Last updated: Nov. 24, 2022
In the last decades, China has invested in furthering Chinese language learning around the world. This development has caused more Western leaders to advocate for limiting Chinese academic influence in the West.[1] The Confucius Institutes stand as one of the key Chinese language institutions with over 500 exist worldwide.[2] These institutions teach the Chinese language and offer the opportunity to take Chinese language tests .[3] Quite often, Confucius Institutes are the only place in a city where one can come into contact with the Chinese language. The Confucius Institutes represent China's strategy to spread the Chinese language and Chinese culture around the globe.[4] But this strategy goes far beyond language learning. Far less well known, and much harder to observe systematically, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strives not only to create individual partnerships and collaborations between Western and Chinese universities but also to create entirely new institutes or even institutions altogether. Most of those establishments have a distinct focus on producing future leaders and elites. The Yenching Academy at Peking University represents one of China's best Universities in almost every field of study.[5] This establishment aims to implicitly imitate elite programs like the Rhodes or Gates Scholarships and to invest considerable sums of money to attract the best of the best to study in China.[6] These initiatives often serve to raise a generation of non-Chinese leaders, which are sympathetic to China and the Chinese way of government. They can be found in almost any area of study. Judging from employment statistics and the profiles of the people applying to such programs, many initiatives seem to be working.[7]
The West should not view these developments as unusual or threatening per se. Many countries rely on language learning to increase awareness of their language and culture worldwide. Germany for example has created a network of over 150 Goethe Institutes, which span almost the entire world.[8] In the past decades, future Chinese elites often studied in the Ivy League in the US and Oxbridge in the UK.[9] The CCP therefore not only has the hard task of making its universities more attractive to foreigners, but also to its elite. Therefore, in the author's opinion, we should not overstate Chinese presence in education and scientific cooperation, as international media often does. Additionally, western universities have had a disproportionate impact in the last 150 years. This becomes particularly clear when you look at which universities and countries have won the most Nobel Prizes. Overall, this trend has not reversed.[10]
The debate centers on two key questions: (1) has the described strategy had an overall positive impact on China's international reputation, and (2) should the West seek to sanction China for its actions by ending academic cooperation. Ultimately, the individual governments must answer those questions.
To answer the first question, some balance is necessary. On the one hand, it makes sense that China uses its funds to promote its own values and to further its own international reputation abroad. Chinese institutions can achieve this by promoting a one-sided vision of China in question or by generally aiming to increase awareness around the world. These projects also provide an opportunity to present a different narrative about Chinese politics compared to the Western media, especially when allegations of human rights violations and other concerns about China dominate Western news stories.[11] On the other hand, most of China’s language programs do not have an overly propagandistic nature. For example, one would not see overt praise of Maoist ideology in a HSK test or course. On the surface, these programs seem apolitical. However, this may not hold true, once one attends a Chinese university.
Regarding the second question, cutting academic cooperation represents only one of many different strategies. This article does not address whether the U.S. should sanction China. However, the West’s notion of ending academic cooperation as a way of sanctioning China would not likely have a major effect. What is problematic is to view an end to academic cooperation as the least painful way of sanctioning China for the West. Firstly, academic cooperation presents fewer concerns for national security than other veins of cooperation with China, especially in academic areas like the humanities, social sciences, law, and economics. While Western governments seem to have a general willingness to curtail academic cooperation, they do not have this same sentiment toward limiting economic cooperation, an area which should be viewed as much more essential by individuals who believe in a “New Cold War” between China and the West.[12]
While few things have a true apolitical nature, we should not view everything from the political lens. Academic partnerships serve to broaden the intellect of students by encountering new cultures. To deny students the opportunity to experience Chinese culture would hurt our own interests. Even when one takes the most critical position on China and its foreign policy, academic cooperation would still be in one’s interest. As seen in the Cold War, isolation, or a creation of two blocs has not led to more security on both sides but to an escalation and ultimately a higher risk of conflict. The West should avoid conflict with China at all costs. Academic cooperation would counteract such a trend, by creating a group of academics and policymakers on both sides that understands the other side's narrative while also having the ability to differentiate between fact and fiction. Universities should therefore focus not on limiting cooperation altogether but on educating students on the problems of modern China and the CCP. This way, students will not miss out on the assets that cooperation with China has to offer while not running into the danger of learning an unbalanced Version of Chinese history and contemporary politics.
[1] US targeting China's Confucius Institute?, Deutsche Welle, available at https://learngerman.dw.com/en/why-is-the-us-targeting-chinas-confucius-institute/a-43403188.
[2] Will Ford, How Far Does China’s Influence at U.S. Universities Go? One Student Tried to Find Out., Politico (04/24/2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/24/confucius-institutes-china-new-mexico-00027287
[3] Chinese International Education Foundation, which serves as a governing body of the different Confucius Institutes, available at https://www.cief.org.cn/kzxy.
[4] Pratik Jakhar, Confucius Institutes: The growth of China's controversial cultural branch, BBC (7 September 2019), available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49511231;
[5] Yenching Academy at Peking University, available at http://yenchingacademy.pku.edu.cn.
[6] 2nd China university starts Rhodes-style program, Associated Press (5 May 2014), available at https://apnews.com/article/f7439ecff8244e5199932ec0f68add5c.
[7] Employment Statistics, China-EU School of Law, available at http://en.cesl.edu.cn/About_us/Student_Life/Employment_Statistics.htm; 2016 graduate survey: most CESL alumni work in law firms, University of Hamburg (12 January 2017), available at https://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/en/internationales/china-eu-school-law/news/2017-01-12.html.
[8] Locations, Goethe Institut, available at https://www.goethe.de/en/wwt.html.
[9] Thorsten Pattberg, How China’s Ivy League Obsession Shortchanges Homegrown Universities, Global Asia (December 2014), available at https://www.globalasia.org/v9no4/focus/how-chinas-ivy-league-obsession-shortchanges-homegrown-universities_thorsten-pattberg; Kenneth Rapoza, Ivy League Schools Self-Censor For China, Forbes (21 August 2020), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/08/21/ivy-league-schools-self-censor-for-china/.
[10] As an example, see: QS World University Rankings 2022, available at https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2022.
[11] Generally see Human Rights Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/china-and-tibet.
[12] Dr. Peter Walkenhorst, Cold War 2.0? Essential Readings on the New Systemic Conflict, Bertelsmann Stiftung, available at https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/unsere-projekte/systemkonflikt/202101-cold-war-20-essential-readings-on-the-new-systemic-conflict.
Leonard John is a student Research Assistant at the Institute for Private- and Procedural Law at the University of Göttingen, Germany.
