Last updated: December 26, 2022
Introduction
Despite the threat of military confrontation by the PRC in response to United States congressional officials visiting Taiwan, the number of congressional trips continues to grow this year. This paper argues that foreign policymakers should consider China’s strategy: coercion and cooperation with ASEAN members to put pressure on the U.S. The argument relies on the assumption that the PRC does not invade the island of Formosa, which would be a poor decision given the support the U.S. has toward Taiwan, such as a $1.1 billion arms package this year (Capaccio, Ellis, and Flatley 2022). Doing so would result in a form of mutually assured destruction. This is due to the attention these trips have received, the support towards Taiwan among Democrats and Republicans, and recent aid that the United States has pledged toward Taiwan. China’s next option could be to place pressure on the relationship between ASEAN and the U.S. China can create new partnerships with countries, such as the Philippines, which would weaken an ASEAN alliance with the U.S. China can obtain easier access to the East China Sea by engaging in development projects and port systems with ASEAN members. If the U.S. doesn’t offer assistance, ASEAN members will be pressured to consider development projects and long-term investments with China.
Pelosi Trip Summary
The congressional trip to Taiwan has been met with controversy because China considers Taiwan a rogue province that will eventually return to the PRC, while the U.S. did not take a position on Taiwan’s status. By visiting Taiwan to meet with President Tsai Ing-wen, the U.S. recognizes Taiwan as an independent and sovereign country. This violates the United States’ diplomatic strategy of remaining undecided on Taiwan’s independence from the PRC. Pelosi vowed to support democracies, such as Taiwan, worldwide, which further elaborates the United States’ investment in Taiwan. While China has responded with military exercises and threats to preserve sovereignty, this paper will assume that China does not plan to invade Taiwan. President Biden, in a speech in May of this year in Tokyo, vowed that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if an invasion were to occur (Kuhn 2022). These are similar positions that previous presidents of opposing parties have expressed. As Thomas J. Shattuck points out, President Bush gave a similar statement saying that “he would do ‘whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself,’” while the Taiwan Relations Act signed by President Carter “provides the legal rationale for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan” to help defend itself (Shattuck 2022). Today, the U.S. is clearly showing its resolve to defend Taiwan. First, just this year the United States increased its defense assistance to Taiwan, such as “a potential $1.1 billion arms package to Taiwan that would include missiles and radar support (Capaccio, Ellis, and Flatley 2022). The United States also sent two missile navy cruisers through the strait (“US Sends First Warships to Taiwan Strait Since Pelosi Visit” 2022), This paper will assume that China decides not to invade Taiwan, instead challenging the U.S. on another front: its relationship with ASEAN members.
Within ASEAN, Vietnam currently maintains a substandard relationship with China regarding maritime boundaries and island claims. As outlined in Vietnam’s 2019 Defense White Paper, disagreements “regarding sovereignty in the East Sea are of historical existence” and “the resolution of disputes in the East Sea is a long-term, difficult and complex process” (“2019 Viet Name National Defense” 2019, 16). Just months before the congressional trip to Taiwan, however, China carried “out more than a week of military drills in the South China Sea in an area between its southern province Hainan and Vietnam” (“China Announces South China Sea Drills Close to Vietnam Coast”). While drills directed at Vietnam have not resumed since the congressional trip, the military drills near the Taiwan strait could lead to a spillover effect, especially if the U.S. continues to send officials. China could present more issues to Vietnam, a U.S. ally, given its “control of water flow to the Mekong Region from the Mekong-Lancang headwaters or Chinese military projection to the Gulf of Thailand” (Ordaniel and Ariel 2021). In the event of additional drills or expanded power projections in retaliation to congressional trips to Taiwan, Vietnam would rely on the U.S. partnership, thereby placing a strain on American military engagement. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, partnerships with the “United States, Japan, the EU, Australia, and India…. Have improved security collaboration, paying special attention to maritime issues” (Thu 2022). However, if the U.S. is sending its resources to the Taiwan strait, abandonment of Vietnam would become an opportunity for China to receive concessions from Vietnam in exchange for the halt of military exercises. Vietnam may be pressured to either settle agreements with China, engage in defense mechanisms on its own, or rely on nations besides the U.S. for support. Island claims made by Vietnam, according to the International Crisis Group, are “‘a bit excessive,’” as described by scholars, suggesting that Vietnam should “revise its baseline” (“Vietnam Tacks Between Cooperation and Struggle in the South China Sea” 2021). While Vietnam may lose on claims regarding baselines and island claims, “some believe that any agreement to which Hanoi would assent is likely to be better than no agreement at all” (“Vietnam Tacks Between Cooperation and Struggle in the South China Sea” 2021). In the event of prolonged U.S. focus on the Taiwan strait, the PRC could expand military exercises near Hainan and the Gulf of Tonkin, perhaps as a strategy to receive immediate concessions from Vietnam.
The United States’ Finite Resources in the East China Sea
While the U.S. does have the ability to move resources to the Taiwan strait while reassuring Vietnam with assistance, the United States does not have an infinite amount of strength to provide defense in the East China Sea. According to Jon Harper, as of 2019 “China had a 355-ship fleet, about 55 percent larger than in 2005,” while “the U.S. Navy has 293 ships in its battle force” (Harper 2020). The United States, however, has “11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers” (Harper 2020) while China launched its third carrier in 2022 (“China Upgrades Its Naval Force with Its First Indigenous Aircraft Carrier” 2022). While this may be a long-term view of the growth of China’s navy, the increase in carriers will make it easier for China to patrol areas off the coast of Vietnam and other ASEAN countries while American attention is focused on Taiwan.
Economic Engagement
China’s use of economic engagement with ASEAN members is another method of improving its relationship with them, with the added benefit of introducing ports to improve China’s patrolling capabilities. Within the benefits of the port system framework, this paper does not rely on fears regarding Debt-Trap Diplomacy. Debt-trap diplomacy can be best described by AIDDATA’s study, “How China Lends.” The study claims that terms of agreements give lenders to countries, such as a well-known case in Shri Lanka, “influence over the sovereign borrower, and effectively limit the borrower’s policy space to cancel a Chinese loan or issues new environmental regulations” (Gelpern et al. 2021). However, Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire point out that “Chinese banks are willing to restructure the terms of existing loans and have never actually seized an asset from any country” (Brautigam and Rithmire 2021). Instead, the introduction of ports to countries of U.S. allies allows easier access throughout the East China Sea and creates an atmosphere of confidence, opening the door for new partnerships away from the U.S.
One member of ASEAN, the Philippines, has recently resumed talks with China to “build three major railways,” while “China is also in talks with Thailand and Myanmar for similar rail deals” (Pitlo 2022). By engaging in additional projects, trust can be built between China and ASEAN members, providing an alternative to partnerships with the U.S. As described by Alvin Camba, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Maros “will move to maintain a strong relationship with Beijing while not completely abandoning ties with the West” (Camba 2022). The Philippines had moved closer to China during the Duterte Presidency, which had originally included the initiation of “three major railway projects with Chinese counterparts” before being scrapped this year (Heydarian 2022). Three months later, however, it appears that the Philippines will continue with the projects, according to Lucio B Pitlo III of Asia Times (Pitlo 2022).
By engaging in additional projects with the Philippines, China can not only improve their relationship but can also propose the creation of ports in the future. Just this year, China began supporting Myanmar with a “strategic port project in the eastern part of Shan state (Myanmar)” (Chaudhury 2022). As described by The Economic Times’ Dipanjan Roy Chaundhury, the move “will give Beijing unprecedented access to the Indian Ocean Region” (Chaudhury 2022). In 2019, China had the “opportunity to win control of a Philippine port facility at Subic, the former site of US military bases that were closed in 1991 amid a surge of anti-American nationalism” (Heydarian 2022). The move also raised concerns regarding the potential for “a Sri Lanka-style take over” (Heydarian 2022). While the facility was sold to a “U.S. equity investment firm” (“Former Hanjin Subic Bay Shipyard in Philippines Being Sold to Cerberus” n.d.), it suggests that concerns regarding the strategic obtainment of ports in the Philipines have occurred in the past. If the facility was sold to “two unnamed Chinese companies,” it would have provided the companies access to areas “50 miles north of Manila… just over 100 nautical miles from the contested Scarborough Shoal” (Heydarian 2022). Therefore, China’s strategy to combat American presence would rely heavily on the purchasing of port systems to retain and expand access and influence towards ASEAN members. The U.S., therefore, should support the continuation of funding towards ports to combat China’s competition.
Conclusion
Engagement or pressure toward ASEAN members, through actions described in this paper, or direct confrontation regarding Taiwan both challenge U.S. hegemony. This paper examines ways in which China can expand its influence and power beyond reclaiming sovereignty over Taiwan. While China has limited options outside a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, there are opportunities to place pressure on the United States’ relationship with members of ASEAN. Either by increasing maritime presence near countries such as Vietnam or engaging in investment projects with the Philippines, both strategies help China expand influence on ASEAN members while the U.S. remains focused on military exercises within the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. would benefit from focusing on ways in which its presence and partnerships with ASEAN could diminish if it focused on protecting Taiwan. While the United States continues to have an advantage in terms of the number of carriers, China’s growth could eventually usurp the U.S. It serves the United States’ best interests to continue to engage with ASEAN members through economic engagement and military reassurance. This leads to more opportunity and diversity in investment in ASEAN members, thereby benefitting the countries in question as well as the U.S. and China.
Cameron Whiteside is a Master of Arts student in Political Science at San Francisco State University and a graduate of UC Berkeley with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science.
