and coordination to conduct counterterrorism operations.[84] For instance, the Ministry of Interior’s operation in 2019 thwarted an ISIS-inspired attack.[85] Drawing a direct link between foreign military aid and counterterrorism operations, the Department of State has stated that U.S. assistance increases have allowed Tunisia to “leverage cooperation with the United States and the international community to continue to professionalize its security apparatus”.[86]
Summarizing the Results
Presented with similar opportunities to seek legitimacy for its local counterterrorism efforts or further funding for its patronage networks, the cases of Egypt and Tunisia show clear contrasts. This presents preliminary support for the hypothesis. As the Egyptian counterterrorism efforts failed to tackle actual terrorism, its government enacted several counterterrorism policies, nonetheless. Process tracing shows a correlation between these counterterrorism policies and a sustained cash flow from the U.S. FMF program. Alternative outcomes, like a desire to quash dissent, do not provide viable explanations for the extent to which these policies have expanded since 2013. The building of a national security state in Egypt, through these policies, serves an economic interest for senior government officials. The elusive special treatment that Egypt receives through the FMF program further provides legitimation for the regime and little incentive for it to alter its approach. So long as counterterrorism appeared as a key objective for the government, regardless of its efficacy, Egypt would continue to receive its military aid.
In Tunisia, we observe that the security apparatus does not engage in similar behavior. Despite having a similar terrorism threat level and similar incentives to abuse military aid, the government follows traditional counterterrorism policy development. Tunisia’s FMF funding increased steadily in tandem with effective counterterrorism operations, particularly in 2019. In essence, Tunisia serves as an ideal case for the relationship between foreign military aid and counterterrorism policy, the type of case that counterterrorism policy development scholars write about extensively. Little evidence suggests that Tunisia’s security apparatus did have an alternative motivation, largely because of its own efforts to become more accountable.[87]
Conclusion
This paper has sought to explain why Egypt has hardened its counterterrorism policies since 2013. Conventional theories of counterterrorism policy posit that governments enact such policies for some version of deterrence, prevention, protection, or response to a terrorism threat in the form of counterterrorism operations. In this logic, Egypt’s hardening of counterterrorism policy should respond to some heightened threat. Instead, one constant in Egypt’s security policy is its foreign military funding from the United States through the Foreign Military Financing program. This program, I’ve argued, provides legitimation and funding for Egypt’s military establishment. In a cross-case design, I’ve shown that Tunisia’s counterterrorism policy follows the aforementioned conventional theory. Presented with the same opportunities, Tunisia’s FMF funding is proportional to its counterterrorism operations. Better yet, its operations delivered considerable success.
The purpose of this research is not to disprove the ‘primary hypothesis’ given that it stands true for most counterterrorism policies globally. Instead, it seeks to explain the behavior of Egypt in particular. The country serves a key role on numerous fronts – as an intellectual hub, a cultural power, and a strategic partner to the U.S., Egypt has “long considered itself a leader of the Arab World.”[88] How it formulates its counterterrorism policy affects the policies of its allies. As Egypt hardens its counterterrorism policy, other autocratic regimes in the region have more reason to follow suit. The findings of this research also have implications for the US-Egypt relationship. As activists and former U.S. officials have argued that Egypt receives a ‘blank check’ from the U.S. government, this research offers some qualitative backing for this argument. If the Egyptian government’s hardened counterterrorism policy simply stifles opposition and undermines human rights without reducing terrorism, then what purpose does the FMF program serve? Recognizing the historic relationship between the U.S. and Egypt, it would be hard to imagine a complete cutoff from the FMF program. Nonetheless, the U.S. should consider serious reform, with specific objectives, to ensure that military aid serves its actual purpose. -
While this qualitative analysis yields some results to support this theory, a quantitative assessment would help provide empirical backing. Future research should consider a regression model assessing the effect of foreign military aid on counterterrorism policy more broadly. It would also be interesting to expand foreign military aid beyond the United States to include the EU which has had considerable influence on North African counterterrorism strategies.[89] While Egypt stands as a unique case, it may be useful to expand the analysis of funding and legitimacy as underlying mechanisms that undergird the need to keep FMF funding.
[1] “Security Assistance State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals: Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives,”(Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006), 8.
[2] Ronald D Crelinsten, and Alex P Schmid. “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet.” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992).
[3] Hasan Noorhaidi, Bertus Hendriks, Floor Janssen and Roel Meijer. “Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia”, ed. Roel Meijer, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2012.
[4]Dina Mansour-Ille, “Counterterrorism Policies in the Middle East and North Africa: A Regional Perspective.” International Review of the Red Cross (2005) 103, no. 916-917 (2021): 667.
[5] Teun van Dongen, “Mapping Counterterrorism: a Categorisation of Policies and the Promise of Empirically Based, Systematic Comparisons.” Critical Studies on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2010): 229.
[6] Sandler, Todd, and Kevin Siqueira. “Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Pre-Emption.” The Canadian Journal of Economics 39, no. 4 (2006): 1370–87.
[7] See: Cynthia Lum and Leslie W.W. Kennedy. Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy. (Springer New York, 2012)
[8] For the relationship between foreign aid and terrorist groups see: Wukki Kim and Todd Sandler. “Foreign Aid and Terrorist Groups: Incidents, Ideology, and Survival.” Public Choice 189, no. 1-2 (2021): 139–60. For the relationship between foreign aid and military intervention see: Emizet F.Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering. “Soldiers and Development Aid: Military Intervention and Foreign Aid Flows.” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 2 (2015): 215–27. Orlandrew E. Danzell, Emizet F Kisangani, and Jeffrey Pickering. “Aid, Intervention, and Terror: The Impact Foreign Aid and Foreign Military Intervention on Terror Events and Severity.” Social Science Quarterly 100, no. 3 (2019): 951–64 and Emizet F. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering. “The Human Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention.” Defence and Peace Economics 28, no. 2 (2017): 230–49.
[9] Patricia L Sullivan, Brock F Tessman, and Xiaojun Li, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7, no. 3 (2011): 283.
[10] Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 15.
[11] Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 17.
[12] See: Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist, Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), Oliver Schlumberger, Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes, (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2007), Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, (London; I. B. Tauris, 2001) and Eva Bellin,“The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–57.
[13] Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 143.
[14] Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, 33.
[15] Christopher Wren, “Egypt, Cut Off from Saudi Funds, Is Likely to Seek Increase in U.S. Arms Aid.” New York Times, May 22, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/05/22/archives/egypt-cut-off-from-saudi-funds-is-likely-to-seek-increase-in-us.html; Graham Hovey, “U.S. Puts Off Jet Sale to Egypt after Saudis Delay on Paying Costs,” New York Times, July 7, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/07/archives/us-puts-off-jet-sale-to-egypt-after-saudis-delay-on-paying-costs-us.html.
[16] William Lafi Youmans, “An Unwilling Client: How Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt Defied the Bush Administration’s ‘Freedom Agenda.’” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29, no. 4 (2016): 1209-1232.
[17] Youmans, “An Unwilling Client,” 1210.
[18]Carothers, Thomas (2003) ‘Promoting democracy and fighting terror’, Foreign Affairs, 82:3, 84, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2003-01-01/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror
[19] Thomas Carothers, “Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (2003) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2003-01-01/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.
[20] “U.S. Foreign Assistance By Country: Egypt,” U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, last updated: February 02, 2021. https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/egypt/
[21] See: Larbi Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections Without Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Holger Albrecht, Raging Against the Machine: Political Opposition Under Authoritarianism in Egypt, (1st edition. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2013); Michaelle Browers, Democracy, and civil society in Arab political thought: transcultural possibilities. Syracuse, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006); Michele Dunne, ‘The baby, the bathwater, and the freedom agenda in the Middle East’, Washington Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2009): 129–141.
[22] Oz Hassan, “Undermining the transatlantic democracy agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia’s counteracting democracy strategy,” Democratization 22, no. 3 (2015): 479–495; Oz Hassan, “The $74 Billion Problem: US–Egyptian Relations after the ‘Arab Awakening,’” International Politics 54, no. 3 (2017): 322–37.
[23]Gregory L Aftandilian, Egypt’s New Regime and the Future of the U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relationship, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2013), 39-40
[24] “Security Assistance State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals”, 21.
[25] Nancy Okail, and Amr Kotb. “Egypt’s Authoritarian Crackdown Hasn’t Helped in the Fight Against Terrorism: Democracy Has Been Crushed -- and Terrorism Is Increasing.” The Washington Post, November 4, 2017.
[26] “Egypt: No End to Systematic Repression,” Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/13/egypt-no-end-systematic-repression
[27] Nisan Ahmado, “Ten Years After Arab Spring, Egypt’s Press Freedom Dwindles” Voice of America News, February 17, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_ten-years-after-arab-spring-egypts-press-freedom-dwindles/6202188.html
[28] Ofir Winter and Meirav Matler, “Egypt’s Challenging Shift from Counterterrorism to Counterinsurgency in the Sinai,” (Institute for National Security Studies, August 2017): 2.
[29] Nicola Pratt and Dina Rezk, “Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring.” Security Dialogue 50, no. 3 (2019): 247.
[30] Nicola Pratt and Dina Rezk, “Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in Egypt after the Arab Spring.” Security Dialogue 50, no. 3 (2019): 239-256; “Egypt: No End to Systematic Repression,” Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/13/egypt-no-end-systematic-repression; “Egypt’s updated terrorist law opens the door to more rights abuses, says UN expert,” United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, April 9, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/04/egypts-updated-terrorism-law-opens-door-more-rights-abuses-says-un-expert?LangID=E&NewsID=25787.
[31] Hicham Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak: The Second Careers and Financial Rewards of Egypt’s Military Elite, 1981-2011.” The Middle East Journal 67, no. 4 (2013): 516.
[32] Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak,” 516.
[33] Bruce K. Rutherford, “Egypt’s New Authoritarianism Under Sisi.” The Middle East Journal 72, no. 2 (2018): 185.
[34] AMS Alyand RH Pelletreau. “US-Egyptian Relations.” Middle East Policy 8, no. 2 (2001): 45.
[35] “Security Assistance State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goal”, 8.
[36] Michael Collins Dunn, “US relations with Egypt: An overview,” In Handbook of US-Middle East relations: formative factors and regional perspectives, ed. Robert E. Looney (Routledge, 2014), 292.
[37] “Security Assistance State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals”, 22.
[38] Jacob Ricks and Amy H Liu. “Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide.” PS, Political Science & Politics 51, no. 4 (2018):842-46.
[39] Ricks and Liu, “Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide,”842–46.
[40] “U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, updated January 18, 2022. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10183.pdf
[41]Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E Brady, and David Collier, The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, (1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 668.
[42]Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 127.
[43] Mahmoud Hamad, Judges and Generals in the Making of Modern Egypt: How Institutions Sustain and Undermine Authoritarian Regimes, (Cambridge University Press, 2018), 80.
[44] Kenneth J. Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, (Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 178.
[45] Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]: Routledge, 2010), 37.
[46] See: Alexander, 2010; Hamad, 2018; Perkins, 2014.
[47] Alejandro Pachon, “Loyalty and Defection: Misunderstanding Civil-Military Relations in Tunisia During the ‘Arab Spring,’” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2014): 513.
[48] Hardy Roger, “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East / Islam, Politics and Pluralism: Theory and Practice in Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria.” International Affairs (London) 80, no. 3 (2004): 143.
[49] Merouan Mekouar, “Police Collapse in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from Tunisia.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 10 (2017): 861.
[50] Hamad, Judges and Generals in the Making of Modern Egypt, 269; Mekouar, “Police Collapse in Authoritarian Regimes,” 858.
[51] “Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia,” International Crisis Group (July 23, 2015): 17.
[52] “Memorandum: Egypt’s draft law on counter terrorism,” Amnesty International (August 2015): 7.
[53] “Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia,” International Crisis Group (July 23, 2015): 26.
[54] “U.S. Foreign Assistance By Country: Tunisia,” U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, last updated: February 02, 2021. https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/tunisia/
[55] Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, 145.
[56]For an excellent analysis of the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and state use of violence, see: Jessica Trisko Darden, Aiding and Abetting: U.S. Foreign Assistance and State Violence (Stanford University Press, 2019). Regarding the ‘primary hypothesis’, the development of counterterrorism policy is conventional done along the dimensions of deterrence or pre-emption. Some, like van Dongen, developed a typology which includes “prevent, pursue, protect, and respond” as the main dimensions of counterterrorism policy.
[57] Ann Marie, Wainscott Bureaucratizing Islam: Morocco and the War on Terror, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-35.
[58] Ahmed M Abozaid, “Counterterrorism Strategy and Human Rights in Egypt after the Arab Uprising: A Critical Appraisal.” Aggression and Violent Behavior 51 (2020): 10.
[59] Egypt’s updated terrorist law opens the door to more rights abuses, says UN expert,” United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, April 9, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/04/egypts-updated-terrorism-law-opens-door-more-rights-abuses-says-un-expert?LangID=E&NewsID=25787.
[60] Mohamed Lotfy, “Egypt – Finding Scapegoats,” EuroMed Rights, (February 2018): 12-15.
[61] Andrew Miller, “Commentary: Five myths about U.S. aid to Egypt,” Reuters, August 13, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-miller-egypt-commentary-idUSKBN1KY1WJ.
[62] Egypt Security Watch, “Quarterly Report: October- December 2016,” The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, (December 2016): 10.
[63] Miller, “Commentary: Five myths about U.S. aid to Egypt.”
[64] Egypt Security Watch, “Quarterly Report,” 10.
[65] Eman Ragab, “Counter-Terrorism Policies in Egypt: Effectiveness and Challenges.” European Institute of the Mediterranean (October 2016): 17.
[66] “Amnesty International Report 2015/16 – Egypt,” Amnesty International, February 24, 2016. https://www.refworld.org/topic,50ffbce5220,50ffbce5226,56d05b5d6,0,AMNESTY,,EGY.html
[67] Okail, and Kotb. “Egypt’s Authoritarian Crackdown Hasn’t Helped in the Fight Against Terrorism: Democracy Has Been Crushed -- and Terrorism Is Increasing.” The Washington Post, November 4, 2017.
[68] Hassan, “The $74 Billion Problem,” 333.
[69] Hassan, “The $74 Billion Problem,” 333.
[70] Alex Blumberg, “Why Egypt’s Military Cares About Home Appliances,” NPR, February 4, 2011. https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/02/10/133501837/why-egypts-military-cares-about-home-appliances
[71] Hassan, “The $74 Billion Problem,” 333.
[72] David Schenker, “Inside the Complex World of U.S. Military Assistance to Egypt.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 4, 2013.
[73] Schenker, 2013.
[74] Schenker, 2013.
[75] Shah and Dalton, “The Evolution of Tunisia’s Military and the Role of Foreign Security Sector Assistance,”2.
[76] Tunisia: Extremism and Terrorism,” Counter Extremism Project, last accessed: April 04, 2022. https://www.counterextremism.com/node/13527/printable/pdf, 4.
[77] Cengiz Günay and Fabian Sommavilla. “Tunisia’s Democratization at Risk.” Mediterranean Politics (Frank Cass & Co.) 25, no. 5 (2020): 675.
[78] Ricks and Liu, “Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide,” 844.
[79] “Tunisia: Extremism and Terrorism,” Counter Extremism Project, last accessed: April 04, 2022, 6.
[80] Giulia Cimini and Ruth Hanau Santini. “Applying Principal-Agent Theory to Security Force Assistance: The Atypical Case of Post-2015 Tunisia.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 15, no. 5 (2021): 668.
[81] Global Terrorism Database, “All successful incidents where there is essentially no doubt of terrorism in Tunisia between 2013 and 2019,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, (University of Maryland, 2019).
[82]Shah and Dalton, “The Evolution of Tunisia’s Military and the Role of Foreign Security Sector Assistance,”6.
[83] Okail, and Kotb. “Egypt’s Authoritarian Crackdown Hasn’t Helped in the Fight Against Terrorism: Democracy Has Been Crushed -- and Terrorism Is Increasing.” The Washington Post, November 4, 2017.
[84] Francisco Serrano, “Putting up a fight: Tunisia’s counterterrorism successes and failures,” Middle East Institute, December 16, 2020. https://www.mei.edu/publications/putting-fight-tunisias-counterterrorism-successes-and-failures.
[85] Serrano, 2016.
[86] Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Tunisia.” U.S. Department of State. Last accessed: April 04, 2022. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/tunisia/.
[87]Anouar Boukhars, “Tunisia’s Evolving Counterterrorism Strategy,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 16, 2021. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/tunisias-evolving-counterterrorism-strategy/
[88] Aftandilian, Egypt’s New Regime and the Future of the U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relationship, 4.
[89] Federica Zardo and Francesco Cavatorta. “Friends Will Be Friends? External–domestic Interactions in EU-Tunisia and EU-Morocco Security Cooperation after the Uprisings.” International Politics 56, no. 5 (2018): 679.
Mostafa El Sharkawy is a fourth-year student at Trinity College, University of Toronto studying International Relations and Public Policy.
