Last updated: Nov. 24, 2022
In its original conception, Europe meant for a general union to serve as a vehicle for economic cooperation between the major countries on the continent (France, Italy, Germany etc.). It began a general process of integration, which progressed steadily but slowly. First came the European Coal and Steel Community, which transformed into the European Economic Community, and later took on its present form–the European Union.
With most of the continent united under one banner, ideas of massed federalization and integration became widely accepted by the time of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). The concept of a general European army symbolizes an amalgam of the efforts undertaken by the European Union to further the integration of the continent. So far, the EU has only created a multinational force on paper. The creation of a multinational force remains a hotly contested issue among the member states.
The U.S. and smaller member states like Denmark have expressed concern that the creation of a genuine common European Army would undermine NATO capabilities. To an extent, those nations have a valid reason for concern.
NATO bases their entire defense framework around the concept of independent nation-states coming together, equipped with a common foundational doctrine to realize specific goals affiliated with the defense of the alliance at large.
A European army would not directly fall under NATO jurisdiction, it would follow the orders of the EU, most likely the European Commission in particular. Thus, the army would have no obligation to subordinate itself to the common foundational doctrine accepted by the alliance, nor would they have an obligation to participate in general NATO operations in case of war. Additionally, as both institutions would be independent of one another, communication between them would not flow from the top-down. Instead, the respective institutions would need to coordinate.
Despite its validity, the argument has flaws. Of the twenty-seven EU member states, six remain unaffiliated with NATO. Thus, NATO-affiliated nations in the EU could easily resolve issues of doctrinal coordination with NATO.
These nations could also resolve the problem with the command hierarchy. Nothing would stand in the way of the EU assigning some of its units under NATO command if (1) the fundamental military doctrines are compatible, and (2) the two entities are engaged in a common war (which would almost always be the case). Issues would only arise if one side developed a negative predisposition toward the other.
If then, an EU army is a practicable concept, why hasn’t the EU created one? A real need for an EU army has not arisen until the Russian invasion of Ukraine. NATO has shown the capability for handling problems it faced. Take the wars between the states forming up the former state of Yugoslavia as an example.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, most of the western world believed that large-scale wars were a thing of the past. The new international systems established created wealth and prosperity. In theory, all parties would see war as extremely undesirable. The fundamental goal of the acquisition of resources would no longer be relevant as they can simply be traded for at a cheaper price. However, recent events surrounding Ukraine have shown the possibility of large-scale conflict. That singular event has united the Europeans to an unprecedented degree while accelerating some previous trends aiming at greater integration.
Would the institution of the EU army unify the continent in the grand scheme of things?
Historically speaking, in 2005 the EU established a series of multinational Battlegroups as part of the larger goal of greater integration, following the admission of new eastern members to the block. Various deployable forces of the member states assembled these Battlegroups ad-hoc. They reached full operational capacity in 2007. The unit has been subject to the Council of the European Union and has come to resemble more of a framework for the use of pre-trained national military forces. The EU has not used the forces so far. For now, they exist on paper rather than in practice.
Recently, the approval of a wide-ranging “Strategic Compass” as part of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aims to establish the foundations for a stronger common defense policy across the EU. Work on the document began about 2 years ago, but the invasion has led to significant modifications. The CSDP has now come to include a definite set of limited aims, given budgetary constraints. These aims include the establishment of a 5000-strong quick reaction force with the goal of becoming fully operational by 2025.
Even though the establishment of an EU army would be practicable, its actual utility would be minuscule. A force of 5000 is equivalent in size to a brigade, which has regional utility at most. This would not serve as a genuine means of power projection. Rather, its utility would lie in its strength as a symbol. It would show the Europeans that they have the capability of projecting not just diplomatic or economic influence, but also military influence. The act of assembling a functional pan-European military force would enable the member states to cross a mental bridge that restrains them from genuinely projecting their collective power. Once the Europeans cross said mental bridge and assemble a token force, their general expansion could proceed, which eventually could greatly aid the European States in the common effort pertaining to European Federalisation.
Sources:
Camille Gijs and Jacopo Barigazzi (2022) “EU leaders approve updated military plan” https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leader-approve-defense-military-plan/
Elisabeth Braw (2022) “Is an EU Army Coming?” https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/20/is-an-eu-army-coming/
Maria Daniela Lenzu (2022) “A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/
Paul Raynolds (2007) “New force behind EU Foreign policy” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6441417.stm
Wedgwood, R. (1999). NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia. The American Journal of International Law, 93(4), 828–834. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555347
Gabriel A. Pierzynski is a final year student of BSc Philosophy and Politics at the University of Bristol.
