Last updated: December 20, 2022
National security represents a key component of a state’s framework and a driving force behind what objectives the state deems important and the trajectory of its power in the future. One can see how national security plays these roles in the U.S., one of the largest and most powerful states in the internationally. The U.S. has expanded its global influence, power, and security components aided by the unipolarity borne from the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Since then, the U.S. has sought to capitalize on this power dynamic by enhancing its global posture, solidifying its alliances, and strengthening its security framework. China’s emergence as a great power competitor and its pursuit to gain level footing with American power and influence has led to Asia’s identification as a strategic region of focus via U.S. national security. Over the years, attempts to contain and pacify China’s power ambitions have led to the construction of a highly intricate and complex diplomatic structure within the region. This paper argues that the interconnectedness between states in the region contributes to increasing vulnerabilities relative to the U.S.’s strategic footing and that, as observed via Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), these vulnerabilities compound instability which can push such a security system to the point of collapse.
Cultural, economic, historical, and political differences between the United States and states in Asia constitute added complexity, which can further complicate action or policy for either the United States or China and states in the region. Aside from China, the U.S. security system categorizes states including Japan, India, North Korea, and Pakistan as states of interest, seeking national security objectives of their own and, simultaneously, contributing to growing instability that pushes this system closer to a critical state and collapse. Since Asia plays an integral role in the United States’ successful maintenance of its global power posture, the U.S. has a national interest in this structure thriving. Thus, the U.S. must carefully navigate future policy pursuits for failure mitigation. PET asserts that catastrophic failures of complex systems have an inevitable and unpredictable nature, meaning any attempts at optimization contribute to the perpetuation of degradation of the system. By analyzing PET through a policy and national security lens, the U.S. can better conceptualize a fresh perspective in understanding complex political systems since states and their connections have an equal importance to the security system itself. Furthermore, this paper highlights the current reconciliation of the United States’ desire to maintain power and the continued threat of Chinese revisionism.
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) and Self-Organized Criticality
Several disciplines have used PET. This paper, however, focuses on variation of PET as postulated by Ted Lewis (national security and critical infrastructure) and Frank Baumgartner, Bryan Jones, and Peter Mortensen (public policy). Ted Lewis observes and analyzes PET- a theory of catastrophe- in his book, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security. Lewis links national security with critical infrastructure, examining how categorization of vulnerabilities and risk to critical infrastructure and key resources play an important role in understanding a given system and its resilience.[1] Theories of catastrophe help shape the broader umbrella of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR), and how complexity in CIKR systems can lead to failure.[2] The importance of CIP revolves around identifying evolving threats to CIKR and how best to enhance their resilience, as well as efficient resource allocation toward CIKR with the highest risk, and greatest importance.[3] PET represents one approach to conceptualizing national security threats, what causes these threats, how amplification of these threats occurs, and the role they play within complex systems.[4]
Bak, Tang, and Wiesenfeld’s sandpile experiment provides a simplified conceptualization of PET in critical infrastructure. This experiment observed the gradual addition of grains of sand to a sandpile, inevitably leading to critical overload at unpredictable times and in unpredictable ways.[5] The experiment revealed the complex patterns of seemingly simple systems and further supports Lewis’s assertion that CIKR structure “determines resilience of the system, as does the threat and vulnerability of the individual components of the system.”[6] Within PET, Self-Organized Criticality (SOC) serves as the mechanism through which instability compounds via attempts to simplify or optimize components of a system, which gradually leading to a critical state threshold.[7] Once one passes this threshold, all future changes to a system (good or bad) can initiate failure since intricate “coupling and interdependencies” of complex systems exacerbate catastrophic potential.[8] Bak emphasizes SOC’s centrality to this theory, asserting that “disastrous events occur after long periods of calm followed by bursts of catastrophes.”[9]
Building on Bak’s assertions, Baumgartner et al. examine PET’s presence within political systems – vis-à-vis policymaking – and introduce positive and negative feedback, helping to further explain Bak’s bursts of catastrophes.[10] The authors maintain that “stasis, rather than crisis, typically characterizes most policy areas” and contend that “large-scale changes in public policies” are commonplace within political systems.[11] Furthermore, they explain how unpredictable these systems can behave when introduced to “destabilizing events, the accumulation of unaddressed grievances, or other political processes,” possibly resulting in radical disruption to a system’s stability.[12] Since political systems represent social systems that lack the ability to discuss and act on all issues all the time. Such “issue-oriented policy” leads to the following possibilities: (1) the domination of one issue or interest; (2) competition between multiple issues or interests; (3) neutralization; or (4) solidified autonomy from other issues.[13]
Ted Lewis observes how normal and black swan feedback loops can occur, their frequency, and how dramatic their effect on the stability of a system can be.[14] While not catastrophic, normal accident loops present a serious threat and occur frequently. On the other hand, black swan loops have a more catastrophic nature, but they occur rarely and unpredictably. Normal accident feedback provides fertile ground for instability. As it builds, the system pushes toward a critical state, fulfilling Bak’s paradox.[15] Bak’s paradox states that consistent attempts at optimization of a system contribute to heightened instability, inevitably leading to a system’s collapse.[16] Since SOC proliferates in a variety of systems, including political systems, PET’s application to this analysis provides a rich theoretical framework through which to examine U.S. diplomatic efforts in Asia.[17]
U.S. National Security and the National Interest
As previously mentioned, national security dictates the actions and policies states pursue to enhance security and maximize power. The United States has benefited from the unipolar power established after the Cold War, ending the dual-power dynamic upheld between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.[18] As China continues to rise in power and prominence, national security focuses more on a return to great power competition, a concept explained by John Mearsheimer.[19] In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer examines the dynamics of great power politics and how perceptions of uncertainty and competition perpetuate power and security maximization.[20] The United States, as a great power, rationally identifies power maximization and security enhancement as primary focuses within its national security, illustrated in the national security strategies of current and previous presidential administrations.[21] Furthermore, Mearsheimer underscores the competition that can arise between adversaries when one wishes to maintain the status quo (the United States) while one seeks to change it (China). The rise of a great power wishing to interrupt the status quo thus presents a direct threat to the state that wishes to maintain it.[22] Therefore, in this case, the U.S. has a national interest in ensuring the continuation of its power dynamic, control, and influence globally.
Bruce Jentleson provides valuable insight into understanding U.S. national security and the national interest in his book, American Foreign Policy. In his book, Jentleson asserts that globalization has “internationalized” U.S. national interests due to the economy’s global connectivity, its broad network of alliances and partnerships, the expansion of the global community, and the emergence of global threats and challenges.[23] As such, “4 Ps Framework”– power, peace, prosperity, and principles– completes our understanding of national interests.[24] Familiarity with this framework is important since conversations of national interest usually involve at least one, if not a combination of these concepts.[25]
Jentleson identifies power as “the key requirement” for “preservation of national independence and territory,” achieved through power and influence against adversarial challenges.[26] Simply put, borrowing from Samuel Huntington, Jentleson declares that “power enables an actor to shape his environment so as to reflect his interests.”[27] Peace intersects all four concepts. Power can implement peace and result in prosperity. Individuals with aligning principles uphold such power. Diplomacy and international institutionalism play a central role in strategies of peace due to the diversity of states, languages, cultures, and socio-political tendencies.[28] Prosperity concerns national interests that prioritize economic policies, and with the consequences of globalization, domestic economic policies overlap with foreign policies.[29] Principles concern the importance of “values, ideals, and beliefs that the United States has claimed to stand for in the world,” with effective principles’-based policy hinging on the perceptions of other states and how closely (if at all) the U.S adheres to those values and ideals.[30] U.S. strategic power, economic partnerships, commonalities with democratic states, and the prospect of peace add varying levels of complexity with each state the U.S. engages.[31]
Alongside Mearsheimer and Jentleson’s assertions, Reveron and Gvosdev argue that states base the establishment of national interests on “national security systems that reflect the priorities, worldviews, and preferences” of a state, further divided into three categories: vital, important, and peripheral.[32] Reveron and Gvosdev further argue that we can categorize the United States’ desire to maintain power primacy as a vital interest because it revolves around ideals and principles, an assertion in line with Jentleson’s peace, power, prosperity, and principles concept.[33] The authors also cover the ongoing evolution of American grand strategy which experienced a paradigm shift in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by “[exposing] homeland security vulnerabilities.”[34] In the wake of this shift, China entered the proverbial ring, identifying themselves as the most capable competitor to challenge U.S. power on the global stage. China’s economic strength aided this entrance, fueling acquisitions of power and security and obstructing the policy pursuits of the United States.[35]
American diplomacy does not have a one-size-fits-all nature, and Asia is no exception. The U.S. engages diplomatically with Japan differently from how it pursues policy with China; diplomatic approaches with Pakistan contrast its strategic partnership with India, and so on. Furthermore, China has undeniable importance to U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities, as numerous presidential administrations have identified China as a primary national security concern.[36] While the national security strategies of presidential administrations have their differences, commonalities can be identified, specifically regarding the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and South-Central Asia.[37]
The Trump administration’s national security strategy placed great emphasis on China’s challenge to U.S. power primacy regionally by “[persuading] other states to heed its political and security agenda,” and “[reinforcing] its geopolitical aspirations.”[38] Pursuits from China to coalesce the region aside, the Trump administration highlighted nuclear threats posed by North Korea while emphasizing the importance of deeper partnership with Japan, Australia, and ASEAN member states.[39] Compounded with the complexities of the Indo-Pacific, this national security strategy identified South and Central Asia as regions of interest as well.[40] Due to ongoing complications between India and Pakistan, U.S. involvement in – and the recent withdrawal from – Afghanistan, and sustained attempts to counter threats by non-state, terrorist organizations, the administration admits that this region “[presents] some of the most complicated national security challenges and opportunities.”[41]
President Biden’s national security priorities generally echo many of the focus areas outlined above. They call for the enhancement of alliance and strategic partnership frameworks – including ASEAN member states, India, and New Zealand – to effectively counter China’s rise. Additionally, these priorities place a special emphasis on “diplomacy, development, and economic statecraft [as the] leading instruments of American foreign policy.”[42] The Biden administration’s strategy does not explicitly identify South and Central Asia in the same way as the Trump administration, but it does address the challenges presented by military involvement in Afghanistan and the persisting challenges posed by terrorist organizations.[43]
Pursuits by the U.S. to mitigate China’s continued rise to great power status while balancing multiple diplomatic fronts introduce greater complexity to this security system. President Biden emphasizes the importance of his administration’s focus on strengthening alliances and partnerships. As the administration establishes more partnerships with different states, effective diplomacy and national security will hinge on the ability to navigate, support, and maintain these partnerships while simultaneously preventing threats to weaken this system.[44] Setbacks or positive feedback will likely spread through the system due to the hyperconnectivity of states resulting in amplified SOC and prompting even more setbacks.[45]
When setbacks occur in a complex system, PET explains how these systems pivot to rectifying vulnerabilities. A state must fix weaknesses to strengthen the resilience of the system.[46] By doing this, the system unknowingly contributes to the buildup of SOC. As SOC increases, a system’s resilience decreases until it reaches a critical state and collapses, fulfilling Bak’s paradox.[47] One can apply the same concept to U.S. diplomacy in Asia: continued conflict between Pakistan and India, the repercussions following the U.S.’s controversial pullout from Afghanistan; China’s aggressive Belt and Road Initiative; and the constant specter of a nuclear North Korea represent instances of feedback that have caused modest changes to policy pursuits by the United States. These events add pressure to the intricate diplomatic structure that the United States has established in Asia, a vital system to its national security that appears to unknowingly amplify SOC.[48]
Currently, perceptions of diminished power primacy dot conversations and scholarship within international relations and national security circles which constitutes a challenge to the U.S.’s ability to maintain power and security.[49] One example comes from James Crabtree who observes the potential of diminished strategic footing, specifically in Southeast Asia, in his Foreign Policy article “A Confused Biden Team Risks Losing Southeast Asia.”[50] Crabtree highlights the geopolitical importance of Southeast Asia due to its proximity to China and the great power competition that currently exists between China and the U.S., reconciling this with hopes for a return to clear leadership in Asia which, so far, has fallen short.[51] Southeast Asia plays a vital role, Crabtree argues, due to its strategic location, presence of allies and partnerships, and the realization that “few regional policymakers relish a possible future under China’s sway and mostly want to maintain a balance between the two superpowers,” which can only be achieved through a sustained regional presence.[52] Lastly, Crabtree contends that “tensions are a feature—not a bug—of regional diplomacy” for the United States and that “finding the right balance” will be challenging.[53]
Another, broader example of U.S. diminished power primacy comes from William Burns in his Atlantic article “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy.”[54] Burns outlines what he describes as a period of transition that finds “American dominance in the rearview mirror, and a more anarchical order looming dimly beyond.” The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic aids growing anarchy, which has presented China with an opportunity to strengthen its position while liberal states like the U.S. shift their attention to growing domestic concerns.[55] The retreat of liberal democracy, the looming specter of climate change, growing inequality, a rise in authoritarian leadership and policies, and faltering economic growth have all contributed to precarious positions that states find themselves in, including the United States is no exception.[56] Burns’ calls for reinvention and restoration in U.S. policy implementation present a watershed opportunity to diminish conflict and maximize its power and security posture on the global stage.[57]
Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen have asserted that political systems commonly have “large-scale changes in public policies”[58] and that “issue-oriented policy” can prompt one of many trajectories including issues of domination, neutralization, or multi-issue competition.[59] While U.S. policies concerning China are not the sole issues of importance to conversations of national security, China maintains a high priority status, demonstrating the potential for the “issue-oriented policies” alluded to by Baumgartner et al. and supporting their assertion that significant developments regarding public policy can result in “destabilizing events.”[60]
Applying Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) to U.S. Diplomacy
In PET, complex systems have inherently unpredictability regardless of their size or architectural framework, so attempts to optimize components of the system contribute to amplified SOC and thus decrease resilience.[61] Nuanced diplomatic approaches of the United States in Asia form an intangible, interconnected network between states which establishes a system that consists of nodes (state actors) and links (relations between any two nodes or states, cooperative or adversarial).[62] Recent events within the region allow one to formulate logical conjecture that the United States, burdened by the prospect of diminished power primacy, will seek to rectify vulnerabilities with efforts at optimization contributing to SOC amplification and, at an eventual but unpredictable point in time, the collapse of the security system it has created.[63]
These concepts have direct support from Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen’s assertion that major changes resulting in “destabilizing events,” understood as SOC (instability), can contribute to dramatic shifts in public policy.[64] When stability faces threats, attempts to restore stability can be framed as optimization efforts, paradoxically contributing to the system’s degraded resilience.[65] As resilience erodes, vulnerabilities proliferate and ultimately lead to collapse.[66] Indeed, one could argue that the period of relative calm after the conclusion of the Cold War in Asia has given way to a period within the last few decades which has experienced an increase in “bursts of activity” that Bak associates with PET and the inevitability of “disastrous events” occurring.[67] To conceptualize this, researchers conduct case studies of specific subregions (East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia) to provide a clearer visualization of the U.S.’s strategic diplomatic structure, its entanglements with states in these subregions, and the inherent complex interconnectivity.
Regional Focus: East Asia (China, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan)
As an emerging great power and great power competitor with the United States, the U.S.’s ability to exert strength and influence in East Asia will have direct effects on containing Chinese exertion of influence. Likewise, the historic tension between North and South Korea (and the U.S.’s involvement on the peninsula) constitutes a direct threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.
The interests of China and the U.S. frequently collide because China serves as a key regional power in Asia and Asia is a region of strategic importance to U.S. power primacy.[68] This does not mean that China and the U.S. do not or cannot work together–bilateral trade deals and partnerships between these two states are incredibly important. However, continued growth in China’s power ambitions and actions throughout the region have made an already nuanced and unique relationship complex.[69]
In the article “The United States, China, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Weixing Hu defines U.S.-China relations as “complex, consequential, and tortuous.” Oscillation between presidential administrations has seen this relationship transition from periods of cooperation, engagement, and competition, to times when both sides are uncertain of the other’s objectives and motives.[70] Hu explains how, presidential administration transitions aside, former President Trump’s administration represented a clear departure from previous administrations’ approaches to China and contributed to “acceleration of the deterioration of the relationship.”[71] Furthermore, Hu states that, as evidenced by Trump’s national security strategy, “China is ‘a strategic rival that challenges American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.’”[72]
Hu maintains that the United States’ approach to China–one that views the benefits of a “prosperous China”–aligns with the U.S. national interest and this concept has been fundamental to China’s policy since the conclusion of the Cold War.[73] As presidents have sought to guide or shape Chinese policy to align with the U.S.’s, China has proved each time that it pursues its own path which regularly diverges from American interests, leading to a “critical juncture” in the current distribution of power and raising questions regarding the framework of U.S. approaches to China.[74] While Hu explains that two factions have been established–one supporting continued efforts at integrating China into the established international order, and the other supporting increased containment measures and enhancing American power and security posture–he contends that both factions share a commonality of increased assertiveness in U.S. dealings with China, supporting assertions of great power competition between the two states.[75]
Concerning the U.S.’s competitive strategy, Hu outlines four central pillars that help to establish future approaches to this partnership: 1) increasing military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, 2) investing in “strategic alternatives” to counter attempts by China to garner influence and power, 3) strengthening allies and partnerships to balance China, and 4) capitalizing on China’s “regional issues” to mitigate challenges.[76] Of particular importance to China–and thus, concern for the United States–is its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This large-scale policy involving states in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa focuses on investing in economic projects with the added benefit of enhanced diplomacy and soft power.[77] Hu argues that should China’s efforts prove successful it will reap the benefits, including “control of major trading routes and the access to natural resources around the globe.”[78]
Joshua Shifrinson’s Security Studies Quarterly article, “Security in Northeast Asia,” explores the nuances of security within the region, specifically focusing on the Koreas, China, and Japan.[79] Shifrinson explores the concept of balance between the U.S. and these identified states, while also examining the serious security threats posed by North Korea.[80] The author observed that North Korea’s military threats, especially its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing, poses serious security threats to neighboring U.S. allies South Korea and Japan, as well as the U.S. since North Korean ICBM’s have sufficient range to strike the continental U.S.[81] Additionally, Shifrinson mentions the possibility of “entrapment” vis-à-vis conflict between North and South Korea which would result in U.S. support of the South due to their established strategic partnership, as well as the potential for Chinese involvement further complicating what would certainly be a dangerous scenario for both China and the United States due to the nuclear capabilities of all three states.[82]
As far as vulnerabilities are concerned, Shifrinson, while optimistic about the potential for settlement between these state actors, acknowledges the ongoing instability and setbacks that have introduced complexity into this system, specifically identifying “ongoing tensions in the US-South Korea and US-Japan alliances.”[83] Tensions in alliance derive from the increasingly fluctuating nature of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives that have resulted in the degradation of these alliance structures, fomented by the potential of reduction in U.S. alliances and the harboring of U.S. military forces in bases in both states.[84] Shifrinson also identified the continued nuclearized pursuits of North Korea as a setback, which he categorizes as a failure of U.S. ambition to neutralize any attempts at a rogue, nuclear North Korea.[85]
Japan plays an important role due to its strategic alliance with the United States, as well as its unique location within the region itself, both of which Hideshi Tokuchi examines in his article “The Role of Japan in Sustaining Regional Order in East Asia.”[86] Tokuchi builds on foundations laid by Shifrinson explaining how the regional security considerably stable environment of East Asia has potential for instability, stemming from factors such as “established nuclear powers” within the region, historical military disputes regarding Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, and China’s territorial ambition in the South China Sea.[87] However, Tokuchi asserts that a nuclear North Korea presents by far the clearest and most dangerous challenge to stability in this region.[88] With these factors considered, it makes sense that the Japanese consider their strategic alliance with the United States as “the bedrock institution of the regional security structure in East Asia.”[89] North Korea’s continued testing of its ICBM capabilities has led to sustained fear of the outbreak of conflict and the potential targeting of missiles at states which have sought to contain it, or who have allied with adversarial states (Japan and South Korea’s partnerships with the U.S. being two examples).[90]
Tokuchi argues that examining the U.S.-Japan security alliance provides valuable insight into the general architecture of regional stability. Categorized by its “hub-and-spoke system,” the U.S.-Japan security alliance helps to balance power in a way that benefits the mutual interests of both states, further solidifying regional cooperation and the pursuit of national security for the United States and Japan.[91] Tokuchi outlines three reasons for the central importance of this partnership: 1) mutual security threats from competitive states (China, North Korea, and Russia), and the broader issue of increased international terrorism, 2) Japan’s proximity to these threats and its stability regarding the stationing U.S. military forces, and 3) both states’ national security interests in maritime issues within the Asian Pacific.[92] Tokuchi concisely sums up these links when he says that “efforts to make the U.S.-Japan alliance more robust contribute directly to the enhancement of the regional security system and the maintenance of the regional order.”[93]
Tokuchi contends that, while this partnership has immense strength, measures can and should be taken to strengthen it further for the mutual benefit of each state’s respective national security interests.[94] First, Tokuchi argues for increased and enhanced communication between the U.S. and Japan, advocating for more leadership from Japan due to its proximity to identified security threats in the region.[95] Relatedly, another measure related to the previous one calls for Japan to take on greater responsibility and leadership in assuring security both regionally and globally.[96] One could argue that the failure of Japan to step into greater leadership in this regard perpetuates the uneven nature of the alliance and presents a sustained vulnerability to a crucial link in the greater U.S. diplomatic structure of Asia. However, one could argue that Tokuchi’s measures could constitute attempts at optimization which Lewis and Baumgartner et al. argue help to proliferate SOC which degrades a system’s resilience.[97]
The analysis of East Asia illuminates the interconnectivity between these states, their political and economic entanglements, and how setbacks to U.S. foreign policy initiatives have resulted in increased instability (SOC) within its diplomatic structure. Moving forward, close attention should be given to the immediate consequences of these actions or policies since PET postulates optimization within a system breeds more SOC which results in further degradation of a system’s resilience to collapse.[98]
Regional Focus: South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran)
While a great power competitor like China does not reside within South Asia, India, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan establish this subregion’s centrality to U.S. foreign policy and national security. A better understanding of this subregion provides a helpful conceptualization of how it factors into the broader system in Asia.
As the largest state in this region, India enjoys a level of prominence which underscores the varied challenges obstructing the realization of its foreign policy and national security objectives.[99] Arunkumar and Sakthivel dissect these numerous challenges in their article “Challenges to National Security in India,” which include Chinese aspirations of regional hegemony, ongoing conflict with Pakistan, nuclear proliferation, and the perpetuation of political instability.[100] The authors maintain a holistic approach in conceptualizing Indian national security and emphasize multiple focus areas rather than one dominant aspect; economic, military, political, and social factors all play important roles since “national security necessarily denotes a nation’s determination to preserve… territorial integrity, political independence and fundamental institutions.”[101]
Arunkumar and Sakthivel focus on a few areas that fall within Indian national security, including cyber warfare, maritime border security, domestic security, and intelligence.[102] The world has seen the emergence of sophisticated and targeted cyber-attacks by state and non-state actors and with technology rapidly advancing, vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks present a clear threat to every state.[103] The authors underscore an absence of “national security architecture today that can assess the nature of cyber threats and respond to them effectively,” an especially vulnerable position given the sophistication of asymmetric cyber-espionage by states like Russia, North Korea, and China.[104] Policymakers should not separate maritime border security and internal security since “intrusions via the sea are extremely difficult to prevent” and can further degrade the national security architecture of the state.[105] Similarly, unrest throughout parts of India and rising political extremism threaten to further exacerbate complications in Indian national security objectives.[106]
In their conclusion, Arunkumar and Sakthivel assert that China “poses the most potent military threat to India,” insisting that cohesion in creating and implementing national security strategies must include this reality, and the potential for “two-front war” between both China and Pakistan.[107] Some of India’s biggest challenges stem from structural deficiencies and will render any competent policies ineffective or unsustainable in implementation, unless addressed.[108] In addition, both the United States and China have individual entanglements with Pakistan and India, whereby China seeks greater cooperation with Pakistan to deter India’s attempts to solidify regional prominence, yet has also sought bilateral relations with India with mixed reception.[109] Additionally, the United States has partnered with Pakistan during the War on Terror following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and has sought to empower India in hopes of providing a strong deterrent to China’s regional hegemonic aspirations.[110] This pairing introduces its fair share of complexity to the U.S. diplomatic structure and will surely constitute a major role in future policy pursuits.
In her article “Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia,” Ayesha Rana states “the U.S. is the sole superpower, therefore, the balance of power in the world suits the U.S.”[111] Rana contends that India contributes to instability in South Asian security due to many factors, least of all its increasing defense budget and the fact that it possesses an army ranking in the top five of all nations.[112] A disparity in opportunity precludes Pakistan from similar actions–(due to “unfair sanctions”)–promoting a perceptual division between two conflicting, nuclear states with on-going disputes; this disparity ensures Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear capabilities, contributing to India’s heightened uncertainty of Pakistan’s motives.[113] Rana also argues that India’s regional hegemonic aspirations further exacerbate security concerns within South Asia and degrade what stability remains in the region, stating that “prevailing asymmetry between… India… and Pakistan… [propels] India’s regional hegemonic ambitions.”[114]
Focusing on nuclear programs, Rana emphasizes how the continued development of India’s nuclear program presents a clear threat to Pakistan and can be understood as a fail-safe option to help deter perceptions of Chinese encroachment within the region.[115] Perceptions of Indian regional hegemony and power acquisition result in Pakistan maintaining and enhancing nuclear deterrence “to safeguard its security against India’s growing nuclear and conventional capabilities.”[116] When coupled with recent strategic agreements between the U.S. and India, Pakistan security threat perceptions have greater visibility. Additionally, India’s economic advantage relative to Pakistan ensures rapid advancement and modernization of military and nuclear capabilities.[117]
These and other conflicting perceptions between India and Pakistan are “rooted in historical facts” pertaining to boundary disputes with Jammu and Kashmir, post-independence convergence, and “destabilization through… proxies after 9/11.”[118] Rana further underscores increasingly “offensive policies” due to deepening “fear and insecurity” post-9/11 and that Pakistan fears “submission” by India due to its abundant advantages over them.[119] Focusing on the post-9/11 world, Rana asserts that “America’s discriminatory attitude towards Pakistan” had a crippling effect on South Asian strategic stability; the fact that cooperation between India and the U.S. continues to grow ensures Pakistan’s reliance on enhancing nuclear options to combat what it sees as clear threats to its security posture.[120] Finally, Rana explores U.S. relations within South Asia and asserts that assistance via economic engagement would promote a more stable and prosperous region and, more importantly, could lead to “durable peace and stability,” benefiting all three parties and the world, by neutralizing a flashpoint region of strategic importance.[121]
Diverging from Rana’s assertions and supporting the importance of the U.S.’s partnership with India, Michael Kugelman explains, in his Foreign Policy article “Washington’s Divergent Diplomacy in South Asia,” how Indo-U.S. strategy is unified via challenges posed by China on both states’ power and security aspirations in the region.[122] He acknowledges present strength within this partnership yet also emphasizes its delicate nature due to consistent setbacks in diplomacy.[123] While he argues that India and the U.S. have found fruitful cooperation in various policy areas, Kugelman admits one major setback could present itself in the form of U.S. sanctions due to India’s recent procurement of missile defense technology from another revisionist power, Russia.[124] Despite this action conflicting with U.S. interests with India, and despite the improbability of the U.S. sanctioning a critical partner in the Indo-Pacific (as Kugelman suggests), the U.S. still reserves the right to act with its national interests and national security priorities as it deems necessary.[125] While this degree of cooperation does not require the same level as cooperation with India, Kugelman underscores Afghanistan’s central importance to this partnership which has experienced diplomatic diminishment over presidential administrations and the weighted importance of the U.S.’s withdrawal from Afghanistan on future relations with Pakistan.[126]
Richard Haass analyzes the importance of Afghanistan in contemporary U.S. foreign policy and national security, especially in the wake of the controversial withdrawal of U.S. forces ending the longest war in U.S. history.[127] Afghanistan’s increased presence within U.S. foreign policy was firmly established in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks due to the Taliban-controlled government’s protection of al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization that claimed responsibility for executing the attacks.[128] As the war raged on, the U.S.’s interests in Afghanistan exponentially increased, leading to a larger military presence but resulting in “modest” success (the first elected Afghan government) and failure (regained control by the Taliban in more rural areas).[129] A lack of definitive success led to perceptions of overreach and renewed calls to withdraw due to troop casualties and the overwhelming cost of ongoing war efforts.[130] Upon Biden’s rise to the presidency, Haass contends that the U.S. had attained “a level of limited involvement commensurate with the stakes” which would “avert the collapse of a government that, however imperfect, was far preferable to the alternative that is now taking power.”[131]
Haass predicts that the U.S.’s withdrawal from Afghanistan–which bears resemblance to the U.S.’s withdrawal from Vietnam in the 1970’s–will result in Afghanistan devolving into a haven for terrorist organizations and leading to increased threats of terrorist attacks throughout the region, threats that already permeate state national security strategies and foreign policy.[132] Furthermore, human rights abuses under a new Taliban-controlled government and the possibility of a refugee crisis directly impact the neighboring states of Iran, Pakistan, and China.[133] This leads to Haass’s postulation that the Taliban may seek expansion into Pakistan–currently suffering from instability and wielding nuclear weapon capabilities–which would, in turn, present increased security concerns for India.[134] As the Taliban secures control over Afghanistan, Washington will need to navigate delicately and, should diplomacy with a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan prove unfruitful or unfeasible, Pakistan could provide an opportunity for moderation between the two, although this too presents a risk.
Iran occupies a unique location within South Asia, situated within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region characterized by its strategic importance and persistent turbulence for the U.S. Iran constitutes yet another obstacle to American security pursuits in this subregion due to the cold, limited relations between the U.S. and Iran which began with the Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s.[135] State-sponsored terrorism and Islamic extremism that permeate Iran and Pakistan present the biggest security concerns not just for the U.S., but for India and other states throughout Southeast Asia as well.[136] Ongoing instability and potential for conflict has ensured that the public view any involvement by the U.S. in this region with skepticism.[137]
Husain Haqqani takes a closer look at Iran’s involvement throughout the region in his article “Iran’s Revolutionary Influence in South Asia.” This piece observes remnants of Iran’s objective of spreading its revolutionary principles (which began in the 1970s) in contemporary policies, national interest, and interstate relations.[138] Haqqani, Director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute, acknowledges the overt expansion of Iranian influence outside of the Middle East, permeating various subregions of Asia “without attracting the same level of attention as their activities in the Middle East.”[139] Specifically, Haqqani identifies several objectives for Iran within South Asia, including maximizing economic and political means for its benefit, spreading Islamic ideology, expanding alliances and partnerships to solidify advantages in proxy wars, and strengthening balance mechanisms regarding its major adversaries of Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia.[140]
Haqqani emphasizes the influence that Iran, a Muslim-majority state, wields throughout Asia, especially in other states that have sizeable Muslim populations (Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), illuminating the schism between Shia and Sunni Muslims.[141] Sunni Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority throughout Asia but, as Haqqani finds, states with large populations and minority Shia populations can still number in the millions, which presents obstacles to national security policies.[142] In fact, Haqqani asserts that cultivating influence with Shia Muslims would enable Iran to exert pronounced influence throughout Asia and its subregions and establish obstacles for adversaries pursuing national security and foreign policy objectives.[143]
Haqqani’s analysis categorizes Pakistan as a unique state due to its shared border with Iran, its nuclear weapons capabilities, and, most importantly, the sizable concentration of Shia Muslims.[144] Iran has identified India as another state of interest due to their proximity, and opportunities for increased cooperation, evidenced by “India being the third largest importer of Iranian oil in Asia” and both states’ histories of ancient civilizations.[145] Furthermore, “trade, investment, and [political]” relations between Iran and India allow Iran to bypass sanctions and other obstacles, which creates an opportunity for India to pursue alternative options for the containment of Pakistan, its primary adversary.[146]
While South Asia lacks the presence of a similar influential state like China’s presence in East Asia, this subregion has its own interconnectivity and complexity. India plays an important role for the United States in securing and deepening its posture in Asia, and both are unified by their mutual distrust of China. However, this relationship presents other obstacles such as the budding cooperation with Iran to contain Pakistan.[147] Likewise, cooperation between Pakistan and Iran (and Afghanistan, by extension) breeds concern due to the potential of nuclear proliferation and enabling of terrorist organizations, establishing yet another roadblock to U.S. foreign policy pursuits.[148] U.S. forces withdrew swiftly and controversially from Afghanistan, illustrating Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen’s observations of system unpredictability resulting in “destabilizing events… [leading] to explosive change” in public policy.[149] In fact, Afghanistan presents one of the strongest examples of such an occurrence which has thrown future policy pursuits of the U.S. and partners in the region into an unexpected and unpredictable environment, an environment which Lewis asserts will result in additional setbacks which will erode resilience.[150]
Regional Focus: Southeast Asia
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam make up the subregion of Southeast Asia. Due to Southeast Asia’s proximity to East Asia (and states’ proximity to China), Southeast Asia merits recognition due to China’s increasing actions centered on territorial disputes in the South China Sea which conflict with other states’ claims and interests. In addition, these states also comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization seeking integration of the region with the rest of Asia, as well as the promotion of shared values and objectives.[151] Proximity to China has resulted in attempts to court these states with Southeast Asia’s own variations of economic and political integration policies which overtly exclude the U.S.[152]
Ralf Emmers tackles the concept of ASEAN’s role in Asia in his article “Unpacking ASEAN Neutrality,” where he argues that ASEAN seeks impartiality in its dealings within the region and remains skeptical of great power interests due to its colonial past involving both China and the U.S.[153] While Emmers acknowledges that ASEAN’s individual member’s interests have fluctuated since its creation, he designates particular importance to the increasingly “multipolar structure” of Asia, emerging in the 2000s and continuing today.[154] Emmers states that complexity has increased as “new actors have emerged and international crises have been more diffused with blurred sets of responsibilities and national interests” leading to a need for evolved neutrality by ASEAN.[155] China’s rise as a regional and great power contender has immediate importance to ASEAN, as the state has executed rapid modernization and expansion in the last few decades leading states in the region, as Emmers observes, to question whether China will seek a more pacified role as a “benign and responsible power” or whether it will continue regional hegemonic pursuits via “coercive influence on its neighbors.”[156]
Emmers highlights U.S.-China competition and China-Japan power dynamic as noteworthy examples of instability within the region. The U.S.’s concerns about China’s expanding military capabilities, coupled with Beijing’s skepticism of U.S. security partnerships in the region, provides fertile ground for a potential security dilemma and perpetuates the complex interconnectivity within the region and between key players.[157] Likewise, Emmers contends that Japan’s deepening alliance with the U.S. and strengthening of “maritime security and defence cooperation with several Southeast Asian states” indicates a desire to mitigate unchecked influence by China and an attempt to balance power.[158]
Graham Ong-Webb’s article, “Southeast Asia in 2019,” provides support for Emmers’ observations and assertions, and examines the ongoing pursuit of adaptable policy given China’s growing regional power and influence.[159] Ong-Webb maintains that Southeast Asia states have continually sought “cohesiveness” within ASEAN to “manage external political and economic risk” and, by doing so, attempt to side with any great powers, neutralizing Emmers’ concept of ASEAN impartiality.[160] However, the outbreak of trade war between the U.S. and China has led to what Ong-Webb describes as a shift in risk perception from ASEAN which could result in its desire to align more closely with China’s economic policies rather than the U.S.’s.[161] In fact, Derek Grossman echoes this sentiment in his Foreign Policy article “Biden Needs a Southeast Asia Policy to Counter China’s Pull,” arguing that Biden’s preoccupation with “values and democracy promotion” has been at the expense of instituting bold policies that can counteract China’s influence in a region “dominated by autocracies and near-autocracies.”[162]
While Grossman does not hold an inherently negative perception of news related to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, he does outline several setbacks that could arguably be categorized within Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen’s framework of significant policy changes (in this case, a multi-issue policy change), prompting action to minimize missteps which would likely compound vulnerability in a patchwork of complex interconnectivity.[163] Grossman’s identified setbacks are as follows: (1) failure to engage in bilateral conversation with any leader from the region within his first year (juxtaposed with his outreach to states including Australia and Japan); (2) a delay by U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, in visiting the region, reinforcing perceptions of Southeast Asia’s low-priority status in the eyes of the U.S.; (3) exclusion in discussions and policies with certain states due to undemocratic values or principles; (4) the lack of a formal Indo-Pacific strategy from the Biden administration; (5) concerns of outside coalitions which degrade ASEAN’s influence; and (6) the absence of economic policies or initiatives within the region.[164] While the Biden administration is only completing its first half of its term, neglecting a region as important as Asia (especially Southeast Asia) could quickly become a liability within U.S. foreign policy and national security, directly threatening the integrity of its diplomatic structure in Asia and potentially resulting in devastating consequences for the U.S.’s power posture.
Interconnectivity between the ASEAN states and their entanglements with China and the United States, coupled with growing pressure from competing great powers, will present obstacles to ASEAN’s ability to maintain impartiality and aid in the degradation of resilience to the U.S.’s strategic footing. China’s belligerence in the South China Sea directly affects ASEAN states due to their proximity. The principled difference between the United States and China compounds complexity. Furthermore, attempts at pressure or coercion from either the U.S. or China could result in the ending of ASEAN impartiality (if economic and political benefits outweigh alternatives) to the other’s detriment; should the U.S. pressure ASEAN to such a point, mounting SOC could cripple the efficiency of U.S. strategic objectives, due to lacking policy and focus, thus rendering its diplomatic structure vulnerable to collapse.[165]
Conclusion
In a world where uncertainty, security challenges, and fluctuating power dynamics permeate intra- and interstate relations, competent and efficient national security analysis and foreign policy implementation play crucial role in maximizing a state’s power and security posture relative to competitors.[166] As great power competition re-emerges between the U.S. and China, adaptability and innovation in accomplishing national security objectives can provide both a deeper understanding of the U.S.’s posture within the global system, as well as conceptualizing its alliances, partnerships, and strategic interests. A state’s ability to navigate complex and overlapping interests with others could very well mean the difference between sustained global power and influence or diminished power and influence, the latter being antithetical to the current national security strategy.[167]
This paper aims to analyze the U.S.’s diplomatic structure in Asia and demonstrate the system’s increasing vulnerability. The application of PET provides a unique perspective, whereby observations of compounding vulnerability inherent to the security system (by way of increased instability) can lead to an increase in collapse probability. As one of the world’s dominant powers, the U.S. is rationally concerned with any degree of diminished power primacy, especially considering that it has benefited from unrivaled, unilateral power and influence globally since the end of the Cold War. Although the U.S. fluctuates with new presidential administrations, these administrations’ national security priorities continue to uphold the strengthening of strategic partnerships and alliances, as well as maximizing power and security.[168] PET examines the inherent instability of complex systems (in this case, a security system) categorized by exponential increases in self-organized criticality (SOC) which is compounded by attempts at optimization when setbacks or failures occur within that system.[169] As complexity, borne from such optimization, increases, so does the system’s vulnerability to future setbacks and failures, perpetuating a cycle of degraded resilience until the system ultimately collapses.[170]
The U.S.’s diplomatic structure’s vulnerability to amplified SOC derives from the nuanced connections and partnerships that exist between cooperating and competitive actors, which compound this complexity as evidenced by my personal case study analysis above. Setbacks experienced by the U.S. in pursuit of foreign policy and national security priorities provide pronounced examples of SOC that contribute to the gradual erosion of resilience of its diplomatic structure, paradoxically fulfilling perceptions of diminished power primacy and vulnerability. These perceptions have and will continue to prompt attempts to optimize this system with any mitigation efforts contributing to the growth of SOC and, eventually, the inevitable yet unpredictable collapse of the entire system.
China, the U.S., and India constitute key players within Asia which all share a combination of cooperative and competitive national security objectives and foreign policy; each one’s primary goal is to bolster its power and security posture relative to competitors, a concept especially pervasive with great powers, as argued by John Mearsheimer.[171] China’s pursuit of great power status directly conflicts with pursuits by the U.S. to prolong its power primacy, leading the U.S. to strengthen its strategic footing in the region.[172] India’s regional power aspirations go against China’s great power aspirations, presenting an opportunity for China to contain India via adversarial states seeking to align with power allies (Pakistan, for example), mirrored by India’s embrace of its own powerful partnerships.[173] Japan and the U.S. exemplify a strong military partnership that seeks continued mitigation of China’s expanding influence with China and Japan’s tense history deepening competition between the two.[174] Iran’s interest in securing regional influence and combating U.S. influence aligns with the security pursuits of Pakistan and other Muslim majority states.[175] As these and other connections between states increase and evolve complexity deepens and resilience decreases.[176]
Interstate relations and national security do not represent the only sources of complexity. Diplomatic mechanisms tailored to individual states and foreign policy also contribute to deepening complexity within such a system. Divergence of foreign policy with a variety of states complicates navigation of nuanced alliance, adversarial, and partnership entities with the individualistic nature of entanglements between states contributing to the complexity of the system’s structure.[177] As partnerships and competition between states in the regions evolve, the ability to effectively navigate national security priorities effectively will become more difficult and result in more setbacks.[178] These setbacks, in theory, drive vulnerability rectification which, in turn, contributes to increased SOC per Bak’s paradox.[179] As SOC increases the resilience of this system will decrease leaving the system vulnerable to more failures and, as SOC increases, the inevitable yet unpredictable collapse of the system.[180]
By utilizing CIP theory, like Bak’s punctuated equilibrium, analysis of national security priorities and foreign policy can be more thorough, providing an added analytical layer to national security research. This analysis provides incredible benefit since gathering a variety of perspectives for conceptualizing systems and interactions can result in the implementation of more competent policies, supporting the continued enhancement of U.S. national security priorities domestically and internationally. Varied approaches in national security analysis provide a deeper understanding of favorable and unfavorable foreign policy options and the consequences of their implementation. Since PET assumes streamlining and optimization can promote SOC proliferation, states must have the ability to conceptualize how policy and setbacks from policy implementation could lead to increased SOC and bring a system closer to collapse.[181] The U.S., more so than any other state, has an interest in staying two steps ahead of everyone else since its power posture is directly affected by its ability to successfully maximize power and security acquisition via national security and foreign policy pursuits.[182] Due to an increasingly multipolar international system and revisionist threats to power primacy by China, the ability to maintain global power and influence will hinge on the U.S.’s ability to be adaptable and implement innovative policy to navigate complexities throughout Asia, as well as other regions around the world, in addition to successfully realizing national security objectives.
[1] Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security (New Jersey: Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2020).
[2] Lewis, Critical Infrastructure, 2020.
[3] Lewis, 2020.
[4] Lewis, 2020.
[5] Lewis, 2020.
[6] Lewis, 50.
[7] Lewis, 2020.
[8] Lewis, 50.
[9] Lewis, 50.
[10] Frank R. Baumgartner, Bryan D. Jones, and Peter B. Mortensen, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policy, eds. Christopher M. Weible and Paul A. Sabatier (New York: Routledge, 2017).
[11] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 55.
[12] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, 56-57.
[13] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, 58.
[14] Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure, 2020.
[15] Lewis, 2020.
[16] Lewis, 2020.
[17] Lewis, 2020.
[18] Bruce W. Jentleson, American foreign policy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).
[19] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).
[20] Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 2014.
[21] White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: White House, 2021). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[22] Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 2014.
[23] Jentleson, American foreign policy, 5.
[24] Jentleson, 8.
[25] Jentleson, 2014.
[26] Jentleson, 9.
[27] Jentleson, 9.
[28] Jentleson, 2014.
[29] Jentleson, 2014.
[30] Jentleson, 16.
[31] Jentleson, 2014
[32] Derek S. Reveron and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, National Interests and Grand Strategy, eds. Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 39.
[33] Reveron and Gvosdev, National Interests, 2018; Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
[34] Reveron and Gvosdev, 50.
[35] Reveron and Gvosdev, 2018.
[36] White House, Strategic Guidance, 2021.
[37] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, 2017). https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; White House, Strategic Guidance, 2021.
[38] White House, National Security, 46.
[39] White House, 2017.
[40] White House, 2017.
[41] White House, 50.
[42] White House, Strategic Guidance, 14.
[43] White House, National Security, 2021.
[44] White House, 2021.
[45] Lewis, Critical infrastructure, 2020.
[46] Lewis, 2020.
[47] Lewis, 2020.
[48] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 2017; Lewis, 2020.
[49] Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
[50] James Crabtree, “A Confused Biden Team Risks Losing Southeast Asia,” Foreign Policy, June 27, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/27/southeast-asia-asean-china-us-biden-blinken-confusion-geopolitics/.
[51] Crabtree, “Losing Southeast Asia,” 2021.
[52] Crabtree, para. 3
[53] Crabtree, para. 16.
[54] William J. Burns, “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy,” The Atlantic, July 14, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/united-states-needs-new-foreign-policy/614110/.
[55] Burns, para. 2.
[56] Burns, 2020.
[57] Burns, 2020.
[58] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 55.
[59] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, 58.
[60] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, 56.
[61] Ted Lewis, Critical infrastructure, 2020.
[62] Lewis, 2020.
[63] Lewis, 2020.
[64] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 56; Lewis, Critical infrastructure, 2020.
[65] Lewis, 2020.
[66] Lewis, 2020.
[67] Lewis, 50.
[68] White House, Strategic Guidance, 2021; White House, National Security Strategy, 2017.
[69] Jentleson, 2014.
[70] Weixing Hu, “The United States, China, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy: The Rise and Return of Strategic Competition,” China Review 20, no.3 (2020), accessed September 16, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26928114.
[71] Hu, “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 128.
[72] Hu, 128.
[73] Hu, 129.
[74] Hu, 130.
[75] Hu, 2020; Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 2014.
[76] Hu, 136.
[77] Hu, 2020.
[78] Hu, 137.
[79] Joshua Shifrinson, “Security in Northeast Asia,” Security Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (2019), accessed December 18, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26639672.
[80] Shifrinson, “Northeast Asia,” 2019.
[81] Shifrinson, 2019.
[82] Shifrinson, 27.
[83] Shifrinson, 34.
[84] Shifrinson, 2019.
[85] Shifrinson, 2019.
[86] Hideshi Tokuchi, “The Role of Japan in Sustaining Regional Order in East Asia,” Asia Policy 13, no. 2 (2018), accessed December 18, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26497765.
[87] Tokuchi, “The Role of Japan,” 32.
[88] Tokuchi, 2018.
[89] Tokuchi, 32.
[90] Tokuchi, 2018.
[91] Tokuchi, “The Role of Japan,” 34.
[92] Tokuchi, 2018.
[93] Tokuchi, 35.
[94] Tokuchi, 2018.
[95] Tokuchi, 2018.
[96] Tokuchi, 2018.
[97] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 2017; Lewis, Critical infrastructure, 2020.
[98] Lewis, 2020.
[99] Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
[100] C. Arunkumar and P. Sakthivel, “Challenges to National Security in India,” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 21, no. 1 (2017), accessed September 16, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48531512.
[101] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, “Security in India,” 115.
[102] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 2017.
[103] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 2017.
[104] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 116.
[105] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 117.
[106] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 2017.
[107] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 118.
[108] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 2017.
[109] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 2017.
[110] Arunkumar and Sakthivel, 2017; Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
[111] Ayesha Rana, “Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia,” Strategic Studies 38, no. 2 (2018), accessed November 16, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48539134, 17.
[112] Rana, “Strategic Stability,” 2018.
[113] Rana, 5.
[114] Rana, 6.
[115] Rana, 2018.
[116] Rana, 6.
[117] Rana, 2018.
[118] Rana, 10.
[119] Rana, 11.
[120] Rana, 13.
[121] Rana, 17.
[122] Michael Kugelman, “Washington’s Divergent Diplomacy in South Asia,” Foreign Policy, October 7, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/07/india-pakistan-wendy-sherman-visit-diplomacy-south-asia/.
[123] Kugelman, “Divergent Diplomacy,” 2021.
[124] Kugelman, para. 5.
[125] Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014; Kugelman, “Divergent Diplomacy,” 2021.
[126] Kugelman, 2021.
[127] Richard Haass, “America’s Withdrawal of Choice,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 15, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/article/americas-withdrawal-choice.
[128] Haass, “America’s Withdrawal,” 2021.
[129] Haass, para. 5.
[130] Haass, 2021.
[131] Haass, para. 7.
[132] Haass, 2021.
[133] Haass, 2021.
[134] Haass, 2021.
[135] Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
[136] Jentleson, 2014.
[137] Jentleson, 2014.
[138] Husain Haqqani, “Iran’s Revolutionary Influence in South Asia,” Hudson Institute, January 17, 2020, https://www.hudson.org/research/16472-iran-s-revolutionary-influence-in-south-asia.
[139] Haqqani, “Revolutionary Influence,” para. 4.
[140] Haqqani, 2020.
[141] Haqqani, 2020.
[142] Haqqani, 2020.
[143] Haqqani, 2020.
[144] Haqqani, 2020.
[145] Haqqani, para. 39.
[146] Haqqani, para. 40.
[147] Haqqani, 2020.
[148] Haqqani, 2020.
[149] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 56-57.
[150] Lewis, Critical infrastructure, 2020.
[151] Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
[152] Jentleson, 2014.
[153] Ralf Emmers, “Unpacking ASEAN Neutrality: The Quest for Autonomy and Impartiality in Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 40, no. 3 (2018), accessed December 18, 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26545299.
[154] Emmers, “ASEAN Neutrality,” 360.
[155] Emmers, 361.
[156] Emmers, 362.
[157] Emmers, 2018.
[158] Emmers, 362.
[159] Graham Ong-Webb, “Southeast Asia 2019,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2020), accessed December 20, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26938881.
[160] Ong-Webb, “Southeast Asia,” 3; Emmers, “ASEAN Neutrality,” 2018.
[161] Ong-Webb, 2020.
[162] Derek Grossman, “Biden Needs a Southeast Asia Policy to Counter China’s Pull,” Foreign Policy, December 16, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/16/biden-southeast-asia-asean-china-strategy-geopolitics/, para. 1.
[163] Grossman, “China’s Pull,” 2021; Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 2017.
[164] Grossman, 2021.
[165] Lewis, Critical Infrastructure, 2020.
[166] Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 2014.
[167] White House, Strategic Guidance,” 2021.
[168] Mearsheimer, 2014; White House, 2021.
[169] Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen, “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory,” 2017; Lewis, Critical Infrastructure, 2020.
[170] Lewis, 2020.
[171] Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 2014.
[172] Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
[173] Hu, “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” 2020.
[174] Tokuchi, “The Role of Japan,” 2018
[175] Haqqani, “Revolutionary Influence,” 2020.
[176] Lewis, Critical Infrastructure, 2020.
[177] Lewis, 2020; Reveron and Gvosdev, “National Interests,” 2018.
[178] Lewis, 2020.
[179] Lewis, 2020.
[180] Lewis, 2020.
[181] Lewis, 2020.
[182] Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 2014.
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Drew Readel graduated from Norwich University with his Master of Arts in International Relations, with a concentration in National Security, in August 2022.
